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

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JAPAN'S DEFENSE POLICY: FORECAST AND IMPLICATIONS.

by

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The purpose of the thesis is to forecast Japan's defense posture in the 1980's. The forecast is based on an indepth review of Japanese history and elements of national security including the East Asian security environment. Drawing from this, several key variables, including economic growth and rising nationalism, are analyzed for their effect on defense posture.

The major conclusion is that Japan is unlikely to move to a

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significantly stronger defense posture in the 1980's. Instead, Japan's most probable course is relatively minor improvements of existing defense forces within present overall defense capabilities. This means that the U.S. can expect to continue to shoulder the major responsibility for Japan's defense, while Japan makes a small but "respectable" contribution, which ~~eshews~~ eschews nuclear weapons.

A review of analyses and conclusions suggests that both nations need to reconsider their interdependent defense policies in order to provide an improved climate for continued strong ties. In particular, Japan needs to find ways to make an increased common defense contribution, while the U.S. needs to rethink the "~~1~~ 1/2 wars" policy and improve credibility.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to forecast Japan's most likely defense posture in the 1980's, considering both conventional and nuclear options. In order to make a reasonable forcast, a rigorous, quasi-scientific approach utilizing propositions and hypotheses is taken. While the data does not allow a true scientific methodology, this approach aids in objectivity.

The foundation for the thesis has two parts: a historical survey and an analysis of Japan's elements of security. The historical survey provides an understanding of the forces which have shaped the modern Japanese ethos and enables a better understanding of modern issues such as the survival of Japanese democracy or the potential for a rejection of the West. The elements of Japanese security are based on the Fredrick Hartmann approach to national power and include such factors as social-psychological forces, the influence of internal politics and foreign policy. This holistic approach is similar to strategic thinking on the part of many Japanese analysts.

In order to aid understanding and to make the notion of Japanese defense posture operational, a hierarchy of defense postures is described and linked to spending options. This allows the development of various propositions connecting such variables as defense policy and economic growth with defense posture.

The analysis leads from various threats faced by the Japanese to a review of present defense policy, the character of defense forces,

national attitudes, the impact of economic growth and spending restraints. Several broad issues concerning such factors as economic vulnerability, the viability of the treaty relationship with the U.S. and strained relations with the U.S.S.R. are also analyzed. Finally, nuclear weapons options for Japan are investigated. Throughout these analyses, an effort is made to provide both sides of critical issues and, thus, a wide range of views is presented.

The main conclusion is that the conditions and variables considered are not likely to cause Japan to move to an increased or more independent defense posture in the 1980's. Japan's most probable course will be a gradual improvement of existing defense forces within the present "realistic" defense posture, which relies on the U.S. to shoulder the major responsibility for the defense of Japan while Japan makes a small but "respectable," defensive contribution. However, Japan will retain at least the potential to attempt defense expansion, if vital interests are threatened. As for a nuclear weapons option, this course is extremely unlikely because of the continuing "low posture" conventional defense and a host of major disadvantages for a nuclear course under most conditions.

Based on the analysis and conclusions, several implications are discussed. One key implication is that U.S. policy makers need to recognize that the Japanese are not likely to move toward a greater role in East Asian security or to make substantial defense improvements. Essentially, their defense costs relative to the U.S. or to NATO nations are very low. One option, which redresses disproportionate defense expenditures and increases Japan's security role without threatening

her neighbors, is for the Japanese to make greater contributions to economic areas which affect security from a holistic perspective. Another implication is that U.S. policy makers need to review the Asian withdrawal and, particularly, the "1-1/2 wars" policy, which provide a downgrading of the western Pacific relative to Europe and concomitant resentment among many Japanese.

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INTRODUCTION

The intent of this paper is to examine Japanese ational defense policy in order to determine her most likely course for the next decade and to review the implications for U.S. policy. The approach shall be to provide an analysis of major historical factors and, using this as a foundation, describe the prominent features of Japanese national security. Applicable theory and definitions will then be stated. Based on this preliminary analysis, a series of propositions and issues will be introduced and evaluated.

The propositions and issues are based on a literature survey and are intended to provide a range of the more plausible casual relationships between various variables and defense policy. The propositions and issues consider the major variables or forces which may effect a change in Japanese defense posture, both alone and in conjunction with other factors. They include the principal defense issues facing Japan. The propositions support the basic problem which the paper will address: to determine what form Japanese defense posture is likely to take in the 1980's.

The propositions are worded as questions and are listed as follows:

(P1) Will the defense buildup program lead Japan to an increased defense posture?

(P2) Will rising nationalism lead to resurgent militarism causing increased aggressive military power?

(P3) Will a changing national consensus on present defense policy cause an increased defense posture?

(P4) Will economic growth cause an increased defense posture?

(P5) Will an increased conventional defense posture lead to adoption of nuclear weapons?

The variables portrayed in the propositions help determine policy. There are other forces which also influence policy, and the analysis will cover these as issues. It will also be necessary to consider the interaction of variables.

The selection of these propositions deserves further explanation. Analysis of the first proposition will help describe where the present defense program is headed. Considering the second proposition, a concern for a rise in Japanese militarism is not new. A main goal of the postwar occupation forces, the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States, and the Japanese government was to prevent a rise of Japanese militarism of the 1930's ilk. The proposition concerning a consensus on defense is considered independently of the militarism proposition. This is done because it is possible, as shall be shown, for defense capability to rise without a concomitant increase of militarism. The proposition concerning economic growth is important because economic growth is what would nourish an increased defense posture. Finally, one would expect for an increase in conventional defense to preceed a development of nuclear capability; however, should it be determined that such an increase is unlikely, the nuclear option shall be analyzed as a general issue.

There are several reasons for taking this kind of approach. First, it is vital to take a historical perspective for a full understanding

of issues and variables. Second, defense policy is more than military capability, and any detailed review of defense policy should include an analysis of the major factors which comprise national security. Third, a rigorous application of definitions and theory, as well as use of propositions and, when possible, hypotheses, though tedious, will aid in objectivity. While the most scientific approach would be to develop each proposition into a hypothesis and statistically evaluate it, the data available normally will not support that approach. Fourth, the sequencing of the propositions will lead the analysis from an analysis of the threat, to an understanding of the direction of present policy, to underlying attitudes, to various internal and external forces and from these to the ultimate defense expansion: nuclear weapons capability. Finally, the separation of the ideas of militarism and rearmament will help to establish the character of defense forces. We shall initially review Japanese history.

CHAPTER ONE

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

It is essential to provide an indepth review of Japanese historical factors in a study of this type for several reasons. First, this analysis provides an indication of the perspective from which the study is approached. Second, it is necessary to establish a set of underlying trends in a country where many traditions persist to provide better meaning to current phenomena which create the security environment. Finally, Japan is unique and poorly understood. Myths must be destroyed and correct analysis made of historical forces.

In this review, all of Japanese history is considered with primary emphasis on modern Japan. A focus on the development of Japanese ethos is taken to provide a foundation for properly understanding the less tangible social, cultural and attitudinal forces which affect policy. The primary concerns are the military first and then the political, cultural, social, and economic forces which have shaped Japan.

Historical Geographic Influence

Japan was blessed throughout history with a climate and location which fostered the development of a strong and prosperous nation. Although resources were lacking, the climate was temperate with adequate rainfall and soil, despite a preponderance of mountains, to support development, when augmented by the plentiful sea and trade.[1] Japan's location was isolated enough to provide cultural insularity and natural defense, yet close enough to other areas of civilization to be

influenced by their development. Japan's situation is sometimes compared to Great Britain, but Japan has been historically more isolated than Britain, her straits with Korea being five times as large as the straits of Dover.

Japan is a small nation, smaller than France but larger than Britain, Italy or the two Germanies combined. Japan's population has been large for her size (today 11M - sixth in the world) with a need for emigration developing in the 19th century. The Japanese Islands are part of a vast archipellago which shields the Northeast Asian continent. The seas surrounding have traditionally served as a means of communication, transportation and contact with the outside world, as well as providing abundant fish, the main source of protein in the Japanese diet.

Unlike both Korea and Britain, Japan was never invaded by an outside army, and unlike Britain her peoples were reasonably united in both ancient and feudal times. Japan's isolation provided the opportunity to voluntarily adapt customs, and the indigenous culture was maintained. This made the Japanese more conscious of visible foreign influences, and one other result has been periodic emphasis on "native" traditions in reaction to foreign influence.[2]

Early History

The earliest writings of Japanese date to the 8th century A.D.[3] By popular legend and Shinto religious beliefs, early Japan (sometime near the 1st century A.D.) was developed and expanded by the Emperor, a descendent of Heaven.[4] The feudal system had its origins between the 9th and 12th centuries as provincial authorities gained the right to

maintain armed bands made up of warriors called bushi (warrior) or samurai (retainer) for protection. A style of warfare emerged quite similar to that of feudal Europe with samurai fighting mounted on horseback. Largely because of the expense of this style of combat, warriors were from among the nobility.[5]

Despite the development of a warrior upper class, the Heian era, from 794 until 1185, was a remarkable age known for peaceful pursuit in the arts and for the absence of violence and bloodshed. The traditional religious belief was the native Shinto, a blend of superstition and awe of nature, which emphasized clan solidarity and military valor. This helped to strengthen the family as the major social institution and provide a foundation for later aggrandizement of the warrior. Buddhism was borrowed from the Chinese during this period and, while it did not drive out Shinto, it began to have a profound impact on thinking.[6]

In Europe the feudal period was a dark age, a regression from ordered antiquity, while in Japan, despite chronic warfare during the first part of feudalism, the feudal period was an improvement over antiquity. The system of government was more efficient, economy and trade improved, and the arts periodically flourished and developed. However, as a result of frequent warfare, the provincial warriors became social and political leaders, and their ethos became dominant.[7]

Early feudal warriors lived close to the land and people. Life was simple with frugality, martial arts, bravery and stoicism stressed as major virtues. This required self discipline and development of character. The extreme form of duty was death over surrender. The

practice of suicide in defeat may have begun to avoid torture but was institutionalized by the 12th century in the form of seppuku (disembowelment), which showed a stoical disdain for suffering.[8]

The legacy of ancient and early feudal Japan continues to influence the nation into the modern age. The Emperor system exists today unbroken in lineage. The family is a major social force, and the Emperor, while no longer technically deified, is the head of the Japanese family. Traditional culture and arts are highly respected and flourish today alongside Western and pop culture. Buddhism and Shinto, having an almost symbiotic relationship, continue to be the major religions with many people subscribing to both, although religion is more secularized and less intense in the postwar era. One major change, the demise of the warrior, exists curiously among the other consistencies. It may be said that much of modern Japanese ethos had its roots in ancient traditions which have been shaped by the insularity and cultural homogeneity of the nation and a willingness to occasionally adapt outside influences.

Tokugawa Period

In the 16th century, three successive military leaders managed to establish a government which lasted 250 years. The period from 1600 to 1867 was unique: two-and-a-half centuries of rule by one family enforced by a dominant samurai class and centralized feudal bureacracy which provided peace and stability.[9]

As in Europe, feudal Japan saw extensive religious activity and the mixture of various influences. The Confucian influence emphasized such traits as order, harmony, proper conduct, and wisdom. This con-

fronted traditional thought which emphasized free expression, spontaneity of action, and natural order. Several primary Buddhist sects developed, some appealing to common people, some to samurai, and others to artistocracy. Zen Buddhism played an important role in teaching the warrior to face death honorably and indifferently. As a major cultural force in Japan, Zen has had a long history of compassion and charity.[10]

The Tokugawa period had a profound effect on society. The gradual withdrawal of samurai from the countryside to newly established castle towns soon cut off the warrior's ties with the land. In the town the samurai was now provided with a stipend. Many samurai became part of the daimyo's (lord's) bureaucracy. Simultaneously, a merchant class began to flourish as each town became an economic center, and a market economy developed. While the warrior tradition was kept alive, the samurai's status declined in peace. Simultaneously, the merchant's status grew. By Confucian logic he was becoming a more valuable member of society.[11]

The samurai faced a pronounced contradiction between his military ethic and bureaucratic occupation. Confucian scholars sought to reconcile this dilemma by urging a balance between book learning and martial arts. Gradually the samurai became part of the scholarly class, and education became more important. However, the samurai class also diminished in power. Government economic problems made it difficult to pay hereditary stipends. By the end of this period, many samurai were forced to take demeaning steps to alleviate financial difficulty such as intermarriage with the merchant class or work as commoners. The growing wealth of the merchants enabled them to buy their way

into the samurai class.[12] Generally, by the 19th century, the rigid class structure had begun to dissolve.

Meiji Period

Driven by the influence of Western nation states and the 1853 arrival of Commodore Perry, the Shogun took stock of his situation in 1867 and decided to return his ruling mandate to the Emperor. A political struggle ensued with the oligarchial Meiji government emerging victorious in 1869.[13] The Emperor Meiji and his innovative statesmen would preside over the modernization of Japan.

The political conflict over the opening of Japan caused the emergence of a movement to revere the Emperor and expell the barbarian advocated by a mixture of young samurai, farmers, priests and scholars, who were mostly fiery extremists ruled by passion rather than reason. Yet their ideals were influential. These shishi were the forerunners of ultranationalist extremists of the 1930s and today. They favored the morality of the East and the technology of the West. Many of them became Meiji leaders.[14]

The motto of the Meiji Restoration was "Military Strength and Prosperity," the former a precondition for the latter, a result of the impression of Western military power on the Japanese and the samurai origins of the leaders.[15] But the same leaders recognized the need to change to obsolete samurai-based military and the feudal class system. The samurai class was ended, replaced by a conscripted military force from all classes. The samurai's hereditary pension was commuted in favor of a final payment, and he lost his hereditary privileges. Simultaneously, commoners gained new rights such as taking names, marrying between classes, managing their own farms, and serving in the

military.[16] Many former samurai became (or already were) bureaucrats, soldiers, teachers, or police because they were the best educated. Others did well in politics, the arts and business; but for some the transition was difficult, and, despite government assistance, there was samurai unrest.[17]

While many samurai resisted their demise, many commoners also resisted their newly acquired right to serve: conscription. Internal personnel problems caused military leaders to take steps to instill discipline and traditional samurai values. In spite of various problems, Meiji conscription was a success. It led to successful prosecution of imperial wars, and it helped Japan accomplish modernization. While many of the samurai clans had been dissolved, others helped staff the officer corps, and some carried on their traditions, although advancement was based on merit, and persons of non-samurai origin could also advance.[18] Thus, the new Army reflected the samurai ethos as well as that of rural and urban commoners, all under the influence of Western military advice and example.

Westernization was led by the Emperor Meiji. Foreign products, ideas, and customs enjoyed widespread introduction. But this did not mean the total abandonment of things Japanese. Instead a dual Japanese-Western existence began to produce a lifestyle different from the West, yet one which included Western influence. Despite intellectual groups, who warned of uncritical adoption of Western ideas, Western intellectual thought found its way into areas such as philosophy, international law, education, economics and government. Libertarian and utilitarian philosophies were introduced. In some cases, the Japanese

emulated Western custom. But the extreme of emulation would soon produce a reaction. In the mid-1880's, Japan began to direct diplomatic action towards revision of exploitive Restoration treaties, which contributed to a nationalistic reaction against Western influence.[19]

Western influence on education began to wane in the 1880's, and a more traditional path was followed. Part of it had a militaristic character. For example, military drills were instituted in schools, and dormitories were organized like military barracks. The conservative movement resulted in the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 which stressed confucian values of loyalty and filial (emperor) piety and was solemnly followed by school officials.[20]

The beginnings of democracy were a result of underlying economic and social discontent and an internal government dispute over whether to invade Korea in 1873. This dispute caused several ex-samurai to leave the government and begin a movement for establishment of a popular democracy. Ultimately this and a movement for popular rights led to the 1889 Constitution and the formation of two parties. While the Constitution guaranteed in theory certain rights and liberties, they were in practice limited. Imperial power remained broad. The new popular assembly or Diet had some influence, but it was limited in authority by the government, which remained oligarchial in character, dominated by the genro (elder statesmen).[21]

With abandonment of isolation in the mid-19th century, it took only twenty years for Japan to turn slowly toward expansion. Natural poverty coupled with geographic location and historical isolation, fostered a strong sense of national vulnerability, cultural uniqueness

and group cohesion, attitudes which persist today. This was used by Meiji leaders to develop an aggressive form of nationalism. Following the Western example, Japan forced the opening of Korea in 1875 and established an unequal treaty including extra-territoriality, an enigma vis-a-vis Japan's dislike of this Western practice. Western competition for influence in the Far East reached an apex in the 1880's, and this was considered a threat to trade and peace by many Japanese. In general, it may be said that Japanese imperialism was a reaction to Western imperialism, combined with increased expectations for growth, an attitude of vulnerability, and nationalism.[22]

The importance and confidence of the military increased with victories against the Chinese (1894-95) and the Russians (1904-05). The 1889 Constitution had given the military a semi-independent role by creating a system where the military dealt independently with the Emperor and could cause a cabinet to collapse by withdrawing the ministers of the Army and Navy. A reputation for militarism was established by use of this technique, and it also surfaced in other areas, a result of the importance attached to the military by Emperor Meiji. In a few examples, Imperial grants were made to the armed forces when the Diet disapproved money. The Emperor was generalissimo: he visited, reviewed, and promoted the military. Basically, reverence for the Emperor and the government structure became tools for the military to operate around civilian government. This would ultimately lead to military hegemony over political institutions.[23]

While the roots of militarism became well established during the Meiji period, it was not a universally accepted phenomenon. Because

of the tradition of service to the Emperor, no thought was ever given to civil-military relations, and they remained tenuous. There was no tradition of public support for the military. The public did not share the more aggressive and extreme military values. While the military was developing high self-esteem, many Japanese were critical of the conduct of servicemen returning from the Russo-Japanese War, and antagonism developed. Even though all cabinets from 1901 to 1913 were led by military men, the period preceeding WWI was marked by frequent military-civilian disputes. However, despite some decline in military influence and the absence of public support, the military remained an influential force.[24]

In 1912, General Nogi, hero of Russian War and former Chief of Staff, and his wife committed ritual suicide after the death of the Emperor Meiji, in his honor. Representing a different ethic, Professor Tarimoto Yutaka, a Doctor of Literature at Tokyo Imperial University, criticized the Nogi suicide as extremist and archaic. As a result, he was expelled from his university post, and until the end of WWII, it was taboo to criticize General and Mrs. Nogi. The General was enshrined as a Shinto God of War, and his memory became an ultra-nationalist tenet.[25] This illustrated the dominance of the traditional ethos and its continuing conflict with more modern values.

Japan emerged from the Meiji period as a major world imperial power which had industralized substantially. While the culture was homogeneous, the clash between East and West was mirrored by clashes within society such as between advocates of democracy and advocates of spiritual traditionalism. Craig's viewpoint is that the Meiji Restoration was

unlike the French revolution, which had been a change in the name of new values. Instead, it was a change in the name of old values, which had remained strong. Pyle offers another view when he notes that many of the old values had to have been undermined for the revolution which followed the Restoration to have ensued. Either way, the young leaders who came to power in 1868 had many revolutionary attributes. They were willing to examine new values and in the process reorder Japanese society. By the end of the period, the traditional samurai ethos had been altered by new concepts stressing libertarian and utilitarian values and the old concepts of an emerging common class. But underneath, the traditional ethos remained strong.[26]

Taisho Democracy

WWI occupied the Western powers in Europe and left Japan relatively free to act in East Asia. Unlike the Western Front, military operations were swift and successful, and economic benefits were enormous for Japan, a result of allied needs and Japanese imperialism in China and East Asia. While the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese War had been well received in Japan, there was popular opposition to Japan's limited role in WWI, particularly what some viewed to be the senseless death of soldiers. Opposition increased to the Siberian Expedition in 1918, made even more unpopular by local economic problems.[27]

In 1918 the leaders of a movement to preserve a constitutional government had gained power, and a party cabinet had been established. This group worked to undermine the power of the military and the peerage. From 1920 to 1923, liberals sharply attacked militarism causing reduced military budgets, personnel and influence. Postwar recession

also contributed to the reduction of the armed forces, although conservatives insured the basic force was preserved. Hostility towards the military was extreme in the cities, and soldiers quit wearing their uniforms in public, a trait similar to the post-Vietnam era for the U.S. Army. Meanwhile, the Army had recognized that the reason for German defeat lay in technological superiority of the Allies coupled with the failure of the German people to stay behind the Army in its hour of crisis (Ludendorff thesis). They took little comfort in having a technologically inferior position in an environment of Western ideologies which seemed to undermine their basic values, and many sought to restore harmony between the Emperor's armed forces and the people.[28]

The 1920's may be considered a liberal decade. Newspapers, which had developed during the Restoration, became an integral part of the Taisho democracy, having a large impact on public opinion and government. Scientific and cultural activity reached a high point. Intellectual thought showed elements of humanism, idealism, socialism and freedom. The arts, theater, and architecture reflected a blend of Western and Japanese ideas. Even the Communist Party flourished briefly during this decade. Proletarian party activity helped to spark government action to address the plight of workers and farmers.[29] Socialist and Communist Party movements never made much headway, yet their growth reflected the growth of political freedom, although the subsequent stifling of their activities was indicative of the clash between traditional and modern concepts.

Labor and Socialist leaders as well as other political groups helped to spark reformism in government, and democracy held sway until

the assasination of Prime Minister Inukai in 1932; thereafter, it fought for survival until 1940. Thus, despite the rise of militarism in the 1930's, the nation had the experience of democracy to fall back on, even though it was rejected as Japan pursued an aggressive course.[30]

Prewar and Wartime Militarism

During Taisho democracy, public opinion towards the military began to change as a result of a nationalistic reaction to malignment of the Japanese in the 1923 Naval Conference and other slights by Western powers. A complete reversal of public opinion followed the excellent military performance in the aftermath of the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake.[31] From 1925 to 1930, the Army established a youth training program in schools, a reservist organization and took steps to modernize. However, by 1927 it was evident that Japan lacked the resources to fully modernize, and this fueled a debate between traditionalists and modernizers. It would eventually contribute to the growth of extremist factions in the military.[32]

Prewar political developments involved a complex rise and fall of democracy which included continual cabinet turnovers and the demise and rise of military influence, highlighted by fait accompli military foreign adventures which the foreign ministry and government were unable to control, even when military-led cabinets were in power. In 1930, the Japanese agreed to an inferior combat ship ratio at the London Naval Conference. Navy leaders objected, and this contributed to an undermining of civilian control, particularly when members of political parties would play upon military discontent for political gains. Soon, world depression fueled the flames of rising nationalism and imperialism.

As in Germany, democratic institutions were not well enough established to withstand the opportunity for economic, social and spiritual revival, which expansionism seemed to offer.[33]

In 1931, following several years of minor military incidents, the General Staff in Manchuria manipulated a staged bombing incident to exert greater Japanese military control and expansion in Manchuria. The government acquiesed to the Army, but also said operations would not be expanded; however, the field army ignored this policy causing the cabinet to split and fall. The government was dragged along behind field army action, and in 1932 the Manchurian puppet state of Manchukuo was established. China protested. On the Lytton Commission's recommendation, Japan was condemned by the League of Nations and subsequently withdrew in 1933. Some historians say that WWII began for Japan in 1931 in Manchuria.[34]

The 1930's were characterized by extremist violence, the discrediting of political parties, degrading of academic freedom, military interference in politics and foreign policy, and a zealous development of national supremacy, all built upon severe economic and social conditions in a developing industrial state. As a result of success in Manchuria, ultranationalists, increasingly impatient with cabinet and Army moderates who tried to maintain order, perpetuated violence. Cabinets turned over frequently. Freedom of thought succumbed in 1935, and for the next ten years a strict surveillance was placed over political theories.[35]

Most historians note that fascism in Japan was not a mass movement as in Germany or Italy. Instead it was developed through a coalition of military officers and rightist civilian leaders who wanted a dicta-

torship and restoration of traditional values. But it was not until the Pacific War began that the government was really in control of this sequence of events, and throughout this period, Japan never produced a Führer. So no one leader may be held responsible, and many historians have pointed out Japan's almost uncontrollable path towards WWII. Even when respected military leaders were premiers, they were unable to control the extreme factional rivalries in the military. The Imperial Way Faction embraced the Emperor and stressed spiritualism. It was opposed by the Control Faction which advocated tight control of the military and technological development. The Imperial Way Faction generated violence and assassination, and it eventually emerged as the stronger of the two.[36]

The hegemony of the Imperial Way Faction caused modernization to lag, while spirit took priority over advanced weapons. The Army in particular developed the capability to suffer and fight relentlessly, but lacked the equipment and economic power to defeat a modern western power. Ultimately, Bushido (the way of the warrior) failed Japan in the Pacific War just as it had failed to prevent Western intrusion in the late Tokugawa period. Extreme forms of samurai traditionalism such as kamikazi attacks also failed.[37]

It is important to recognize the impact of the loss of the war on the military. Under the Emperor Meiji, Japan had arrived at great power status, foreign adventures had been successful, and the military had become an elite force. From 1885 to 1945, 28 percent of civilian cabinet posts and over half of the prime ministers were military. While a high degree of professionalism had developed, the idea of civilian domination of the military had not been introduced. Despite

the military's elite status, a tradition of civilian discontent had developed, beginning perhaps with commoners' distaste for samurai supremacy in the Tokugawa period and traced through opposition to conscription in the 1870's, pre WWI military-civilian conflict, and post WWI military-civilian conflict. Yet the intervening periods often showed some support for military action, particularly when it was successful.[38] In sum, the total public attitude toward the military from 1870 to 1941 could be described as ambivalent.

The Imperial Army which fought the Pacific War was founded on traditional warrior values which were similar to those which shaped the modern profession of arms in general. The Control Faction in particular represented basic traits of military professionalism. However, political manipulations, assassination and insubordination bore little resemblance to the Meiji armed forces, the basic samurai ethic, or to military professionalism.[39] While many traditional samurai characteristics were evidenced during combat, and various individuals and units behaved honorably, the military as a whole did not demonstrate the tradition, and the net effect was for the nation to blame in part militarism, and the military for defeat.

Postwar Reform and the Fall of Militarism

The defeat and U.S. occupation significantly changed Japanese history. It succeeded because it built on earlier trends and institutions, while dissolving certain dysfunctional systems. 1945 to 1952 was a period of transformation and a new beginning for a people numbed by defeat. The transformation might be compared to the Meiji Restoration. Both involved major changes in Japanese attitudes and institu-

tions, and both were a result of Western influence. Yet the postwar occupation was quite different in some vital respects. It was a revolution imposed by a conquering force molded on the force's own system of democratic, Western values. It was not as profound as the Meiji Restoration: much of modernization had already been accomplished, and the people were generally receptive to change and democratic ideas.[40]

The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, focused on a postwar policy in Japan of demilitarization, democratization, and participation in a peaceful world economy. But the Allied occupation was really a U.S. occupation under the Supreme Commander Allied Forces Pacific (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur.[41] The Japanese, bewildered and anxious in defeat, expected a harsh occupation, but to their surprise they found it benevolent. Their sense of duty to nation was easily transformed into a sense of duty to reform through cooperation with the allies, and this was reinforced by the shock of discovering the regional antipathy among Asian peoples toward Japan, a result of imperial elitism, militarism, and wartime atrocity. The primary area of benevolence, aside from the generally positive attitude of the reformers, was the system of occupation government. While Germany was governed by the conquerors, Japan was ruled by SCAP through the Japanese administrative structure. Despite purges, this institution remained sound, and after two years of reforms MacArthur gradually turned over the control of the government to the Japanese.[42]

The Japanese people had been psychologically unprepared for defeat, and blame was focused on the militarists, ultranationalists and govern-

ment in general. In this environment, the Americans approached their tasks with almost evangilical zeal. Their prime objective was to disarm Japan and prevent the revival of a Japanese threat. Other objectives were to introduce democratic ideas and, through such programs as educational reform, to develop a psychological infrastructure supportive of democracy. The circumstances produced an ideal climate for change. Contributing factors were the presence of the occupation force, the total discredit of the wartime government, a surprising liberal democratic tradition among the well-educated, traditional Japanese administrative skills, and trained human resources.[43] One might say the occupation force was a catalyst to help the Japanese develop a democratic tradition in the face of the total discredit of militaristic authoritarianism.

The occupation began by dismembering the empire, demobilizing the military, dissolving paramilitary and ultranationalist organizations, and removing old leadership. De-militarization and disarmament were accepted easily. Some historians puzzle over this because they overemphasize traditional military rule and "reverence for the art of war."[44] But the Japanese ethos is a mixture of many philosophies, samurai traditionalism being only one of several important forces. When seen in historical perspective, it is not surprising that postwar de-militarization was successful.

Another postwar reform was political amnesty for those who had opposed the prewar and wartime governments - communists, socialists, liberals. Another step was the trial of war criminals and purge of all of those in certain positions in the old order. Seven of twenty-five "war criminals" from Japanese leadership, including Prime Minister

Tojo, were executed. Moreover, 200,000 former military and government high officials were purged from office. While there was some injustice, these reforms paved the way for younger, more receptive men in office and for the development of political parties, which soon ranged from the liberals and progressives (conservatives who survived the purge) to socialists (moderates to leftists) to a fringe of leftists and many small local parties.

The most significant reform was the 1947 Japanese Constitution, which was widely accepted despite obvious American influence. It transformed Japan from a state founded on Imperial divinity and feudal tradition to a state founded on parliamentary democratic procedures which guaranteed human rights, gave power to the Diet, decentralized the government and made the judiciary independent. The Emperor was defrocked, although he remained an important state symbol. The practical change was small--he had never really been in power--but the theoretical effect was to weaken the Shinto tradition and myth (Shinto as a state religion also ended), break with the Meiji past, and secularize religious beliefs.[45] While there are criticisms of a Japanese self-identification problem resulting from this change, it has continued to be widely accepted.

Land, labor, economic, and education reforms were substantial. A key economic change was the demise of the major zaibatsu holding companies and financial undermining of zaibatsu families. While some of these families made a subsequent recovery, the Reischauer analysis has stood the test of time: the old zaibatsu system has been replaced by an economy which encourages competition among various companies.

The system is neither oligarchial nor monopolistic, although various old zaibatsu concerns, no longer of a pre-war ilk, exist within the new system. Closely associated with economic reforms were education reforms, which eliminated teaching of traditional morality. While some would ultimately be modified, the reforms have survived subsequent efforts at revision.[46]

Postwar Recovery, Democracy and Rearmament

In 1948, reform became recovery as SCAP priorities shifted, a result of international forces including the advent of the cold war and a perceived internal threat from the Japanese left. In 1948, SCAP limited labor's right to strike and purged an estimated 20,000 communists from government posts. In 1949, SCAP authorized the Japanese government to review 1946 and 1947 purges so that by 1951 almost all of those purged for wartime actions or offenses had regained political rights, although only a few again became influential. (After all, they had been severely discredited.) In 1950, as a direct result of the Korean War, the U.S. considered Japanese rearmament and a National Police Reserve of 75,000, a para-military force to deal with insurrection, was founded.[47] These policies from 1947 to 1950 were linked to the external threat posed by the Soviet Union, and through communism the external threat was linked to an internal threat. The Soviets had kept 600,000 Japanese prisoners since 1945. In 1947, the first group returned, well indoctrinated with Soviet ideology. Notions of political freedom had spawned the post-war regeneration of the Communist Party in Japan, and the communists had promoted strikes in 1947 which had threatened the government. Thus, these policies were

a reaction to a perceived internal threat from the left connected to the Soviet threat.[48]

In 1951, SCAP (now General Mathew Ridgway) permitted the Japanese to examine postwar policy, and a confrontation between conservatives and the left ensued. Any effort by the conservatives to undermine reforms and return to traditional ways was called "reverse course" by the left, even though the 1947-1950 period had already witnessed revisions influenced by the cold war. Conservative proposed changes did not contemplate prewar militarism or authoritarianism, although they did advocate some fundamental revivals of prewar ideas. Despite the conservative nature of the government in the 1950's, only minor "gains" were made, the most notable being the development of a small, defensive armed force. Conservatives found it impossible to elevate the Emperor to his old position, to revise the Constitution, to centralize the police or to teach traditional ethics in education.[49] The counterbalancing of forces which prevented the conservatives from their "reverse course," demonstrated the postwar efficacy of the party system.

From 1952 to 1960, the conservative (Liberal-Democratic merger in 1955) membership in the House of Representatives fell from 70 to 65 percent, Socialist membership rose from 25 to 30 percent and the Communists ceased to be a major factor. The Socialist minority in the Diet, combined with public opinion, the press, and majority factionalism prevented the "reverse course." The conservatives stayed in power, however, because the Japanese preferred to protest without taking the step of defeating a candidate who was reliable and "sincere," and the

Socialists and others represented an ideology without firm Japanese roots, which purveyed a potential threat.[50]

Treaty Negotiations

Both in America and Japan, there was no consensus on how postwar Japanese security should be maintained. While major rearmament was out of the question, the growing cold war indicated the option of unarmed neutrality could probably not depend on Soviet good faith. In 1947, the Japanese proposed retention of U.S. bases in Japan, although this course was fought by the Socialists who advocated unarmed neutrality. The government agreed in principle, but in practice they recognized a more reliable guarantee was required, one based on U.S. military power in the Pacific. The result of extensive negotiations was the 1951 (bilateral) Security Treaty, which recognized Japan's right of self defense, the willingness of the U.S. to maintain forces in Japan, and the use of American forces on the request of the Japanese government for internal security. Treaty provisions caused significant controversy including charges of violation of Japanese sovereignty, humiliation, and conflict with Article 9.

Generally, the 1951 treaty was a result of Dulles pushing for major Japanese rearmament and Japan attempting to find a viable, mutual arrangement. While the Japanese were able to avoid major rearmament, some were disappointed by the final outcome of the less than mutually balanced, unidealistic treaty. Desiring an explicit security guarantee, the Japanese had at least obtained a kind of *de facto* guarantee by U.S. troops being stationed in Japan. Prime Minister Yoshida recognized that to make the alliance "mutual," Japan would have to build its own

defense forces. Despite opposition, the U.S. alliance was accepted as necessary by most; however, people were uneasy about being drawn into the cold war, an anti-nuclear weapons "allergy" had developed, and nationalism was rising.[51]

Between 1952 and 1957, Japanese diplomacy was driven by goals of placing security arrangements under a UN Charter, obtaining an explicit U.S. security guarantee, and replacing the 1951 treaty. From the inception of this treaty, the Japanese obtained security arrangements by initiating and building up the SDF, while allowing the U.S. to back away from the Dulles position. To avoid any return to militarism, constitutional guarantees of civilian control were emphasized, the defense organization was ranked below ministerial level, and the armed forces were called "Self Defense Forces" (SDF). While they remained small, they were increased in size taking on the responsibility for internal and external security. In 1956, the U.S. acknowledged their contribution to the common defense. While there were internal political problems over constitutionality and national consensus of the SDF, by 1959 Japan's gradual rearmament policy had paid off, for the U.S. was willing to negotiate a new, more equal treaty, which resolved nuclear problems, asserted residual Japanese sovereignty over territory occupied by the U.S., and was concluded in 1960.[52]

Negotiations over the new treaty went well, and both sides were satisfied. The new treaty established firmly security arrangements which had evolved since 1947 and had not been clearly defined. It committed the U.S. formally to the defense of Japan, committed Japan to internal security and participation in external defense, and gave

Japan a voice in deployment of U.S. troops from Japan. That is, the Japanese were given the right of "prior consultation" for the commitment of U.S. troops from Japanese bases to locations outside Japan. At the same time, Japan rejected the use of her troops outside of Japanese territory. Japanese leadership had set out to establish the proper security arrangement between the U.S. and Japan and to satisfy voters with this policy. While the new, mutual relationship helped demonstrate Japanese independence, popular acclaim failed to materialize. Instead huge protest demonstrations rocked Tokyo creating a major national crisis.[53]

The Treaty Crisis

The 1960 Mutual Security Treaty (MST) crisis was produced by a complex set of forces which combined to produce a post-occupation reaction to Western influence. Specifically, events in the 1950's to silence the Japanese left, reminiscent of previous prewar suppression of freedom, produced the only postwar cooperation of the left (including all Socialists). Efforts were directed using extreme confrontation politics at the treaty and the political leadership. Other attitudes, such as growing nationalism, reluctance to be drawn into the cold war, dislike for foreign troops in Japan and disunity among conservatives (over these same issues) contributed to an irrational, explosive environment. Faced with this situation and convinced of the need for the treaty, Prime Minister Kishi used unilateral tactics to win Diet approval. This un-Japanese (and undemocratic) approach was given widespread publicity by the press and caused widespread resentment. People remembered Kishi's WWII association with the Tojo cabinet and

associated Kishi with defeat and subservience. As a result, hostility toward him grew. Ultimately, even though the treaty was ratified, the riots and general dissention caused a visit to Japan by Eisenhower to be cancelled, and Kishi was forced to resign amidst violence from the extreme left and counterviolence from revived rightists. Surprisingly, the Kishi resignation calmed the storm.[54]

One significant theme of the 1960 MST crisis was the growth of Japanese nationalism. Some have linked that to the "reverse course" growth of rightist groups; however, in his definitive study on rightist influence in Japan in 1960, Morris noted that nationalism was devoid of preward militarism, and that rightist groups were fragmented with little influence.[55] At the other extreme, nationalism permeated the Japanese left taking away some of the threat of internal insurrection and contributing to future splits within the left and between the left and the major communist powers. The new nationalism was built on pride in economic achievement, reaction to foreign influence, and ambition for an increasing regional and world role. In the 1960's, nationalism had become fashionable because it was not linked to prewar militarists or the fringe of small, postwar rightist groups. It included new ways for the citizen to look at his country and a new basis for pride. The Security Treaty issue caused the new nationalism to coalesce and allow frustration to be shown. At this point, some argue that the Japanese had become "more secure in their self respect and more confident in their future."[56]

A New Order in the 1960's

With the Ikeda succssion, excitement abated, left wing unity

dissolved (to include a Socialist Party split), parliamentary debate resumed, and the LDP continued to do well in subsequent elections. Conservatives advocated the treaty for increased independence, a greater veto over U.S. actions, and generally increased security. No one advocated collective security similar to NATO. The concept was alien to Japan. The Socialists, who internally encompassed a left-to-moderate spectrum of attitudes on security, continued to advocate unarmed neutrality: Japan would develop a course between the East and the West with reduced armament the method.[57]

In the 1960's, growing economic prosperity and the passage of time helped to further reduce postwar anxiety and undercut the left's economic position. Unions discovered that cooperation with management was more profitable than conflict, and management developed the company into an analogy for the Japanese family tradition. Throughout society, satisfaction increased, and the new Japanese national pride was demonstrated in the excellent conduct of the 1964 Olympic Games in Tokyo.[58]

American scholars who had participated in the occupation looked back on it in 1968, and, despite criticism of some SCAP procedures, they concluded that it was successful. By the end of the 1960's it was clear that there had been no massive replacement or revision of reforms. A Japanese type of democracy had been established, and political change had been consistently marked by moderation. The difference between 1945 to 1968 and 1932 to 1945 was remarkable, but the themes of the 1924 to 1932 period helped to explain why such a difference could exist. An optimistic view was that time had reinforced the institution of democracy.[59]

By 1970 Japan's extraordinary economic growth, increased standard of living, and increased potential for a more active world role caused the people to become introspective about who they were and what their role should be. Some analysts like Herman Kahn predicted the extreme of a new Japanese economic and military superpower. Others predicted an increase of pacifism with many analyses ranging between these extremes. Within Japan, resistance to an increased military role continued, and pacifism remained strong, although many Japanese were frustrated by Japan's passive foreign policy and a negative image of the past. The government gradually lowered defense spending as a percentage of the budget and as a percentage of GNP; however, economic growth allowed absolute spending increases which facilitated a gradual defense buildup. Japanese postwar trade protection continued, despite the need for liberalization of trade procedures. It was in the midst of this confused environment that a series of policy shocks by the U.S. government and the 1973 world oil crisis would profoundly affect the Japanese.

Japanese History in Retrospect[60]

As we examine Japanese history, four major themes emerge which aid in understanding. The first theme is the pronounced effect of traditional customs practiced over generations. Many of Japanese present day social practices and values have been present for generations to include such things as decision making practices and the importance of the family. A second theme is the ability of the Japanese to adapt ideas from outside cultures without disturbing their basic cultural continuity, while at the same time rejecting

ideas like the class system during the Meiji Restoration and authoritarian militarism in 1945, when they prove to be dysfunctional. A third theme, perhaps a subset of the second, is the struggle beginning with the Meiji Restoration between the authoritarian (but not totalitarian) tradition and more liberal groups which advocated constitutional or parliamentary government. The oligarchs were dominant during most of the Restoration, but liberal groups gradually gained influence until they became dominant during the Taisho Democracy in the 1920's. But one should not "blame" the oligarchs. Their revolutionary zeal and toleration for new ideas allowed the democratic forces to grow. A fourth theme is the Japanese attitude toward Western nations. Since the mid-nineteenth century this attitude has vacillated between receptivity and rejection, and there is a basis for it in premodern history as well. One sees a pattern of acceptance then rejection of Chinese influences during the prefeudal and early feudal period followed by a similar but less pronounced cycle in reaction to Western traders in the middle and late feudal period. Relations with the West were originally hostile during the Perry opening in 1853-54. Following the Meiji Restoration we see a period of Western acceptance in the 1870's and 1880's, often to the extreme of emulation, followed by rejection and nativism reaching a high point during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. This in turn gave way to a period of acceptance in the 1920's followed by aggression and rejection in the 1930's to 1945. From the end of WWII to 1970 we see a period of acceptance with perhaps a rejection cycle in the late 1950's culminating in the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty crisis. The cyclical

nature of Western acceptance and rejection has led many historians to note growing signs of Japanese disenchantment with the U.S. and to consider the possibility of a future split. We will also see other ways that an understanding of history will aid in understanding the dynamics of defense policy.

CHAPTER ONE

ENDNOTES

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[5] Ibid. Craig and Reischauer, op. cit., 1978, pp. 39-40.

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[7] Ibid. (Ike), p. 10; Craig and Reischauer, op. cit., 1978, p. 49.

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[11] Previous two paragraphs from Pyle, K. The Making of Modern Japan, 1978, pp. 6-7, 25.

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[13] Yasoaka, A. Understanding Japan, No. 38 International Society for Educational Information Inc., Tokyo, 1978, p. 7; Hane, op. cit., pp. 264-66.

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[18] Hane, op. cit., 1972, pp. 301-03; Coox, op. cit., 1972, pp. 41, 42; Buck, op. cit., 1975, p. 29.

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[25] Seward, J. Hara-Kiri, 1968, pp. 97-98.

[26] Hane, op. cit., 1972, pp. 384-90; Pyle, op. cit., 1978, pp. 60-62.

[27] Coox, op. cit., 1972, pp. 47-48; Yasoaka, op. cit., p. 95.

[28] Ibid. (Yasoaka), pp. 94-97; Buck, op. cit., 1975, pp. 30-31.

[29] Ibid. (Yasoaka), pp. 80-84, 94-97.

[30] Hane, op. cit., 1972, p. 391.

[31] Coox, op. cit., 1972, p. 50.

[32] Buck, op. cit., 1975, p. 32.

[33] Hane, op. cit., 1972, pp. 450-53.

[34] Yasoaka, op. cit., 1978, pp. 99-101; Coox, op. cit., 1972, p. 52.

[35] Ibid. (Coox), p. 52; Hane, op. cit., pp. 459, 470-72; Ike, op. cit., p. 25.

[36] Ibid. (Hane), pp. 102-104.

[37] Buck, op. cit., 1975, p. 33.

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[47] Ibid. (Beasley), pp. 289-90.

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[55] Morris, I.I. Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan, 1960, pp. 392-95.

[56] Packard, op. cit., 1966. p. 337.

[57] Ibid., pp. 334-35.

[58] Reischauer, op. cit. (note 1), 1974, pp. 295-96.

[59] Goodman, op. cit., 1968, pp. 5-6.

[60] Some of the observations and the basic idea for this section are taken from Ward, R.E., Japan's Political System, 1967, pp. 22-23.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORY AND DEFINITIONS

It is necessary to provide some key definitions and theory associated with fundamental ideas and variables analyzed in this paper. Of major concern is the relationship of the military to government for which Huntington and Janowitz will be primary sources. Also important are discussions of defense policy, national security and how the military fits into the democratic model. Finally, it will be necessary to define and theoretically discuss some of the key variables--nationalism, militarism, national consensus, economic growth, economic crisis and defense posture. Other variables and terms will be made clear in usage. First, underlying theory will be examined.

National Security

A fundamental raison d'etre for the existence of national government is to insure the security of the state. Security is the condition which allows the sovereign state freedom to determine its own course, unimpeded by interference from outside states or in coordination with the collective wishes of several states. As nation-states become increasingly interdependent, they must adjust to the needs of other states. In this environment, they must consider the dynamics of outside forces when determining their own course, yet the notion of national security is what allows this to be done, whether it be collective or individual.

National security is also the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from threats. There are two basic themes to theoretical research depending on whether the focus is conflict or cooperation. If one assumes that conflict is likely, the theme is increasing national security by maximizing national power in conflict situations. If one assumes cooperation among nations is possible, then the theme is increasing national security by facilitating international cooperation and minimizing national power. In practice, in international relations, both themes are operative. The major powers assume conflict is possible and try to increase national power to increase national security. But the major powers also try to practice cooperation and at least discuss reducing the military element of national power. In Japan, both themes are present, although the cooperation theme dominates. Japan actively seeks international cooperation while minimizing the military element of her national power.[1]

National power is the capability to cause other nations to practice policies favorable to the wielder of the power, which they might otherwise not adopt. It is also the ability to prevent other nations from exercising national power over the holder.[2] Both, or the second component alone, may be present. In the second sense, national power and national security are nearly synonymous, because national security reflects more of a defensive, reactive or passive idea. In Japan the two ideas are nearly synonymous, since postwar Japan has not and does not appear likely to force another nation to abide by Japanese will, nor does Japan use the potential to do this as a lever in international relations. Thus, the term national security will be used for Japan since

it properly conveys the passive sense of Japanese security policy.

National security is more than just military security. It is composed of an interrelated set of elements which should be considered together. They run the gamut of every characteristic of a society, although some are more important than others. Therefore, it is necessary to narrow them down to the most essential and to choose a typology for analyzing them. In this paper, the elements chosen are social-psychological, political, economic, foreign policy, and military. They are considered within an international framework of forces and trends which influence them.[3] These "elements" are similar to "variables", but they do not lend themselves to operational definitions so the term "element" is used. The approach shall be to use this construct to describe Japan's national security picture. This will enable better understanding from a holistic perspective of the primary focus of the paper which is military security. The elements of national security are analyzed in Chapter 3.

The Military Profession

Because he must be the one to suffer most, the professional soldier seldom favors war. Instead he favors preparedness. He is keenly aware of potential threats, and he acts to counter them religiously. He normally contributes a cautious, conservative, restraining voice in the development of policy. That is, he is unlikely to favor a provacative, chauvanistic course. In this sense, the prewar Japanese military was not professional in its overseas adventurism.

From the basic ethics followed by Western military professional tradition, politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and

participation in it undermines the profession. The officer may vote, but he must remain neutral in political activity. The prewar Japanese officer corps was anything but politically inactive and, by this measure, was unprofessional.

The military profession serves the state, and to be properly employed, it must be organized into the state hierarchy to best serve state policy. Loyalty and obedience are the highest virtues. In Japan these virtues were ingrained in society as part of the samurai tradition, yet they were in little evidence during various prewar acts of disloyal factionalism, assassination and disobedience in the 1930's. Instead of serving the state, the military gradually gained hegemony over the government.

In the 17th and 18th century in England and America, the military was under control of the crown, as was also the case in Meiji and prewar Japan. In the West, parliamentary groups adopted the term "civilian control" as a means of increasing parliamentary power in relationship to the crown and the military. England and, later, the United States were successful in establishing civilian control, but Japan was not for various reasons which were reviewed in Chapter 1. Thus, militarism was able to rise in Japan.[4]

Ideally, the military security of the state then is assured by a professional military force which is under civilian control, organized into the state hierarchy to best serve the state, apolitical in nature, conservative in foreign relations, and a realist kind of advocate of military security to preempt every considered threat. In the case of prewar Japan, the military was not professional in many instances. But

the postwar Japanese military is a different kind of force which more closely resembles this description of a professional force.

Civil-Military Relations

In Janowitz's democratic model, civilian political elites exercise control over the military through a set of formal rules which define the function and exercise of military power. The officer corps is a small group with distinct career patterns which are separate from the state: they obey the government because it is their duty. Civilian control is also assured through the strength of democratic political institutions and various institutional arrangements provided for by constitution, law and practice.

Janowitz is concerned about the possibility of a rise of "unanticipated militarism," which develops from a lack of an effective military tradition, inadequate institutional controls, and/or inconsistency (or failure) of civilian leadership. In the post-industrial state, technological development and the continuing refinement of war making capacity may tend to undermine the democratic model in several ways. In one example, technical capability of military professionals may lead to their entrance into heretofore civilian areas. In another example, the military may become more of a business organization and less of a military organization, "civilianizing" the military elite, reducing its awareness of the traditions of the democratic model, and undermining the effectiveness of the military profession.[5]

According to Huntington, there are two types of civilian control: subjective and objective. Maximizing power of civilian groups relative to the military is subjective control. It identifies the control of the

military with the special interests of one or more civilian groups. Objective military control is that distribution of political influence between military and civilian groups which is most conducive toward raising professionalism of the officer corps. Subjective control civilianizes the military and uses a variety of forms to exert hegemony over military leaders. In prewar Japan, subjective control was exerted by civilian forces as Taisho Democracy rose. Objective civilian control militarizes the military, makes it a tool of the state and focuses on the development of military professionalism. Objective control is only possible when a military profession arises. It may also help cause a rise of professionalism, although objective control is impeded by many civilians who think in terms of subjective control. Thus, Huntington observes that a high level of objective civilian control is a rare phenenomenon among modern Western powers. A combination of objective and subjective control is most likely.

There should be a balance between civilian control and military influence which allows objective control while providing the military the opportunity to influence policy to the extent that it provides a conservative, restraining voice. If the prevailing ideology is antimilitary, the military is able to influence policy only by sacrificing professionalism and becoming "civilianized." On the other hand, the military can raise its professionalism and maximize civilian control by renouncing all political influence and "leading a weak, isolated existence, divorced from the general life of society." As the ideology shifts and antimilitary attitudes decline, military influence may be increased without undermining professionalism. If this does not take

place, then the equilibrium between military influence and the ideology of society may be disturbed.[6]

Definitions

In Chapter 1, working definitions were provided for some key terms. In this section, most of the variables used in the propositions and some other key terms will be conceptually defined.

Nationalism underlies the cohesion of modern societies and contributes to the legitimacy of political authority. The nation state is considered an indispensible framework for all activity. The common denominator of nationalism is a sense of group loyalty among the people toward the nation-state. Loyalty may be shown as support for certain national interests such as independence, security or expansion. In these cases, preserving tradition is important. There are other manifestations of nationalism as well. Various types may coexist, or one type may become predominant. The goal is always the assertion of national identity. The means varies from increasing military force to increasing economic productivity, to developing culture: any or all may be present.

Nationalism, though it is a recent phenomenon traced generally to the French Revolution, has undergone several changes. Originally, it was an elite movement. Today it is a mass movement in which people have demanded increased participation in government and society (to a lesser degree even in Communist states). Nationalism may be a divisive force capable of producing tension among neighbors over sovereignty disputes, or it may be an important factor in preventing ideological hegemony by the great powers. It may combine with democracy to reinforce democratic institutions, or it may become a causal

determinant of aggressive militarism, fascism or communism. Nationalism is an emotional force which can lend itself to solidifying national unity and developing national pride, or it can create an atmosphere where hysterical, ultranationalist tendencies take hold during a crisis. The potential range of possibilities for the nature and effect of nationalism is wide, and it may be either a useful or a destructive force.[7]

The extreme form of nationalism discussed in Chapter 1 is ultra-nationalism, and it shall be defined as that type of extreme nationalism which promotes either isolation and frantic girding of national security, or aggressive expansion and unbridled development of military power, and advocates circumvention of existing political institutions. Ultra-nationalists in Japan are also called rightists. They differ from the right-wing of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party because their position is rigid and uncompromising, and they often advocate violence or other illegal tactics. Some rightist groups are criminal organizations. However, according to Dixon, both the right-wing and the rightists (or ultranationalists) share the same basic political views, described as follows:

a. Desire to amend the constitution, particularly Article 9

b. Advocate substantial rearmament and/or development of nuclear weapons: oppose three non-nuclear principles and non-proliferation treaty

c. Fervently oppose communism

d. Agitate for return of norther territories

e. Advocate restoration of Emperor and other traditional values including state Shinto.

f. Advocate using force to prevent Socialist or Communist accession to political power.

Dixon notes that this description correlates to theoretical description by Lipset and Roab of the American right, described as preservationist, nostalgic and preoccupied with bygone days. It also tends to be either isolationist or aggressive in foreign outlook and advocates military superiority through technology and extensive defense spending.[8]

It should be noted that rightists and right-wingers differ principally in that the latter intend to work within the system, are not extremists, and are willing to compromise. Similarly, right-wingers and conservatives differ primarily in degree. While conservatives share some of the above stated views, none of them are shared to the same degree, and item e. regarding the Emperor is usually not shared at all. On defense, conservatives normally advocate gradual improvement of defense capability.

A question for Japan is whether rightist groups are gaining influence and, if so, will nationalism begin to take on an ultranationalist hue, thus becoming a casual factor of militarism?

Militarism has several different connotations. Huntington uses it almost synonymously with "military traditionalism" or "military professionalism," and in this usage, the connotation has a positive value. Most often, especially in this paper, militarism has a negative value as in Janowitz's "unanticipated militarism." It is the antithesis of military professionalism. Militarism is a doctrine or system that values war and accords primacy in state and society to the military. It implies a policy orientation and a power relationship. Violence in

foreign affairs is justified by appealing to virtues like courage, patriotism and honor. In other words, classic military virtues are extolled, but the military lacks professionalism. In the extreme, privileges are conferred on the warrior, and armed forces determine institutional arrangements, citizen rights and resource allocation. In a less extreme form, subjective civilian control of the military gives way to the military sharing power in a partnership with other civilian groups. The ideal type for this form was Japan from 1931 to 1941.

Militarism is not necessarily limited to men in uniform. It may include acts by civilian or paramilitary groups as well. Rightists or right-wingers may be militaristic without effect on the military. Militarism suggests a disregard within the military for professional bounds and the lack of technical competence among soldiers: a breakdown of professionalism. In a nonmilitarized society, the soldier is an apolitical agent and specialist. In a militarized society the soldier is a political principal and a policy generalist, competent to deal in a full range of foreign and domestic policy. His military expertise then is probably low. This is most often seen in developing nations.

In modern democratic society, one step toward militarism may occur when the armed forces make veiled or overt threats of sanctions if military advice is unheeded. Threats may include resignation, withdrawal of support, publically announced disagreement, disclaim for the regime, and refusal to execute orders. More than a few isolated instances would be necessary. Enough of these sanctions would be

required to enable the military to begin to influence policy covertly and gradually gain hegemony over rival civilian power factions. Militarism may also occur when domestic sources call for military leadership because of disagreement among political leaders, revolution or social disorientation. Particularly when leaders of the armed forces have been part of a respected ruling class, as in Tokugawa and Meiji Japan, this is possible. If democratic institutions and particularly the concept of civilian primacy are strong, then military professionalism will remain high and militarism will not rise. Even if called upon to lead the nation through major disaster or civil strife, the military will soon reestablish civilian institutions. Thus, an instance of military control over the government does not necessarily equate to militarism.

Generally then, militarism is most likely in states where democratic institutions and military professionalism are not well developed. In mature political cultures, militarism is unlikely as armed forces normally engage in prescribed modes of influence. However, a demise of political institutions, an unheeded threat, and extreme domestic turmoil may contribute to a rise of ultranationalism, providing there is a decline, diffusion, or absence of military professionalism.[9]

Other definitions of militarism are possible. Those of a "progressive" persuasion tend to confuse militarism with overseas economic activity, an increasing military force, or a large defense industry. This kind of definition easily leads to a misunderstanding of the phenomenon of militarism for militarism and overseas economic activity are not clearly related. One may exist without the other.

Rearmament and defense industry are also confused with militarism, yet each may appear with or without militarism. Generally, it is correct to understand militarism to be a phenomenon which includes increased military influence in an environment of subjective civilian control and decreased military professionalism.

National Consensus is a term which is frequently used and misused by authors who analyze Japan. It is a very important part of decision making and tends to add extra weight in Japan to public and media opinion. It means several things: first, that a majority of the population favors the policy; second, that opposition groups have had a chance to be heard with some ideas incorporated into the policy; third, that the political process has reached this conclusion, and the Prime Minister is prepared to support the policy. Sometimes the first feature is called domestic consensus, and the second two are called political consensus. Because of the need for national consensus, decision making is a slow and tedious process, and opposition arguments are carefully considered. Even though there may be no apparent agreement between majority and opposition groups, a behind-the-scenes compromise or a toning down of an extreme policy usually results to show due consideration for the minority. The less powerful the majority, the more of a compromise the consensus policy will be. Thus, Japanese national consensus is quite likely to be a result of popular opinions and political process which considers all viewpoints and reflects a middle-of-the-road course.

Economic growth is a variable which may be measured, although there is disagreement over what measurement to use, and economic crisis is a

variable which may at least be noticed. In this paper, two measurements of economic growth will be used. One will be Gross National Product (GNP), which is the measure of an economy's level of production, and the other will be the size of government purchases (budget), which is a measure of how much a government is able to influence various social, economic and military programs. There are limitations in the use of GNP. The method for determining it, depending on whether an expenditures or income approach is used, includes factors such as consumption expenditures by household or indirect business taxes, which may vary in ways misleading to the analysis. Also, leisure time and standard of living are not accurately reflected. Another limitation is that GNP is concerned solely with market transactions and does not consider non-market activity. Despite these limitations, GNP is the conventional, objective and simplist measure to use. One component of GNP is government spending. It will be used in order to see what share is devoted to the military, since this will enable a judgment to be made about the opportunity cost of military spending. The opportunity cost of an item is defined as terms proposed in the budget which must be sacrificed in order to obtain more of the original item.[10] Economic crisis is a more subjective notion of an internal or external factor which causes disruption of the economic system. It includes such phenomena as a depression, recession, or embargo. Economic vulnerability is the susceptability to internal or external forces which may cause a crisis.

Defense posture is the basic dependent variable in the study, and it may be measured on an ordinal and internal level. It is a statement

of the military security policy of the nation in terms of its observable characteristics. A change in the overt policy or in several of the characteristics may show an increase or decrease in defense posture. In a most general sense, a nation's defense posture is the ability of the military to assure national security and carry out the directed missions of the government. Of course to do that the other elements of national security must allow it. An increase in defense posture implies enhanced ability, and a decrease implies reduced ability. Defense posture is relative to military threats. If the threat increases while defense posture stays the same level, it is possible for defense posture to go down. In this paper, Japan's defense posture will be made operative by providing as one measure a hierarchy of plausible defense postures for Japan in the conceptualization of the problem, Chapter 4, and using defense spending as the other measure.[11]

CHAPTER TWO

ENDNOTES

[1] International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 77, 1968, pp. 40, 41; Japan is clearly passive in power. No effort is made to use the military as a policy lever. An effort is made to use the lack of military power as a kind of virtue for seeking diplomatic solutions. Foreign policy statements emphasize the importance of peace and harmony and Japan's renunciation of military force for other than self defense purposes. International action reinforces this policy posture.

[2] See discussion of power in Isaak, A.C., Scope and Methods of Political Science, 1975 (rev.), pp. 236-241.

[3] Adapted from Hartmann, F.B., The Relations of Nations, 1973.

[4] Much of the four preceeding paragraphs taken from Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 1964 (rev.), pp. 63, 65, 68, 69, 81.

[5] Preceeding two paragraphs taken from Janowitz, M., Military Institutions in Developing Nations, 1977 (rev.), pp. 188-190.

[6] Preceeding two paragraphs taken from Huntington, op. cit., 1964, pp. 83-84, 90-94.

[7] Preceeding two paragraphs taken from National Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 77, 1968, pp. 63-65; Morris, I., Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan, 1960, pp. vii, viii, ix.

[8] Preceeding two paragraphs developed from Dixon, K.H., The Extreme Right-Wing in Contemporary Japan, 1975 Ph.D. Thesis, Fla. State Univ.; Axelbank, A., Black Star Over Japan, 1970, p. 90; and Morris, op. cit., 1960, p. 407. It should be noted that the term uyoka for "right-wing" is considered demogatory, and this label is placed on the most conservative of LDP politicians by convention. Of course, from a leftist perspective, everyone to the right, whether moderate or conservative, is called uyoka.

[9] Much of preceeding five paragraphs taken from International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 10, 1968, pp. 300-304.

[10] Solomon, L. Economics, 1972, Chap. 8 and p. 26.

[11] Chapter 4 conceptualizes plausible defense postures and makes this variable operational.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Along with the history of Japan, the elements of national security form a foundation for understanding Japanese defense policy.

(1) Social-Psychological Element

There are many forces impacting on the modern Japanese. We have already examined the immense historical forces of the Japanese effort to become the first modernized Asian nation. This section examines various social and psychological forces, typical of a growing industrial society and of a traditional society attemp'ing to fully modernize, which have hammered away at Japanese character causing some scholars to comment that the Japanese today are confused about their meaning in the modern world. However, other equally respected scholars have marveled at Japanese success at coping with social problems, developing an excellent educational system, and adjusting to change. Many Japanese are feeling the strains of rapid growth, while others are adjusting remarkably well to such a phenomenon as urbanization. Many are concerned about the conflict between materialism and Japanese cultural essence, while others seem to be able to maintain Japanese traditions in spite of Western intrusion.[1] In sum, the nature of today's Japanese society lies somewhere between the extremes of disruption and harmony. The Japanese seem to be coping with changes well, although many are concerned about what effect the changes will have.

Ishida observes that conformity in Japan means conformity to the changing situation, and the Japanese have proven over and over again their ability to adjust.[2]

With this general observation of Japanese society in mind, it is necessary to narrow this analysis by focusing on several important parts of the social-psychological element of national security. They will include a description of relevant Japanese national attitudes., some basic personality traits, and family/group relationships. We shall attempt to see how they affect political behavior, decision-making, and, indirectly, defense policy.

Social Trends and Attitudes

The late 1960's brought a postwar investment boom, general contentment and a bright outlook for the future; however, the end of rapid economic growth and the tough decisions which began to face the Japanese in the early 1970's, along with the changing world order heralded by the Nixon Shocks, brought increasing pessimism regarding the future of daily life and society.[3] As a possible result, the government began to shift economic emphasis slightly from growth to social well-being. This is reflected in a leveling off of real GNP growth to 5-7 percent from 10-11 percent and in an increase of government expenditures in social and environmental programs in the late 1970's.[4]

The impact on the ruling party of the shift in emphasis is as yet unclear. The LDP continues to gradually decline in power, just barely holding on to a Diet majority in October 1979 national elections. In a study of opinion polls, Kojima notes that a sense of alienation towards

the ruling party is gradually increasing, and that the number of people who identify with no particular party has increased as well. Apathy, predominantly among the youth, is recognized by Ike. However, Kojima also observes the rise of positive attitudes toward democratic ideas: increased consciousness of human rights, increased positive evaluation of the constitution, and growing opposition to leaving things in the hands of politicians.[5] Interestingly, the decline of the LDP appears to correlate to the rise of democratic thinking, suggesting a continuing move towards increased effectiveness of the opposition; however, the opposition remains fragmented.

Some other attitudes are noted by Kojima. There is a waning of extreme "pro" and "anti" feelings toward other nations, although Japanese still have difficulty with foreign relationships. There is a weakening of the tendency to idolize Europe and America and a regaining of self confidence, especially as a result of economic success. The economic nature of national success has brought about a change in the nature of modern nationalism. It is achievement oriented, and focused on economic success and traditional self-identification rather than international aggression, military power, or racial supremacy.[6]

Olsen and Reischauer observe that in Japan the compartmentalization of values is important, a mirror of the compartmentalization of family life. It allows the addition of new values without excluding old values, and it permits modernization in harmony with nature, as efforts to improve the ecology have shown, although there is some conflict, and a major question still remains of whether the end result will be harmony between economic growth and social order.[7]

Several basic trends in Japanese society may be discerned. First, the strengthening of democratic ideals is apparent, and, coupled with the passage of time, this strengthens the institution. It is difficult to imagine today the overthrow of democracy in Japan. Second, many modern values to include materialism have resulted from modernization; however, conventional social norms and much of traditional family life remain, a result of compartmentalization of values. While many people do feel a sense of loss of identity, one may expect most Japanese to adjust well to the changes. Third, a different type of nationalism has developed from economic growth and social change. Unlike its pre-war counterpart, it is inward looking and nonaggressive. Fourth, increased emphasis has been placed on social well-being, although econominc growth continues to be paramount.

The Japanese Character: Giri, Amae

Considering these general social trends, it is now possible to look more closely at the psychology of Japanese behavior. Ruth Benedict's analysis of the Japanese character is regarded by most scholars as an important foundation for further study. Publishing in 1946, Benedict identified giri to one's name as the duty to keep one's reputation unspotted. It includes acts of etiquette, stoicism in pain, and sometimes violent acts to remove a slur or insult. Giri is partly the cause of a need for a "safety valve," an outlet for keeping giri intact, in Japanese politics and social relationships. Benedict emphasized putting the aggressive side of giri in context with all other non-aggressive behavior that goes with it such as self-control, duty, and honoring a commitment. However, the continuing popularity of traditional theater such as The Tale of the 47 Ronin, a true story of the vengence

and honorable suicide of 47 samurai retainers during the Tokugawa period, is evidence of the continuing operation of an extreme giri type of force in Japanese culture.[8]

Benedict's efforts to explain wartime fanaticism and authoritarianism caused significant controversy in the postwar era. Subsequently, Japanese scholars offered different explanations. Maruyama saw pressures of prewar modernization leading Japan inevitably to war and identified problems in the "premodern" Japanese national character in accepting democracy. He emphasized the importance of status and family standing: a hierarchical order in society. Interestingly, his findings supported Benedict's.[9]

In other studies, the Japanese are sometimes described as having no sense of individually derived selfhood; instead, self is seen as part of a family or group through which identity is developed through amae, which means establishing a reciprocal dependency relationship within the group where the leader (father) is benevolent and the followers are loyal.[10] Takeo Doi developed the concept of amae initially as a way of helping him explain differences between himself and American students during a period of study in the U.S. in 1950. He saw the concept of amae as a thread running through Japanese society.[11] More recently, Mitchell has shown that understanding the concept of amae is essential to understanding Japanese political behavior and decision making.[12]

Amae may be translated as "reciprocal dependence," It is an institutionalized behavior and may be seen as a positive emotion involving a need to be dependent, and, in the extreme, as a potentially destructive force promoting abberant behavior when one is denied it. Takeo Doi notes

that amae is present in Western society, but it is ubiquitous and pronounced in Japanese society, a result of fostering parental dependency into the fabric of family life. Japanese children are led to expect nurturance, attention and love: in other words, they are spoiled. They are encouraged to amaeru: to seek emotional dependency; to seek benevolence. They become dependent and in return they expect benevolence. For our purpose, what is important is to understand how this psychological behavior pattern influences political group behavior and decision making, and to understand the struggle to find an outlet for creative expression so that amaeru will be possible.

Some analysts have observed that the Japanese are submissive and, therefore, prone to authoritarian rule. These analysts usually mistake submission for reserve and fail to account for the intricate, widely prevalent force of amae. The decline of the traditional attitude of allowing leaders to take care of political matters is partly explained by trust in leadership developed through the leader's willingness to satisfy the needs of the people while showing human warmth and feeling. The leader's power is limited by the people's dependence on him and their loyalty to him. One reason for PM Kishi's political failure in the 1960 treaty crisis was his failure to show consideration for minority political and general public views.[13]

Political Group Behavior

As in feudal times, the family is the most important social group. Family type relationships are evident throughout society, although the society as a family headed by the Emperor is less pronounced than in the prewar and wartime period. Family relationships form a prototype for

political relations based on allowing minority opinions to be heard, as they are in the family.[14]

By his very nature man seeks the group, not the individual. In Japan this is most pronounced. Even though there may be friction among individuals, they normally choose to act in concert with the larger group since that is a virtue. This enhances group solidarity. In the same way, small groups, when faced with a crisis, tend to overlook differences and act in concert with larger groups, and this relationship extends to the nation-state. It helps account for Japanese ability to pull together since ancient times in the face of a threat, despite internal differences. It accounts for the dislike of conflict of opinion and the like for the appearance of consensus in group decisions. This is generally a good trait, but there are some problems. Groups are sometimes moved by the lowest common denominator of choice without effective individual opposition. Individual group hysteria may promote mass hysteria. The self is derived from group membership, but the feeling of not having self is so strong that a person will endeavor to stay with a group even when that course is irrational. While these group behavior problems are not uniquely Japanese, they are seen in a pronounced form in Japan. Yet even though Western man behaves as though he has a self of individual creation, he often has become an "organizational man." His desire to belong is similar to the Japanese trait of amae.[15]

Within and among political groups, authority and cohesion are maintained by the ability to satisfy amae needs of members. Within the LDP, the President becomes the Prime Minister and maintains that position by

allowing various party faction leaders to be represented in the cabinet and contribute to policy. Naturally, some members are more influential than others, and much of this influence is accounted for by such factors as hierarchial standing and size of faction. Yet the amae process still works as all members contribute in some way to a final decision. It is an adhesive force. Concern is shown even for extreme views, which may not show up in the final decision but are at least heard.

Amae forces also hold within the Diet as a larger group. While an opposition bill has rarely been approved, opposition views are often reflected in legislation, and they do tend to circumscribe policy. Obviously, as the LDP majority decreases, opposition views become more influential, particularly if the opposition unites on a given issue.

Because everyone has the opportunity to contribute to a consensus decision, the expectation is created that everyone will support the decision, and group members usually do not disagree. When they do, the result is often ostracism and resignation. This produces an "us" vs. "them" mentality manifested as factionalism in Japanese politics. Sometimes it produces competition among groups resulting in destructive excesses and violence; however, in an optimistic opinion, the Japanese seem to have learned that open competition is harmful. Factionalism is believed to help channel energy within the faction by providing an outlet for amaeru. Factionalism is criticized by Americans because it tends to retard open competition; however, that is not a Japanese value. They are more concerned with preserving the group as a basis for authority, and factionalism adapts custom to politics.

One key trait of political group behavior is that factions of the majority party may adopt policy initiatives of like factions of opposition parties with the result that opposition ideas are often incorporated into government policy. For example, there are doves in each party, and anti-defense attitudes of the opposition find their way into the LDP. This helps cause policy changes on defense to be gradual and sometimes incorporate a little of all positions, as in the case of holding troop strength down while buying the F15. A dysfunctional characteristic is that the majority party may show benevolence and consideration but exercise the majority view anyway. However, they avoid "tyranny of the majority," a practice which ignores minority views and the amae political culture. Minority views are at least heard and they often circumscribe policy.[16]

Conclusion (to Social-Psychological Element)

The impact of social-psychological forces on Japanese defense policy will be further developed as the propositions are examined. For now, it is possible to make several observations.

There has been a tendency for many analysts to exaggerate the social problems associated with Japanese economic growth. While there have been social dilemmas, most Japanese are coping reasonably well with them, as one would expect from their historical adaptability and capacity for compartmentalizing values.

Underlying social and psychological forces may be expected to have an impact on national attitudes, and both will impact on defense policy.

While majority views will dominate, opposition views within the LDP and within the Diet will likely contribute to defense policy and

will increase in influence as the opposition increases in size.

The amae political culture plays a major role in political behavior and decision making.

(2) Economic Element

Japan's postwar economic growth has been phenomenal. From 1946 to 1954, real national income grew at a 10.8 percent average annually to return Japan to a prewar level of productivity. From 1950 to 1970, Japan's economy experienced annual real growth over 10 percent, nearly three times the growth of the U.S. economy for the same time period. Meanwhile, the nature of the economy changed from textile oriented with a modest manufacturing capacity to a diversified and sophisticated economy including a wide range of heavy industry.[17]

If Japan maintains an annual real growth rate of six percent, it will equal or surpass the U.S.S.R. in total GNP and the U.S. in per capita GNP in the 1980's. From the ruin of WWII, Japan now has the number three economy in the world and is gaining on the leaders. While Japan's economy is only a little over one-third the size of the U.S. economy, it is a major factor in the world economy because of growth, manufacturing intensive output, and trade. Indeed, Japan is probably the only nation which could join the two superpowers as a third superpower in this century.[18]

There are many reasons for Japanese economic success, a few of which will be mentioned here. After the war, Japan still had a large pool of skilled laborers, technicians and scientists who helped to speed recovery, assisted by a high degree of technological borrowing. A tradition of high savings and investment promoted growth. The growth of international

trade and Japan's impressive export trade growth, particularly the development of highly competitive manufacturing products, contributed to economic growth. From the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's, exports grew 15 percent per year. Rapid internal expansion was encouraged by tax concessions and a liberal loan policy to industry, and import policy through the 1960's was protectionist. While the idea of "Japan Incorporated" is an exaggeration, there has been a high degree of cooperation among politicians, bureacracy, and business as well as between management and labor.[19] Finally, although arms exports are extremely limited for political reasons, both the Korean and Vietnam wars were boons to the economy.[20]

Japan is powerful economically, but her lack of many natural resources has made her dependent on imports. In 1975, raw materials accounted for 72.1 percent of imports and 93 percent of oil was imported, 85 percent from the Middle East.[21] Large percentages of such critical materials as coal, iron ore, copper, and bauxite were also imported.[22] Efforts have been made to diversify imports and stockpile fuel in the past few years with some improvement, but Japan still remains resource dependent. However, some analysts now believe the problem is manageable due to diversification, improved trade freedom, and transportation improvements.[23]

Because of Japan's reliance on foreign raw materials, there is a tendency for people to exaggerate Japan's reliance on trade. While Japan is reliant on trade for most of her energy needs, the overall reliance on trade is considerably less than that of most West European countries with only about 10 percent of Japan's GNP accounted for by

trade. Therefore, the growth of Japan's economy, while reliant on trade for critical resources, has primarily been a function of internal consumption and growth, although one must still recognize the criticality of imports to fuel the economic system.[24]

Most of Japan's trade relationships reflect the export of predominately manufactured goods and the import of predominately raw materials. This is even true with the United States, Japan's top trading partner. Japan's second and third (in volume) trading partners are non-communist East and Southeast Asia (including Australia) and the European Economic Community (EEC), although the number four trading partner, the Middle East, has become very important in terms of the oil weapon. Japan has successfully taken steps to attain more of an international than a regional stance, branching out into South America, Africa and increasing world trade in general. Japan has also improved trade with communist countries, particularly the PRC. Furthermore, Japan has taken steps to reduce reliance on the U.S.; however, the U.S. will remain important so long as efforts are made to reduce long term misunderstandings and conflicts.[25]

The dynamics of Japan's foreign economic policy have a major impact on national security and, considering this, Japan has several foreign economic goals. First, Japan needs to continue to import raw materials and agricultural products to keep the economy producing at full employment levels. Second, Japan desires to promote unrestricted world trade and maintain a world rather than a regional view. In principle, Japan has no tariff or non-tariff barriers to trade; however, in practice some protectionist policies are still evident. As a result, there is a con-

tinual stream of complaints, some unfounded, from U.S. and European business and manufacturing concerns. Japan is said to "sell and not buy," the U.S. Treasury Department has identified dumping, and the EEC has taken retaliatory protectionist measures. Whether we consider these charges valid or not, there are indications that Japan is working with her trading partners to solve problems. In October 1979, the U.S. General Accounting Office noted that Japan's Trade Barriers were easing, but perhaps too slowly. One key indicator is the U.S. trade deficit with Japan. In the first six months of 1979, it declined $1.9 billion in relation to the same period in 1978: a good sign. Third, returning to goals, Japan is working for increased diversification of sources of raw materials to prevent political pressure. Finally, Japan is working to assist developing nations, particularly in Southeast Asia. In general, national security is a common denominator of these goals.[26]

The world economic environment is primarily determined by the U.S., EEC and Japan, although other forces such as OPEC have become increasingly influential. The basic issue is whether there will be conflict or compromise. From Japan's perspective, the extreme danger, short of war, would be for the U.S. and EEC to become increasingly protectionist and for another oil crisis to ensue. If there is cooperation, issues will be negotiable, and Japan's position will improve. If there is conflict, Japan will be placed in a tenuous position, which might drive her to increased isolation and anti-western nationalism.[27]

(3) Political Element

As seen in Chapter 1, the Japanese do not have a long democratic political heritage.[28] Democratic ideas, often poorly understood, were

absorbed during the Meiji Restoration and rose in the Taisho democracy, only to fall due to weakness of political parties, military hegemony, a non-democratic ideology, and a world economic crisis. Despite the lack of a long democratic heritage, the postwar Japanese were able to build on earlier democratic ideas under tutelege and encouragement of the U.S. occupation in order to develop what is today a sound, constitutional parliamentary democracy, although not without its contradictions.

Left wing parties, for example, espouse Marxist ideologies, a true liberal party has not emerged, and there has been only one party in power since 1955. Japan's democracy is of a different character than its U.S. and British models. Describing the Japanese political system in any detail is well beyond the scope of this section. Even a broad overview would be too lengthy. Instead, the focus shall be on the question of how the political element of national security affects defense policy.

System of Government

The Japanese parliamentary democracy contains several major groups or individuals which are in a position to influence defense policy. The Prime Minister--President of the majority party--is perhaps the key player, although his role is diminished somewhat in Japan due to consensus decision making under amae cultural constraints. He is sometimes more of a mediator than a leader. He appoints the cabinet, although the cabinet ministers are not his "cronies," but instead many are his political competition or allies in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It follows that the LDP cabinet is a kind of coalition cabinet since the LDP is nearly a coalition party. This tends to cause a steady

middle course because of the spectrum of defense policy preferences within the LDP, although there is party solidarity once a course is reached.

The major defense decision making body is the National Defense Council, consisting mostly of cabinet members and, by its composition, giving priority to financial, economic and foreign policy matters over defense matters. This helps to explain or is explained by Japanese emphasis on the economic and foreign policy elements of national security.

Issues are addressed in the Diet by negotiation and compromise, with a vast majority of bills resulting in amae-driven joint amendments by ruling and opposition parties. Most compromises are made in committee to preserve the tradition of avoiding open debate, which periodically takes place anyway. The Diet is less of a debating forum that the U.S. legislature but still stands clearly in the democratic tradition.[29]

In the Diet, one party dominates, although a coalition is becoming increasingly more likely for the 1980's. Parties are composed of factions which, except for the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and Clean Government Party (CGP), are normally tied more to personal rather than policy preferences. Once a consensus is reached, strict party discipline is usually followed. The LDP is conservative on defense policy; it contains politicians who might be called right wingers on defense issues, although it is difficult to identify them as a group. Estimates on the size of the LDP right wing range from five percent to one-third of the party. Somewhere closer to five percent is most likely.[30]

The opposition, particularly the major opposition Socialist Party (JSP) and rising Communist Party (JCP), orients toward an ideology which

is widely variant from the LDP, particularly on defense policy, even though a compromised course is practiced, and opposition views have become more tolerant in the past five years. Some say there is little room in the political culture for the elite to accommodate the opposition--to encourage the opposition to amaeru--and this results in obstructionist, sometimes violent, tactics by the opposition. There is truth to the observation that obstructionist tactics have occasionally been used; however, they are used when the minority is not allowed to amaeru, and, most often the amae political culture provides for avoidance of "tyranny of the majority." Thus, LDP conservative defense policies may be expected to be watered down by opposition views, unless there is a major threat to the country, and even then the amae process would probably operate.[31]

Opposition Parties

It is useful to take a closer look at the political opposition. Opposition views range from moderate to "progressive" to a radical left. Often parties have a public view and a private view, the former an ideal and the latter a pragmatic assessment of what can be done. The Komeito-Fair Play Party (FPP)--is a political branch of a new, militant Buddhist, middle-of-the-road position between the LDP and JSP on many matters. It could be a swing party for a coalition; however, the FPP is opposed to increased rearmament. The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), split from the JSP in 1960. Along with the new Liberal Club (NLC), both small parties, it takes a middle-of-the-road to progressive position on defense. The DSP rejects neutralism, and favors "low posture defense." The second largest party in the Diet, the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP),

is a Marxist party and has long opposed defense and the pro-U.S. stance of the LDP as one of its major platforms, favoring "unarmed neutrality" instead, a position which may have contributed to its steady decline since 1960. More recently, the JSP has pragmatically acknowledged the SDF, as a result of a PRC endorsement of a strong Japanese defense, but still calls for arms reductions. Its private view may be more circumscribed. The final key opposition party is the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), which has made gains in recent years. The JCP is opposed to the MST, favoring instead nonaligned neutrality with sound self defense; however, the JCP opposes revision of Article 9. Generally, progressive or left wing parties oppose steps to revise Article 9 and favor either "low posture" defense or a defense reduction. All oppose major increases in defense capability. Naturally, as the size of the opposition has increased in the 1970's, its influence has increased, although internal divisions are sufficient to prevent an opposition coalition. A coalition of swing parties with the LDP is the more likely alternative. The weakened influence of the LDP, shown most recently in Ohira's slim majority in October 1979 lower house elections, has caused the government to shun bold decisions favoring instead a steady unobtrusive course.[32]

The Constitution and Judiciary

The Japanese government is founded on the 1947 Constitution, which has remarkably not been revised and is followed in spirit, although with some controversy. One provision is worth analyzing. The new constitution provides that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a soverign right" and declare that "land, sea and air forces, as well as

other war potential, will never be maintained (Article 9)." As previously mentioned, this provides for a continuing controversy over the legality of the SDF. The government has legitimized the SDF by making it a "defensive" force only, interpreting the constitution to allow this and in three separate cases from 1976 to 1978 the courts have upheld the constitutionality of the SDF. A movement to revise Article 9 currently lacks popular support, nor is there a trend in that direction. In other words, Article 9 is interpreted to allow the SDF as a self defense force but to impede its expansion into a major, offensive force.[33]

Decision Making

Japanese political decision making is best viewed as a three sided relationship, similar to the economic policy relationship. Ministries (and agencies) provide policy input and technical expertise. The Diet, or specifically the party in power in amae type consideration of opposition views, makes the final decision by council deliberation and Diet vote. Both ministries and politicians depend on the electorate which elects the party in power and provides broad policy guidelines in the election and in opinion surveys. Most deliberations are private, although there is a movement to make them public. All decisions are hashed over in the press. Business and other interest groups have some indirect influence on defense policy, and the press and public views have a major influence. Emphasis in Defense White Papers on public opinion and the preoccupation throughout the government with polls are proof of the importance of public views. The Japanese appear to be even more tuned in to public opinion than the U.S., and the active press keeps the public well informed.[34]

The bureaucracy is an elite, professional group with a sound reputation and tradition. It provides the government with a rich source of ideas and administrative support. Because the bureaucracy often takes the lead in initiating policy, it is difficult for it to remain impartial. Some analysts charge that the bureaucracy really runs the government while the politicians engage in power struggles: an exaggeration but one worth keeping in mind.[35] The ruling party needs the support of the bureaucracy, but the tough decisions are made by the politicians and the bureaucracy needs their consent; however, frequent political turnovers lend some truth to their near autonomy. Foreign Ministry, Finance Ministry, political leadership and Diet views have a clear upper hand in the Defense Council to curb defense spending and prevent any major policy change. The Defense Agency is the weakest member of this council in status and one of the weakest members of the bureaucracy in status as well. Therefore, while there will be amae driven consideration for Defense Agency positions, Finance and Foreign Ministry positions may be expected to prevail, so long as the majority consensus in the population and in the Diet is not undercut or exceeded.[36]

Conclusion (to Political Element)

There is a wide difference in scholarly views on the effectiveness of Japanese democracy. There are weaknesses which need correction, but the present system has been very successful in the past 30 years, and on that measure it is effective. Ike predicts Japanese democracy will survive based on its perceived legitimacy by the masses, its homogeneous culture, the time which has passed since the end of the Pacific War, and the consistent social base of political parties.[37] It should be added

that the amae political culture is able to operate in the political system. There is no reason to expect a sudden demise of democracy in Japan, even (or possibly especially) if the LDP loses power. Opposition parties are generally inclined to work within the existing system, and the decrease of the LDP majority has been pursuasively correlated to a rise in Diet influence. The most likely course now is for decision making to follow customary practices and for policy to follow a cautious path. A coalition government is quite possible. Of course, a rise of conservative consensus on improving defense capability is always possible too, although it is perhaps dependent on simultaneous growth of the LDP right wing and the LDP, and neither trend is present. A major threat to vital interests or the growing potential for a threat might provide growth of the LDP or consensus among several parties on increased defense. However, even in the face of a major threat, a cautious course might be followed. The degree to which Japan will be able to follow a cautious course will be determined not only by internal political factors but by the effectiveness of her foreign policy in consideration of international forces and trends.

(4) Military Element

General Policy

In 1957, the Japanese government developed four basic defense principles and a defense objective. While their wording has been adjusted, they essentially remain the foundation of defense policy today.[38]

Objective: "...to prevent direct and indirect aggression, and once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving

the peace and independence of Japan founded upon democratic principles."

The principles are:

"(1) To support the activities of the United Nations and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.

(2) To stablize the public welfare and enhance the people's attachment to their country, thereby establishing a sound basis essential to our national security.

(3) To build up effective defense capabilities progressively within the limits necessary for our self-defense, with due regard to the national resources and the prevailing domestic situation.

(4) To cope with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression."

Additionally, since WWI, Japan has abided by three non-nuclear principles: non-possession, non-manufacture and non-entry into Japan's territory of nuclear weapons. Also, Japan bans the possession of medium range ballistic missiles or long range bombers which could threaten other countries. Finally, Japanese policy forbids the dispatch of armed units for the exercise of military power to foreign territory.

The basis of Japanese defense strategy is to prevent direct and indirect aggression through close cooperation with the United States, especially in regard to providing Japan with a nuclear deterrent. In

the case of enemy aggression, Japan maintains adequate forces to deter a small-scale attack, but relies on the United States to aid in repelling any attack. Thus, the key to Japan's strategy is deterrence: providing a small force, which discourages a conventional attack, and relying on a security arrangement with the U.S. to deter a nuclear or major conventional attack.[39]

Normally, the military institution of a nation fosters its military traditions. But the SDF was reluctantly formed during the Korean War on orders from MacArthur without national consensus, Until the 1970's, men of the old Imperial Armed Forces did form the bulk of the leadership; however, Japan kept a close watch on the military from the beginning, forcing strict adherence to the civilian control principle, always alert for any sign of a resurgence of militarism. Constantly attacked by the opposition through the 1960's, the military maintained a low-profile role; however, by 1970 a small but steady buildup of armed forces caused several analysts as well as communist nations to find a resurgence of the Japanese military and militarism.[40]

The principle of civilian control of the military is firmly established--perhaps too firmly--as a reaction to prewar and WWII militarism. The Diet approves authorized strength, budget, organization and even mobilization of the Self Defense Forces in case of attack. An objective person has to wonder how Japan can convene a Diet session in the midst of an attack; yet, questioning this policy is taboo in the military. The civilian Director General of the Defense Agency, a politician, is in the chain of command, thus further isolating the military from the Prime Minister. In the U.S., the President would deal directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a crisis and even on many

routine matters in order to gain a military point of view. Once again, it is taboo for the military to question this policy.[41]

Low morale and lack of popular support are reflected in manpower problems, particularly procurement. Throughout the 1970's, 90 percent of authorized strength was rarely attained. Personnel costs of the defense budget take up an increasing percentage, as leaders pay attention to rising expectations of personnel and attempt to attract a volunteer force. Naturally, as personnel expenditures go up, equipment and maintenance expenditures, the cutting edge of the force, go down proportionately.[42]

General Composition

The Japanese Self Defense Forces are organized into ground, air, and maritime components, which emphasize rapid development and high readiness. In 1977, their general composition was as shown in Table 3-1.[43]

TABLE 3-1: General SDF Composition

Ground	Air	Maritime
12 Infantry divisions	10 Interceptor Sqdrns.	14 Submarines
1 Mechanized division	98 F4EJ	32 Destroyers
1 Tank brigade	150 F104J	15 Frigates
1 Airborne brigade	3 FGA Sqdrns. with	11 Recon. Sqdrns.
1 Composite brigade	100 F86F	with 130 Anti-
740 Tanks*	87 FB6F	sub (ASW) patrol
500 APCS	9 F1	aircraft
(*150 Modern M74 Tanks)		
Personnel:		
155,000 active	42,000 active	44,000 active
39,000 reserve	600 reserve	No reserve

Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF)

The GSDF, consisting of 155,000 persons, is oriented primarily against Japan's major threat, the Soviet Union, with secondary missions of internal security and disaster relief. The force is lightly equipped with one tank or armored personnel carrier per 125 troops, while the Soviets average one armored vehicle per 20 troops. The U.S., West Germany and Britain all have slightly less armor density than the Soviets. The need for armor is less than that of countries in Europe because of Japan's mountainous terrain and sea approaches; however, a Japanese counter-attack effort, or mobility in general, would be vulnerable without armor protection.

While Japan is known for its modern equipment, budgetary constraints have severely hampered the GSDF procurement program. Over three-fourths of the 740 tanks are obsolete, and procurement constraints have also hampered artillery development. Another critical factor is that the logistics system is insufficient to support the GSDF in sustained combat because budget constraints have forced emphasis on combat units to the detriment of support units. Finally, a personnel shortfall in the enlisted ranks and a small reserve force (39,000) represent a major constraint when we consider the total lack of mobilization procedures. The GSDF cannot afford many casualties.[44]

One final point. The GSDF is totally defensive in nature. It lacks the assets to project power or to sustain an operation outside the country. Moreover, it is barely adequate to defend Japan for a short period, let alone go somewhere else to fight.

Air Self Defense Force (ASDF)

The ASDF is organized on a short notice, scramble basis. Japanese fighters scramble approximately 500 times a year, mostly in response to continual Soviet air intrusions.

Japan's ASDF is behind the Soviet threat in several key areas. The F104E Starfighter, Japan's mainstay fighter, has poor low altitude intercept capability and is outclassed in maneuverability. In the 1980's, it will be augmented by the F15 Eagle, which can match the top Soviet fighter. Japan began building 100 F15s on contract in 1979; however, slow building is similar to the tank situation, with budget constraints creating defense shortfalls by delaying procurement. Because of this and the growing obsolescence of the radar system, the overall air defense is deficient.[45]

Martitime Self Defense Force (MSDF)

The Japanese naval force may be described as a small, coastal navy which is designed to protect Japan when aided by the U.S. Navy. Its major strength is the Japanese shipbuilding industry, largest in the world, which builds all Japanese ships, most of which are designed for anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Generally, the maritime force surface vessels are up-to-date; however, all submarines are diesel powered and less capable than Soviet subs. Surface vessels lack fleet air defense capability and antisurface ship weapons, placing them at a disadvantage with most modern navies. The Navy is well equipped with ASW aircraft; however, modern submarine design of the Soviet Navy has made this system increasingly obsolescent.[46]

Comparative Figures

In future chapters, precise comparisons are made. For now it is useful to use Table 3-2 to show that Japan has a relatively small force in most comparative categories in relation to her economic size and potential threat from the Soviet Union.[47]

Despite the equipment and personnel shortfalls, Japan's force is well modernized for its size. Deficiencies show through especially when the force is compared to the Soviet threat.

Conclusion (to Military Element)

The primary value of Japan's military forces is to provide a deterrent to armed aggression. Roughtly capable of repelling small, probing attacks, the force is neither offensive nor projectable in nature. Comparied to other countries, it is small but technologically advanced. It faces problems in executing its mission and clearly depends on U.S. forces to provide the primary defense capability. The defense posture described in this section may be called "realistic," which means a defense posture under Japanese control, which ideally has national consensus and can "deal effectively" with limited conventional aggression" in the near future." The JDA believes it has fallen short of the final part of this goal.[48] It shall be seen in future chapters that "realistic" defense is dynamic; that is, it is continuously changing. One question is: do defense changes mean a growth of defense capability and will this lead Japan to an increased defense posture?

TABLE 3-2: Military Power of Major Countries and Areas (Rough Estimates) (1976)

Total Force (in 1,000 personnel)		Army (in 1,000 troops)		Navy (in 1,000 tons)		Air Force (Combat aircraft)		(Naval combat aircraft)
USSR	3,580	China	2,800	US	5,520	USSR	7,900	715
China	3,250	USSR	1,830	USSR	4,240	US	5,800	2,300
US	2,130	India	830	UK	1,240	China	3,800	600
India	960	US	790	France	480	Poland	785	50
N. Vietnam	700	N. Vietnam	690	China	350	India	725	50
ROK	630	ROK	560	W. Germany	230	Egypt	600	0
France	500	N. Korea	410	Italy	230	Sweden	600	0
W. Germany	500	Turkey	370	Taiwan	210	N. Korea	590	0
Taiwan	490	Pakistan	370	Peru	190	UK	500	30
N. Korea	470	W. Germany	370	Turkey	180	France	500	120
Japan	236	Japan	155	Japan	168	Japan	500	0

Foreign Policy Element and Forces and Trends

Some analysts say that, since WWII, Japan's foreign policy has been devoid of initiative, overly reliant on the United States, and reactive; that her negotiating style is inflexible and often too cumbersome to resolve problems; that Japan deals from a position of weakness rather than strength. Japan's postwar foreign policy has shown evidence of all of these traits, but it would be misleading to make an absolute statement to this effect. It is more correct to say that, at first Japan was a "client," state of the U.S. and reacted to U.S. policy. Gradually, Japan emerged from the client status to establish a more independent foreign policy, which still relies, however, on the U.S nuclear and conventional military deterrent.

As a result of the effect of the Nixon shocks on Japanese pride during a time of rising national consciousness in the early 1970's, the Japanese entered a new era. While there are some continuing examples of introverted, reactive diplomacy, Japanese international political activity greatly increased in the 1970's, and more initiative was shown.

For example, there have been increased Japanese political activity and statements, such as active UN involvement, increased aid and loans to ASEAN, assistance to other developing nations, and statements about "economic and political" involvement. Also, the action to improve relations with the PRC, economic activity with Vietnam, and economic activity with North Korea are all Japanese diplomatic initiatives, despite their economic foundation. A more active role by political leaders has been evident. Prime ministers of several administrations

in the 1970's have visited other nations and discussed an increased political role. In the recent World Trade Conference, Japan took an active part. The gradual defense buildup has been in the direction of increased self-reliance.

Evidence of Japan's more assertive international style may be found in her role in the United Nations. While some Japanese analysts recognize that Japan should be either part of the Big Five or be added to that group, the leadership ignores this and, instead, concentrates on playing an active role. Japan has always desired to place her national security on a UN basis, but the UN fell short of that goal. In that regard, Japan is self critical of her own deficiency in failing to contribute to UN peace keeping forces, a controversial issue in Japan, and thus surprising for the Japanese Mission to the UN to openly recognize.[49] But Japanese positive contributions outweigh this shortfall.

Japan recognizes major world problems and is taking action to assist in solving them. Japan endeavors to support arms control by following a policy of peace without resorting to military power as mentioned. Japan ranks high among UN contributors (No. 3 in 1977, $129M).[50] In the North-South problem, Japan is attempting to play the role of mediator, and also Japan usually pulls her share in various aid and assistance programs. Furthermore, at the World Food Conference, a Japanese proposal for adjusting and strengthening the food information system was adopted. Japan is also actively involved in other problem areas such as Law of the Seas, regional organizations, the environment and natural resources, and establishment of the UN university. It is clear that Japan plans

to take an active and perhaps in some cases a leadership role in their resolution.[51]

Two foreign policy weaknesses are slow policy making and poor negotiating procedures. Slow policy development is caused by consensus decision making and a tendency to deal effectively with only one issue at a time. A second weakness is Japanese negotiating style which some analysts consider to be stilted and unimaginative.[52] Even today, analysts observe a comparison of the Japanese style of showing "sincerity" at resolving U.S.-Japan bilateral trade issues with postwar efforts.[53]

One particular concern relating to international negotiations is whether Japan will be able to negotiate tough political issues without a concomitant military element of national security. To analyze this question it is useful to look briefly at bilateral relations between four different states/organizations and Japan: OPEC, ASEAN, PRC, and USSR, in turn. In the case of the oil issue with OPEC, it was demonstrated to Japan in the 1973 Arab oil embargo and in subsequent Arab price hikes that in a crisis Japan is powerless to assure adequate energy resources; however, the U.S. appeared equally powerless to influence a crisis-driven Arab oil embargo, despite U.S. military might, and one must question the capability of any nation to dictate the world oil flow or price during a crisis, short of world war. Japan has since taken economic and diplomatic initiatives to reduce this problem. Japanese relations with ASEAN serve to underline the positive effect of an assertive economic and political policy made more effective through military weakness. When Prime Minister Fukuda made a 13-day visit to ASEAN nations (sic) in 1977, his reception was very positive,

in stark contrast to a similar visit by PM Tanaka in 1973. In 1973, anti-Japanese demonstrations reflected continuing postwar suspicion, while in 1977 overt anti-Japanese acts had almost entirely abated. Today, extensive economic cooperation is cementing relations, and claims of Japanese economic imperialism have subsided. ASEAN nations have become Japan's number two trading partner.[54]

Despite the potential for conflict between the PRC and Japan over historical differences, oil claims, territory and the Taiwan issue, relations with the PRC have steadily improved. They even survived a temporary setback during the PRC-Vietnam War, when Japan reluctantly sided with Vietnam and called for a PRC withdrawal. While the primary reason for improved relations is probably economic compatibility, political initiatives and cultural ties have also played a role.

In East and Southeast Asia relations, Japanese military weakness has appeared to be an advantage. Other nations no longer seem to feel threatened, and China has ceased rhetoric about the growth of Japanese militarism. Instead, the PRC recently called for an increase in Japan military strength and maintenance of U.S. strength in East Asia.[55] In many other relationships, Japanese military weakness has appeared to be a diplomatic strength. However, a key exception is the Soviet Union.

Japanese historians often bitterly note the rather devious Soviet declaration of war against Japan in the twilight days of WWII.[56] Relations between the two countries have never been good, and today the several issues which divide them, coupled with Soviet intransigence, serve to point out the weakness of the Japanese negotiating position. Japan was dismayed in 1977 by the Soviet 200 mile territorial waters

declaration, and a conflict continues over fishing rights around northern Japan, to include a major issue of the four islands over which sovereignty is disputed.[57]

In negotiations, Japan sought to maintain existing catch limits for her fishing fleet, while Soviets were unyielding, demanding severe restrictions in the "Soviet Zone." Even though some progress has been made evidence by Japanese-Soviet cooperation in joint shrimp fishing operations this year, many problems remain. The Soviets often board and detain Japanese trawlers, and a Japanese negotiator recently returned from a fruitless negotiation with the Soviets for a "cooling off" period, all of this evidence of Soviet "hegemony" and intransigence.[58] The fishing issue increases in importance when it is remembered that Soviet action threatens Japan's major source of protein and, therefore, her security.

The situation is complicated by the Kurile (northern) Islands dispute. Despite Japanese demands for their return, the Soviets are unyielding. They are reported to have recently increased troop strength in the North by establishing a base on Shikotan Island off Hokkaido (thus bolstering the charge of a growing Soviet threat), and they do not appear willing to revert sovereignty over the islands to Japan.[59] In cases like these, the situation of dealing from a position of weakness could frustrate the Japanese.

Conclusion (to Foreign Policy Element and Chapter 3)

From this analysis, it may be said that Japan's position among nations is that of an economic power which maintains a small military and low-key but increasingly active foreign policy. Clearly, there are prob-

lems associated with dealing from a position of military weakness as cited in the example of bilateral relations with the Soviets. Japan's approach may lead to difficulty and frustration, but thus far it has propelled Japan forward in most diplomatic and economic relationships. Even in the case of the Soviet Union, the Japanese Foreign Ministry cautions overemphasis on a threat in the apparent Soviet troop buildup noting Foreign Minister Sonoda's recent favorable talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyoko. One must also recognize Japan as the Soviet's number two non-Communist trading partner and Soviet financial ties to Japan ($1.5 billion in loans to Soviets in 1977).[60] In short, Japan may be endeavoring to work her trait of relative military weakness into a strength by focusing on the economic and diplomatic elements of security.

The picture one gets of Japan is that of a nation-state slowly moving toward a greater role in world affairs. While there are some indications of leadership, as yet Japan is usually satisfied to merely pull her share or fall a little short, rather than lead. For example, the larger amount of the money Japan saves on defense through the Mutual Security Treaty with the U.S., one to five percent of GNP annually, could be directed toward a more extensive effort to resolve North-South problems and promote more programs like the UN University. In other examples, Japan's ASEAN initiative was considered by some to be her only assertive policy in 1977, and the decreasing strength of the LDP was seen to retard initiative.[61]

Of course, the possibility always exists that Japan will have to devote a greater share of the GNP to defense. It is conceivable that consensus on a Soviet threat, coupled with frustration at Japanese

inability to negotiate with the Soviets and a decline of U.S. influence in East Asia (or other factors) could propel the Japanese toward a decision to make a major increase in defense posture. However, Japan's emergent foreign policy capability should at least enable a foreign policy initiative to be made prior to any decision to increase defenses. If a decision is made to increase defense capacity, it will most likely follow a slow, deliberate course.

CHAPTER THREE

ENDNOTES

[1] For three contrasting but informed points of view from which these thoughts are assembled, the following are used: Kenneth B. Pyle, The Making of Modern Japan, 1978; Edwin O. Reischauer, The Japanese, 1977; Ezra Vogel, Japan As Number One, 1979.

[2] Ishida, Takeshi, Japanese Society, 1971, pp. 37-38.

[3] Kojima, Kazuto, "Public Opinion in Japan", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vo. 41., No. 2 Summer 1977, p. 208. Kojima believes the primary cause is for "increasing pessimism" in the economy. The other factors are added in by the author.

[4] Vogel, Ezra. "The Miracle of Japan," Saturday Review, May 26, 1979, p. 21.

[5] Kojima, op. cit., 1977, pp. 212-213; Ike, N. Japan, The New Superstate, 1974, pp. 96-98.

[6] Kojima, op. cit., 1977, p. 215.

[7] Olsen, Edward A. "Japan: Economic Growth and Cultural Values," Asian Forum, Spring 1976, pp. 5-6; Reischauer, E.O. "The Japanese," (Film), 1970.

[8] Benedict, R. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, 1946, pp. 145-149; For discussion of "safety valve, " see Ike, N., op. cit., 1974, p. 52.

[9] Mitchell, Amaeru: The Expression of Reciprocal Dependency..., 1978, pp. 12-14, 60-91.

[10] Ibid., p. 72.

[11] Doi, Takeo. The Anatomy of Dependence, 1973, pp. 11-13, 26.

[12] Mitchell, op. cit., 1978. This is his basic thesis which is well supported. It is used extensively to explain the political element of national security in this chapter.

[13] Previous two paragraphs from Ibid., pp. 5, 6, 19-21, 73-76.

[14] Ibid., pp. 70, 71; Reischauer, op. cit., 1977, pp. 129-134.

[15] Doi, op. cit., pp. 132-141.

[16] Previous three paragraphs drawn from Ibid., pp. 79, 96-115, 160.

[17] Pyle, op. cit., 1978, p. 168.

[18] Carpenter, W. (et. al.) "U.S. Strategy in Northeast Asia" SRI, 1978, pp. 93-97; Patrick, H. and Rosovsk, H., Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works, 1976, pp. 12-14.

[19] Whitaker, op. cit., 1974, p. 384; Patrick and Rosovsk, op. cit., 1976, pp. 48-50.

[20] Pyle, op. cit., pp. 169, 170; D. Whitaker (et. al.) Area Handbook On Japan, 1974, p. 381. Kaplan, M. and Mushakoji, K. Japan, America, and Future World Order, 1976, pp. 179-180; Patrick and Rosovsk, op. cit., 1976, pp. 45-47.

[21] "Japan Making But Slow Progress..." Japanese Times, 5 Jun. 76, p. 9; Japan Report, Oct. 76; p. 2; Patrick and Rosovsk, op. cit., 1976, p. 60.

[22] Whitaker, op. cit., 1974, p. 381.

[23] "Japan Making But Slow Progress in Bid to Produce Its Own Oil," The Japanese Times Weekly, 5 Jun. 1976, p. 9; Tsatomu, Kano (ed), The Silent Power, 1976, pp. 177-178. By FY 79 Japan had 90 days of emergency oil reserves stockpiled: Japan Report, Jan. 16, 1978, p. 8.

[24] Kaplan, op. cit., 1976, p. 180.

[25] Ibid., pp. 180-185; and "UN Paper on North-South Conflict," FEER, Aug. 10, 1979.

[26] Austin, The Paradox of Progress, 197, pp. 95-104; Kansas City Star, 8 Oct. 1979; and Kojima, op. cit., 1977.

[27] Ibid., (Austin), pp. 105-115.

[28] Reischauer, E.O., The Japanese, 1977, p. 237.

[29] Itoh, H. Japanese Politics-An Inside View, 1973, p. 9.

[30] Ibid., p. 7; "One-third" figure from an estimate by Dixon, K.H. The Extreme Right Wing in Contemporary Japan, Ph.D. Thesis, FSU, 1975, p. 29. Unfortunately Dixon does not substantiate this estimate, and most other estimates are much smaller; e.g., Weinstein, F.B. (ed), U.S.-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia, 1978, p. 20.

[31] Itoh, op. cit., 1973, pp. 7-9, 187: JDA, The Defense of Japan, 1978, p. 180.

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

[32] Pyle, op. cit., 1978, p. 159; Blaker, M., "Japan in 1977: An Emerging Consensus," Asian Survey, Jan. 78, pp. 97-99; Scalapino, R., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, 1977, pp. 114-115, 330-331; Buck, J. The Modern Japanese Military System, 1975, p. 222.

[33] JDA, op. cit., 1978, pp. 182-185; Ibid. (Buck), pp. 99-111.

[34] Reischauer, op. cit., 1977, pp. 286-297; Itoh (ed), op. cit., pp. 30-43.

[35] Ike, N., A Theory of Japanese Democracy, 1978, pp. 40-41. The more critical view if offered by Itoh, Ibid., pp. 15-30. Interestingly, Japanese scholars seem to be more critical--a healthy sign.

[36] Ibid., (Itoh), p. 6; Buck (ed), op. cit., 1975, pp. 188-189.

[37] Ike, N., op. cit., 1972, pp. 132-133.

[38] JDA, Defense of Japan, 1976, p. 2.

[39] Two preceeding paragraphs from Ibid., pp. 1-5; JDA, op. cit., 1978, pp. 55-78.

[40] Buck, J. op. cit., 1975, pp. 34-39.

[41] Ibid., pp. 193-194.

[42] Ibid., pp. 70-82, 242; ISS, The Military Balance, 1973-79, p. 92; JDA, op. cit., 1976, p. 91; JDA, op. cit., 1978, p. 213; For rising personnel costs see the last source, p. 212.

[43] ISS, op. cit., 1978-79 and 1979-80; Johnson, S. and Yager, J. The Military Balance in Northeast Asia, 1979, p. 29.

[44] Two preceeding paragraphs from Johnson, S. and Yager, J., op. cit., 1979, pp. 29-31.

[45] Ibid., pp. 31-32; also see Chapters 6 and 8.

[46] Ibid.

[47] JDA, op. cit., 1976, p. 21. Compiled from ISS, Military Balance, 1975-76, Janes Fighting Ships, 1975-76.

[48] JDA, op. cit., 1978, pp. 68, 71. The term "realistic" defense appeared in the Fourth Defense Buildup Program Outline.

[49] Japanese Mission to UN, The Changing United Nations and Japan, (Pamphlet) 1976, pp. 2, 6, 10, 11, 23, 24, 29, 30, 47-49.

[50] Data obtained from the United Nations Association of the USA.

[51] Japanese Mission to UN, op. cit., 1976.

[52] Scalapino, R., op. cit., 1977, pp. 55-102.

[53] Blaker, M., op. cit., Jan. 78, pp. 97-101.

[54] Ibid., p. 97.

[55] Buck, J., op. cit., 1975, pp. 149-50; Oksenberg and Oynam (ed), Dragon and Eagle, 1978, p. 124. Barnet, A.D., China and the Major Powers in East Asia, 1977, pp. 115-116.

[56] Dixon, op. cit., 1975, p. 52.

[57] Blaker, op. cit., Jan. 78, p. 99.

[58] JPRS document 73806 # 29; Dahlby, T., Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 Nov. 1978, p. 10.

[59] Oka, T. "Soviet Base Review, Japan's Military Fears," Christian Science Monitor, 1 Oct. 1979, p. 3.

[60] Ibid.; Dahlby, T., op. cit., 3 Nov. 1978, p. 10.

[61] Blaker, op. cit., 1977, pp. 94-98.

CHAPTER FOUR

PROBLEM AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

The problem is to determine what form Japanese defense policy and capabilities will take in the 1980's. To understand this problem, defense policy should be seen in the framework of the elements of national security discussed in Chapter 3, with primary focus on the military element of security, which has been called defense posture. A difficulty of dealing with the many complexities of a nation's defense posture is that one can easily lose sight of their meaning when involved with their intracacies. Comparing weapons systems is especially difficult. Thus, it is necessary to describe defense posture as succinctly (or generally) as possible so that it may be measured and compared.

In this paper, two components will be used to measure defense posture. They will be the defense posture stated in policy terms, and defense options stated in spending terms. To aid in conceptualization, this chapter will restate the current defense posture, provide an operational continum for plausible defense postures, and discuss policy options.

Japanese Defense Posture

A hierarchy of defense postures is represented in Table 4-1.

TABLE 4-1: Defense Hierarchy

"INDEPENDENT" NUCLEAR DEFENSE
"JOINT" NUCLEAR DEFENSE
"REGIONAL" CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE
"INDEPENDENT" CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE
"IMPROVED" CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE
"REALISTIC" CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE
"REDUCED" CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE

The procedure for describing these postures will be to list the key traits for each beginning with the current, "realistic" (conventional) defense posture and moving up the hierarchy. Then, characteristics of a "reduced" policy will be discussed. It should be emphasized that these defense postures are based on options which a wide range of policy analysts both within Japan and without have considered and the authors subjective typology and description, except for the current, "realistic" defense posture. Their arrangement is peculiar to the particular political forces in Japan which shape them. They are not rigid. Most likely, future policy changes will be different rather than identical to them. They do serve a useful purpose of enabling rudimentary measurement and visualization. (Qualifying remarks are provided in the Chapter Four endnotes).

The current defense policy is called "realistic" (conventional)

defense and is described in Chapter 3-Military. "Realistic" defense implies a continuous improvement in technology and readiness, and honesty in stating what forces can and will do. Key characteristics of "realistic" defense are:

(1) Insure internal security

(2) Defeat a small probing attack or defeat a major attack with maximum U.S. assistance[1]

(3) Protect shipping in territorial waters with limitations[2]

(4) Reject regional security

(5) Reject use of nuclear weapons (3 non-nuclear principles)

The next policy option in the hierarchy is called "improved" (conventional) defense. It implies the development of a force roughly comparable to that of West Germany, France or Great Britain (provided their present capabilities are maintained), which consumes a larger share of GNP than one percent--at least two to three percent assuming constand GNP growth of 5-7 percent (Chapter 8 provides rationale for this spending requirement). Despite increased capabilities, basic policies do not change. In an "improved" conventional defense posture, the Japanese would:

(1) Insure internal security

(2) Defeat a major attack with minimal U.S. military assistance (policy change)[3]

(3) Protect shipping in territorial waters

(4) Probably reject regional security

(5) Reject nuclear weapons.

The next policy option is called "independent" (conventional) defense, although some would call it "autonomous" defense. "Autonomous" defense was introduced in 1970 and meant that Japan would govern its defense. It was not really descriptive of the defense posture, which was considerably less than "independent" defense. The term "autonomous" is avoided also because some (primarily opposition parties) use it to mean abrogation of the U.S.-Japan MST, which this posture does not necessarily imply. It requires spending a much larger share of GNP on defense to build a military force camparable with economic power. Under "independent" defense, the Japanese would:

(1) Insure internal security

(2) Defeat a major conventional attack with only economic or political assistance (major policy change and constitutional change)[4]

(3) Protect shipping within a 200 mile limit (major policy change)[5]

(4) Probably reject regional security

(5) Reject nuclear weapons

The next defense posture in the hierarchy is regional (conventional) defense in conjunction with the U.S., in an East Asian collective security system, or in some other arrangement. Regional defense is placed above independent defense because an "independent" capability would logically preceed a regional role, although their development could be simultaneous. However, a regional role could conceivably be adopted at any defense level. It could also follow the development of nuclear weapons or be skipped entirely. Under a regional defense posture, the Japanese would:

(1) Insure internal security

(2) Defeat a major conventional attack with only economic or political assistance[7]

(3) Protect shipping in region included in collective security arrangement with assistance

(4) Accept regional security (major policy change)

(5) Reject nuclear weapons.

The next defense posture in the hierarchy is "joint" nuclear defense, which, if it were to occur, would probably follow a breakdown in non-proliferation efforts. It would be provided in tandem with the U.S., or another nuclear power. Conceivably, the nuclear option could be applied earlier, say along with "realistic" or "improved" defense; however, this is considered unlikely for several reasons. First, from a strategic viewpoint, a nuclear force should complement a conventional defense, although adoption of nuclear weapons might reduce the size of a large armed force. Second, there is no precedent for attaining a nuclear weapons capability without a major conventional defense. France, Britain and to a lesser extent, India were all regional military powers before developing nuclear weapons capability. Third, because it is unlikely that circumstances would cause the U.S. to favor a Japanese nuclear capability, a strong conventional defense is logical as an antecedent. Finally, nuclear defense is the most resisted and most politically volatile step for Japan and, thus, more likely to follow a conventional buildup if it occurs. However, some analysts focus on the prestige factor of nuclear capability, and it is possible that prestige could play a role in causing adoption of nuclear weapons

at any defense level. Under the more likely case of a "joint" nuclear defense posture, Japan would:

(1) Insure internal security

(2) Defeat an enemy attack with economic assistance[8]

(3) Protect shipping to the Mid East with assistance (major policy change)[9]

(4) Reject or accept a regional security role

(5) Accept and build defensive nuclear weapons (major policy change)[10]

The final policy option of "independent" nuclear defense is in line with the multipolarity idea to the point of an independent nuclear multipolarity. Logically, this would follow some mutual arrangement during a nuclear buildup. Under "independent" nuclear power, Japan would:

(1) Provide internal security

(2) Defeat a major enemy attack with economic assistance

(3) Protect shipping world-wide"

(4) Reject or accept regional security role

(5) Accept and build a total nuclear force (major policy change)[12]

The lowest defense posture on the hierarchy is "reduced" (conventional) defense which implies some degradation through reduction or stagnation of the realistic defense posture. The reduction could take place in any area. It includes a UN security arrangement and, at the extreme, unarmed nuetrality.

In order to facilitate easy comparison of these defense postures, Table 4-2 has been constructed.

TABLE 4-2: Defense Posture Characteristics

CHARACTERISTIC	"REDUCED" CONV. DEFENSE	(PRESENT) "REALISTIC" CONV. DEFENSE	"IMPROVED" CONV. DEFENSE	"INDEPENDENT" CONV. DEFENSE	"REGIONAL" CONV. DEFENSE	"JOINT" NUCLEAR DEFENSE	"INDEPENDENT" NUCLEAR DEFENSE
Internal Security	Reduce	Insure	Insure	Insure	Insure	Insure	Insure
External Security	Reduce	Defeat small proble of major attack w/maximum assistance	Defeat major attack w/ minimal assistance	Defeat major attack	Help defeat major attack in region	Independent or Regional	Independent or Regional
Shipping Security	Reduce	Protect in territorial waters (limited)	Protect in territorial waters	Protect in 200 mile limit	Protect East Asian region w/assistance	Protect Mid East w/ assistance	Protect around world
Regional Security	Reject	Reject	Reject	Reject	Accept	Reject or accept	Reject or accept
Nuclear Weapons	Reject	Reject	Reject	Reject	Reject	Accept Defensive Only	Accept
Requires a Major Policy Change	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

It must be emphasized again that this concept is an arbitrary envisionment of plausible defense postures. They are intended to provide a framework for conceptualizing the major dependent variable of this study: defense policy. The hierarchial arrangement in a limited sense also makes the dependent variable operational. The defense postures are independent of the several security arrangements which are possible for each defense posture such as the U.S.-Japan MST, a security arrangement with the USSR, or an East Asian collective system. A shift to a higher or lower defense posture might be indicated by the change of only one of the characteristics of the current posture. The judgment of whether a shift has occurred, is occurring, or is likely to occur will be made through the process of evaluating the propositions.

It is also useful to analyze the dependent variable in terms of real (allowing for inflation) defense spending, for which there are several options. First, defense spending may be decreased, which will at some point cause a reduced defense posture. Second, defense spending may remain level, which may also cause a reduced defense posture relative to a threat, providing the threat increases. Third, defense spending may increase at a low level which insures the same posture is maintained and, possibly, the next higher posture is gradually approached. Fourth, a major increase in defense spending will cause an increase in defense posture.

It is difficult to make a generalization about precisely what spending level would enable Japan to move to a higher posture. Conservative analysts suggest 2-3 percent of GNP to move to improved conventional defense, while more "progressive" analysts believe 1 percent of GNP is

already doing that. But percent of GNP spending is misleading because it is a function of economic growth which may fluctuate. It is probably best to use a comparative approach. In order to defeat a major conventional attack with minor U.S. military assistance at an "improved" defense posture, Japan would have to at least increase spending to match Great Britain and West Germany considering that the most likely (and only real) external threat is from the USSR. In order to defeat a major conventional attack unassisted, Japan would have to proportionately match the U.S. and USSR spending, at least until substantial land, sea, and air forces were created. To go nuclear would be an additional expense, and for several years Japanese spending would have to proportionately exceed that of the U.S. and probably match Moscow's in order for Japan to develop the force. To maintain her current defense posture, slight increases will be needed to develop new technology and generally to keep up with force and equipment improvements of the threat. More precise spending figures are introduced in Chapter 8, based on this conceptualization.

CHAPTER FOUR

ENDNOTES

[1] Some analysts say that Japan could hold out for two weeks awaiting U.S. assistance; but clearly U.S. naval and air forces would be needed right away (see Chapter 3-Military).

[2] Limitations are a lack of air cover and superior threat naval vessels, both surface and subsurface. U.S. assistance would be very helpful, even in territorial waters.

[3] U.S. assistance would augment Japanese forces rather than performing the major defense role as in realistic defense, although U.S. "offensive" capability would be the only type used. A policy change is indicated because spending would have to exceed the present one percent of GNP level which is a formal policy, and a reserve is required.

[4] The Japanese would need to have "offensive weapons," a major arms industry to include exporting major weapons systems to reduce cost, and a much larger force in equipment and personnel. Thus, a major policy change and a constitutional change are indicated.

[5] The 200-mile limit coincides with territorial fishing limits adopted by the U.S. and USSR and is designed to illustrate that at this level Japan would protect her fishing boats and close in shipping lanes. It also includes the "battlefield" where such a conflict would most likely be fought--well off the Japanese coast. This might require a major policy change (see Note 9).

[6] Japan would probably reject regional security at this level; however, the ultimate shift to it would be logical and, perhaps necessary.

[7] Conventional capability could drop in a collective alliance, combined forces being greater than independent ones, if regional security includes such an arrangement.

[8] With a nuclear deterrent, an argument might be for reducing conventional forces (as the U.S. has done); however, there are pitfalls to this approach. For example, a superior nuclear force could use a nuclear standoff to make a conventional attack, as some fear might happen in Europe.

[9] Development of a "blue water" navy would be expensive. It is considered likely to accompany a nuclear decision, if such a decision is made; however, it is also quite possible for Japan to move to a nuclear posture with only a regional or smaller navy. A major naval force would include "offensive" weapons and a large spending increase. This would be a major policy change, requiring a constitutional amendment (if not already done).

[10] Development of defensive nuclear weapons would mean changing the three non-nuclear principles, a major policy change, although the Constitution would not require amendment (there is some debate to this point, and there would be more in the face of such a decision).

[11] If a "blue water" navy were already built, this would not require a policy change. If not, Note 9 above would apply.

[12] The spending and nuclear weapons would require not only a major policy change but a constitutional change as well.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE THREAT

This chapter analyzes the threat to Japan with primary emphasis on the most dangerous external threat, but also other external and internal threats are considered. To accurately assess the threat, it is described within the framework of the military balance in Northeast Asia.

What are the threats, threat capability, allied capabilities and trends? There are three plausible external threats and two internal threats to vital Japanese interests, which are perceived by some strategic thinkers and politicans, although there is neither domestic nor political consensus on them as yet. The first external threat is to Japanese resources and trade through embargo, the second involves naval interference with sea lanes or fishing, and the third external threat is directly to the military security of Japan by Soviet forces. The internal threat is primarily from extreme leftist forces which might cause insurrection; or, if one's perspective is "progressive," the threat is from rightist groups. Historically, the leftist threat has been of more importance to the government, and it is tied to the external threat.

Considering resource vulnerability, there are various possibilities for an oil embargo or production slowdown from the Mideast. The oil crisis of 1973 caused Japan's only post-war recession in 1974 and a vicious inflationary cycle as well. While this threat is the most

likely, one could well argue it to be a threat to which there is no military response, so we will focus primarily on the threat of Soviet action. The most dangerous threat to trade and resources is the growth and activity of the Soviet Navy, which has backed up tough policy on fishing in 200 mile territorial waters, and some analysts say it poses a significant threat to Japanese shipping, primarily in the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asian waters and the western Pacific.[1]

Japan does not have the capability to project naval power very far. Her ships are not fitted with adequate surface weaponry, nor does she have the cruisers, carriers, or support ships to conduct expeditions outside home waters in the face of Soviet interference.[2] This is a result of Japan's policy forbidding offensive forces, and "defense of shipping lanes" has not been added to her defensive repertoire. Therefore, Japan relies on the U.S. to protect shipping lanes; however, were Japanese policy to change, her anti-submarine welfare (ASW) ships and aircraft could augment U.S. forces in East Asian waters.

Areas of primary concern for resource and trade lanes are the Pacific and Indian Ocean. Table 5-1 compares Soviet and U.S. ship days in the Indian Ocean giving the Soviets a clear advantage.[3]

TABLE 5-1: Ship Days in the Indian Ocean

YEAR	SOVIET	U.S.	RATIO OF SOVIET TO U.S. SHIPS
1974	10,500	2,600	4.0 : 1.0
1975	7,200	2,800	2.6 : 1.0
1976	7,300	1,400	5.2 : 1.0

However, the U.S. has the capability to shift forces from the Pacific where it has a clear advantage as shown in Table 5-2.

TABLE 5-2: Soviet, U.S. Ship Days in Pacific, 1974-76

YEAR	SOVIET	U.S.	RATIO OF SOVIET TO U.S. SHIPS
1974	7,400	34,800	1.0 : 4.7
1975	6,800	27,000	1.0 : 4.0
1976	5,200	19,000	1.0 : 3.7

From these two tables, it may be clearly seen that the Soviets are dominant by this measure in the Indian Ocean, while the U.S. is dominant in the entire Pacific Ocean. The Indian Ocean is important to Japan because of the movement of Mid East Oil through it. Table 5-3 considers combined ship days in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

TABLE 5-3: Ship Days in the Indian and Pacific Oceans

YEAR	SOVIET	U.S.	RATIO OF SOVIET TO U.S. SHIPS
1974	17,900	37,400	1.0 : 2.1
1975	14,000	29,800	1.0 : 2.0
1976	12,500	20,400	1.0 : 1.6

Recognizing that these figures represent somewhat of an over simplification and do not include the past three years' data, they are least illustrate a trend which has taken place since the early 1960's: the gradual rise of the Soviet Navy. Yet, overall the U.S. maintains the edge in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, when they are considered together. While in the past year some authoritative sources have been saying the advantage is tilting in the Soviet direction, really what is happening

is a gradual erosion of U.S. superiority. However, the U.S. still retains the edge, as will be shown.

Because of the Soviet concentration in Northeast Asia, they hold the advantage there, a result of the U.S. posture of holding a major reserve in the eastern Pacific. The U.S. Asian "withdrawal" has caused concern over U.S. reliability to help defend the region. Aware of this, the Carter administration has repeatedly attempted to reassure the Japanese. Recently, Secretary Brown emphasized that the U.S. could and would shift forces anytime it is necessary to counter a threat.[4]

A second threat involves the potential for Soviet military activity directly against Japan and should be viewed relative to the military balance in Northeast Asia, a system of complex interrelationships, which will be simplified somewhat to expedite the analysis.

It may be assumed that forces in both Koreas and Taiwan are occupied with self defense and may be excluded from the comparison, although they do tie up some Soviet, U.S. and Chinese forces for contingencies. Neither North Korea nor Taiwan threaten Japan. China is included, but as a counterbalance against Soviet forces and not against Japan. In spite of a nuclear capability and some remaining difficult issues between Japan and China, the PRC is not considered an opponent of Japan for several reasons. First, rapprochement has developed positive relations between the two nations. Economic relations are extensive, particularly from China's perspective, and they are growing. China and Japan appear willing to solve differences harmoniously. Second, the PRC has neither the industrial base nor the military capability to support a major offensive war very far across

water. Finally, the PRC has made a major policy shift since 1971. The U.S. presence in East Asia is welcomed as a stabalizing force against growing Soviet might, and the Japanese are encouraged to improve their defense forces. The Chinese are not likely to suddenly alight themselves with the USSR.

Therefore, four military forces are considered: the Soviet Union; the PRC aligned against the Soviet Union and neutral toward Japan; and, the U.S. aligned with Japan against the Soviet Union. The method for comparison will be to focus on forces committed to East Asia, constraints for employing these forces and reserve forces available. Table 5-4 compares some key force characteristics.[5]

Using this table to compare the U.S. and Japan vs. the U.S.S.R., the Soviets have the advantage in every area except aircraft carriers and destroyers; however, destroyer figures are fairly close, and the carrier advantage is reduced within range of land based bombers when one U.S. carrier is in the Indian Ocean and by the submarine threat. Interestingly, though the Japanese eshew a regional security role, they have a limited de facto regional role by virtue of geographical location astride Soviet air and sea routes to the Pacific and the Sea of China. Indeed, the U.S.S.R. finds it necessary to maneuver around Japan continually.[6] The small Japanese force shown in Table 5-4 contributes to the regional balance by having the potential to defend key straits.

Despite technical disadvantages in every area, the PRC also contributes. Even if China were to choose a neutral role, the Soviets would most likely have to devote some (or most!) of their regional

TABLE 5-4: The Military Balance in Northeast Asia[5]

CHARACTERISTICS	COMMITTED FORCES				STRATEGIC RESERVE		
	JAPAN	USA	PRC	U.S.S.R.	USA	U.S.S.R.	*(ADVANTAGE)
Combat Divisions	13	1-2/3	75	46-1/3	6-1/3	30-100[c*]	
Personnel	240,000	138,300	1,500,000	700,000	--	--[e*]	
Tanks	740[b]	250[d]	7,500[b]	5,000-7,500	--	--[e*]	
Mechanization[a]	1:125	1:23	1:241[b]	1:20	--	--[e*]	
Aircraft carriers	0	1-2	0	0-1	4*	0	
Cruisers	0	5	0	7	10*	3	
Destroyers/frigates	47	16	19[b]	53	86*	17[g]	
Ship tonnage	194,000	600,000		1,000,000[b,h]	--	--[i]	
Attack subs (nuclear)[f]	0	4	1	14	22*	?[g]	
Attack subs (diesel)[f]	15[a]	0	65[b]	55	9*	?[g]	
Long range bombers	0	14[b]	1,000[b]	200	--	--[e]	
Jet fighters and medium range bombers	350[b]	390	4,700[b]	2,100	--	--[e]	

(See endnotes for explanations)

forces to assuring that neutrality; that is, it would be unthinkable for them to leave an exposed flank to the Chinese. If the Chinese make qualitative improvements in the 1980s, this problem will become more pronounced for the U.S.S.R. A review of Chinese capabilities shows the inability to project power over water but a limited capability over land, albeit with extensive technological shortfalls. What the PRC lacks in modern modernization, it partly makes up for in men and quantity of outdated equipment. Of course, their severe technological disadvantage discourages offensive action.

In spite of Chinese deficiencies, the Soviets obviously consider the threat to be significant. One-fourth of total Soviet forces are stationed in Northeast Asia. There are only three to four Soviet divisions stationed across from Japan with the bulk of the regional force directed towards the PRC. While a PRC-U.S.S.R. rapprochement could change the balance of forces, there is nothing as yet to indicate more than troubled detente for the two major communist powers in the 1980's. When the Chinese are added to the equation, a more balanced picture is presented for ground forces.

Turning to the Soviet forces, approximately half of their regional divisions were at low (about one-fourth) strength in personnel and reduced (one-half to two-thirds) strength in equipment in 1977.[7] Soviet doctrine calls for overwhelming combat superiority in the attack, and low troop strength is a hindrance. Superior combat power is the most important principle of the offensive for them. On the European front, NATO commanders plan for the Soviets to attempt a 5:1 combat power advantage at the decisive place and time in the battle. In their

own manuals, they teach economizing forces to achieve from 5:1 to 10:1 advantages on narrow fronts.[8] Against Japanese (or any other) light infantry, they might risk a lower ratio, but probably not less than 3:1. The Japanese have four divisions and one tank brigade on Hokkaido, the most likely and, because of geographical location, perhaps the only plausible place for an assault. To attack Hokkaido, the Soviets would have to build up and move about 10 to 25 divisions, depending on what ratio they would accept and whether they might chose to concentrate against only part of the total Japanese force on the island. While some of these forces could be air assaulted, disembarked from ship, or air landed, the bulk of Soviet combat forces--heavy, mechanized units--would have to move primarily by amphibious assault. The Soviet Far Eastern Fleet, which has about one-fourth of total Soviet amphibious assets, has the capability to move only a little more than one tank battalion in an amphibious assault at a time.[9] Therefore, in a land battle for Japan, the U.S.S.R. would initially have to rely primarily on a light infantry seaborne and air assault force, supported by air and naval gun fire and augmented with a small armored force.

Despite some Soviet experience in amphibious operations in WWII, this is a highly improbable scenario for several reasons. Soviet doctrine evolves around the use of heavy forces in the offensive, it would take too long to move heavy forces into Japan, and the operation would be extremely risky. The well trained, mobile Japanese tank brigade now stationed on Hokkaido, coupled with tank and infantry units from other divisions, have the potential to devastate a light infantry assault. However, the low level of Japanese mechanization makes most

infantry forces immobile and vulnerable. Yet, the Soviet buildup and training for such an operation would almost certainly be detected, and U.S. and Japanese forces could be repositioned. This would reduce Japanese shortfalls and cause the U.S.S.R. to require an even larger force at a greater risk than discussed here.

What about the possibility of a Soviet probing attack, perhaps to test Japanese and American will or to cause a political fait accompli in Japan? Recently, the Soviets have positioned more forces on the Kurile Islands over which Soviet sovereignty is disputed by the Japanese. While this appears provocative or intransigent rather than threatening, Soviet motives are unclear. In case of a probing attack or infiltration, Japanese forces appear adequate; however, they questioned their own capability at the end of the Fourth Buildup program in October, 1976, when the Cabinet recognized that actual capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces were short of the ultimate goal of "dealing effectively with conventional aggression on a scale not larger than a localized conflict." Capabilities have not changed significantly since then. While the total capability is questionable, most analysts seem to agree that the SDF is an adequate deterrent for a small, probing attack, although recently the possibility of a Soviet air assault has at least raised questions about this capability.[10]

Whether the attack is large or small, U.S. forces will be involved because they are positioned in Japan, although none of the forces on the four main islands are ground combatant. Providing assets are not committed elsewhere, with superior airlift and sealift capability the U.S. can relatively quickly move two to four light divisions or a

smaller number of heavy units from Okinawa, Hawaii and the continent. The Soviets have the advantages of moving troops by land on an improved Trans-Siberian railway system and a larger force available to move; however, land transportation for heavy forces is by no means easy and, once Soviet forces arrive, the amphibious deficiency is still there. Probably, the U.S. would be able to position forces prior to an attack based on an identified buildup, and this would cause the Soviets to have to further increase forces. In any event, an attack on Japan risks direct confrontation with the U.S. and global war. The impact on total Soviet security--military and economic--would be enormously detrimental, even for a buildup without an attack. Without further belaboring this issue, it seems clear that the U.S.S.R. is unlikely to risk an attack on Japan--large or small--without severe provocation. Yet, it must be remembered that, while the likelihood of an attack is low, the potential is there and growing. If the military balance shifts in favor of the Soviets in the 1980's, the potential for a land attack may increase.

Air and seapower comparisons are at least as complex as the ground comparison. Referring to Table 5-4, in Northeast Asia the Soviets appear to hold a slight overall advantage in forces, yet the Americans and Japanese have a geographic and reinforcement advantage. In territorial waters and over Japan, the MSDF and ASDF could provide an excellent anti-submarine and air defense augmentation to U.S. forces, and the Soviets might be cut off from the open sea. In the region, the major Soviet advantage appears to be in airpower; however, types and capabilities of aircraft make this comparison greatly over-simplified. Furthermore, PRC capabilities at least hold some Soviet

aircraft in check, although the precise effect of this is unclear. One estimate shows one-fourth of Soviet long range aircraft and most frontal aviation assets "committed against the PRC."[11]

From the foregoing discussion of Soviet air, land and sea direct threats to Japan, several generalizations may be made. Because of enormous problems the Soviets would face in a ground attack on Japan, the land combat threat is unlikely. Soviet air and sea regional and Indian Ocean advantages pose a more probable, yet still unlikely threat. In terms of observable indicators, the U.S. capability in the total Pacific is supreme; however, it is also challenged by growing Soviet power. Indeed the Soviets appear to have the edge in air power, or at least they are able to challenge U.S. supremacy.

What are Japanese perceptions of the threat? This is probably the most important question concerning the threat. The Japanese people have had little feeling of direct, external threat since the early postwar period. For example, in 1971 less than 50 percent of respondents could think of any country being hostile to Japan. Table 5-5 shows Japanese opinion on the likelihood of an attack from 1968-1972.

TABLE 5-5: Japanese Opinions on the Likelihood of an Attack[12] (by percentage of response)

	Likely	May or May Not	Not Likely	Absolutely Unthinkable	Others/ No Answer
June 1968	3	43	40	5	9
October 1969	5	35	47	7	6
April 1972	4	43	39	8	6

Table 5-6, using slightly different response categories, shows opinions from 1972 to 1975.

TABLE 5-6: Japanese Opinion on the Danger of Attack[13]

	Danger Exists	Danger Cannot Be Totally Ignored	No Such Danger	No Opinion
November 1972	25	27	23	25
October 1975	15	29	34	22

From these two tables, one may discern a slight decrease in perceived threat, although there is a sizable number of respondents with some misgivings. Akio Watanabe explains that, while the Japanese do not have a strong feeling about a specific direct threat, they do feel general misgivings about international tension among the "superpowers," about being drawn into a conflict they would seek to avoid.[14] In 1973, Nobutaka Ike commented that, while Korean tension periodically caused high Japanese anxiety, the Japanese at that moment probably felt less threatened than any time since 1945.[15] In 1976, Seizaburō Satō observed the Japanese to feel increased general anxiety but little likelihood of an attack.[16]

JDA views differ from those of the general public. The JDA considers the threat real and ominous saying in the 1978 Defense of Japan that the increased Soviet naval strength has become "an unignorable factor" in the security of Japan.[17] Defense analysts are also concerned about Soviet air and naval intrusions in and around Japan. In Europe and the Far East, the strength of Soviet forces is said to exceed U.S. strength, and sea lanes are considered by the JDA to be jeopardized.

They are also concerned about the total naval balance in which the Soviets worldwide have surpassed the U.S. in total numbers of major categories, providing carriers are not considered separately. Table 5-6, prepared by the JDA, reflects this concern.[18] Of course the failure to consider carriers shows that the JDA is exaggerating the threat a little.

TABLE 5-6: U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R.: Trends in Numbers of Naval Vessels



The JDA recognizes that the 1-1/2 war strategy of the U.S. results partly from rapprochement with China and consideration that the PRC serves as a counterweight against the U.S.S.R. However, the JDA is concerned about the decline of U.S. strength relative to the Soviets, particularly in Northeast Asia, and the role of the PRC as a Soviet counterweight is

recognized to hold some contradictions. While a few analysts still harbor misgivings over the reliability of the PRC, JDA concern is tempered by the recognition that military power or the Asian continent is primarily directed inward along the PRC-U.S.S.R. (and Mongolian) border, and in Korea, the security of which is very important to the Japanese.[19]

The possibility of war in Korea is an indirect threat to the Japanese tied to growing Soviet might. It is made important by its relative likelihood,[20] particularly in the wake of the Park assassination, and the traditional importance of Korean stability to many Japanese. A Korean war has the potential for undermining U.S. and Japanese rapprochement with China and providing unity of effort between Moscow and Peiking, a crucial change in the military balance in Northeast Asia. In Japan, a Korean war would probably precipitate internal political strife, if not from the left, then among the 700,000 Koreans living in Japan. This could lead to leftist insurgency and unlawful rightist response. In such a climate, some fear the previously mentioned Soviet attempt at a fait accompli. All of this ties in closely to these Japanese questions of American will: Is the U.S. willing (and able) to help defend South Korea? Is the U.S. pulling out of East Asia?

The problem for the JDA is that opposition parties and the public at large do not fully share JDA views on a Soviet threat or a "Korean threat" despite frequent Soviet air and naval intrusions, the Soviet force buildup and Korean instability. In fact, all of these variables have existed to some degree since the early 1950's and appear to have had little effect on the development of a national consensus on a threat.

The threshhold of where a consensus would develop is an unknown. While some analysts have noted a move to the right on defense, it is too early to say whether recent Soviet positioning of troops on northern islands or vituperations about rapprochement with China will cause consensus on a threat.

Conclusion

To sum up the military threat, the Soviets have a slight air and seapower advantage over the U.S. and Japanese in the western Pacific and Indian Ocean which is tempered by U.S. capability (and will) to reinforce using U.S. naval superiority in the Pacific. Also the PRC should be considered as a counterweight to at least fix the bulk of Soviet land forces and a portion of Soviet air power. However, one must recognize the immense technological disadvantages of the PRC and, thus, question their reliability. Against the U.S.S.R., Japan by itself is at a tremendous disadvantage. But considered as an adjunct to U.S. forces, Japan plays an important role by virtue of geographical location. The possibility of a Korean conflict provides an indirect threat which is tied to an internal security threat from the left and the gradual buildup of Soviet strength in the region. Finally, the potential embargo on oil imports poses a non-military threat to which a military response could not be readily addressed.

National consensus, however, does not support these threat perceptions. Instead, the threat perceived by the public and the political opposition is lower than that seen in the regional force comparison in this chapter, and far away from the JDA perception. It has more to do with general anxiety about world tension than specific

threats to Japan. Thus, a problem exists in perceiving the threat. One's perception is connected to a complex series of assumptions about U.S. actions, Japanese attitudes, Soviet action, Chinese reliability and regional politics. Perhaps this is the best conclusion for the threat: while Soviet naval power and general combat power have increased, the U.S. maintains a deterrent made credible by its presence and projectability, and any threat to the Japanese is more potential than real, more ill-defined than precise. However, the trend of a Soviet increase and a U.S. decrease in worldwide and regional forces has caused some Japanese analysts, who remain in the minority, to consider a significant threat from the U.S.S.R. Korean instability poses an indirect, less dangerous but much more likely threat, which is tied to a possible internal security threat and to Soviet action.

CHAPTER FIVE

ENDNOTES

[1] There are many reports on the Soviet Naval threat and tough policy on fishing: e.g., Presidential Press Conference, 29 June 79 with Japanese Press, Selected Statements, 1 Sep. 79, pp. 44-46. The Washington Post "Japanese Fear Soviets Have Viet Air Base, " 14 Apr 79; MacLead, "Admiral's Warning: Soviet Navy Threat," Christian Science Monitor, 4 Oct. 79; Janes Fighting Ships, 1979-80; JPRS, 73806, #29, "USSR Seizes Japanese Boat," K40D0, 10 Jul 79 (also see Note 4 below).

[2] Johnson, S. and Yager, J., The Military Equation in Northeast Asia, 1979, pp. 33-34.

[3] Ibid., p. 17: From Understanding Soviet Naval Development, U.S. Dept. of Navy, 1978, p. 14. (Tables 5-1, 5-2, 5-3).

[4] Cooley, K., "U.S.: We'll help protect oil flow to the Far East," Christian Science Monitor, 25 Oct. 79, p. 7; McLead, op. cit., 4 Oct. 1979.

[5] Table compiled from: Johnson and Yager, op. cit., 1979, pp. 10-30, 48-50; Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), The Military Balance 1979-80 (see additional notes in chart below); Japanese Defense Agency (JDA), The Defense of Japan, 1978 (official pub.), pp. 29-54.

[a]Mechanical vehicles; troops army wide.

[b]Indicates a clear technical deficiency or a majority of outdated equipment.

[c]The higher figure considers European U.S.S.R.

[d]Estimated based on standard tables.

[e]Soviets hold a global advantage and forces are conceivably deployable.

[f]Does not include missile subs.

[g]The U.S.S.R. has the advantage world wide in these areas, yet the U.S. has a geographic advantage in the Pacific by holding an entire fleet in reserve. The Soviets may be able to reinforce with submarines, but reinforcement takes

considerably longer and reduces forces in other strategic areas.

[h]Estimated based on 1,330,000 in western Pacific and Indian Ocean.

[i]Figures unavailable but the U.S. has the edge.

[6] Ibid., (JDA), 1978, pp. 35-37.

[7] Johnson and Yager, op. cit., 1979, pp. 10-12; also some information in previous two paragraphs from this source; ISS, op. cit., 1979-80; and Ibid. (JDA) pp. 40-41.

[8] A. A. Sidorenko, The Offensive (A Soviet View), Moscow, 1970 (Trans and Pub. by USAF), p. 29.

[9] Johnson and Yager, op. cit., p. 12. Also see Kennedy, W.V., "The Defense of Japan," SSI, 1979, pp. 2-10. Kennedy believes the air assault threat to be critical.

[10] Oka, T., "Soviet Base Renews Japan's Military Fears," Christian Science Monitor, 1 Oct. 1979, p. 3; JDA, op. cit, 1978, p. 65; For discussion of Soviet air assault see Kennedy, op. cit., 1979, pp. 2-10.

[11] Johnson and Yager, op. cit., 1979, pp. 18-19.

[12] Scalapino, Robert (ed), The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, 1977, p. 116.

[13] JDA, Defense of Japan, 1976, p. 56.

[14] Scalapino, op. cit., 1977, p. 117.

[15] Ike, N., Japan, the New Superstate, 1973, p. 106.

[16] Tsutomu, K. (ed), The Silent Power, 1976, pp. 206-207.

[17] JDA, op. cit., 1978, pp. 30-33.

[18] Ibid., pp. 27, 32-35; Janes Fighting Ships, 1968-1977; Surface Ships include aircraft carriers, destroyers and escort ships.

[19] Ibid. (JDA), pp. 16, 40, 50.

[20] See Shaplen, "Letter From South Korea," New Yorker, Nov. 16, 1978.

CHAPTER SIX

THE NATURE OF REARMAMENT

As an extension of the discussion of the military element of national security, it is necessary to examine the nature of rearmament, especially since there is much controversy surrounding its precise description. This chapter will address rearmament and describe the present defense trends in order to expand the understanding achieved in preceeding chapters and to form a basis for the succeeding chapters as well. It is best to accomplish this by use of a proposition.

(P1) Will the defense buildup program lead Japan to an "improved" (conventional) defense posture?

It is necessary first to review arguments supporting this proposition. There are those who have argued that Japan is already rearming at a rapid rate and, with her economic capability and arms industry, Japan will soon have a major military force. Variations of this view are continually purveyed by the media, because of the obvious sensational effect. For example, on December 3, 1978, CBS News 60 Minutes carried a report on Japanese defense development emphasizing its well trained and equipped forces. Tom Buckly, a television commentator for the New York Times said that, "even now Japan might be readying for another devastating strike somewhere in the Pacific."[1] The media tirade does not die and often carries an implied WWII analogy. Another report wrote in 1977 that Japan's

toughtest lesson from WWII was defending trade in her sea lanes, and the MSDF is oriented that way,[2] as if we were to expect a burgeoning navy capable of defending Japan's sea lanes. A Tokyo correspondent for the Economist wrote in 1978 in an article entitled "Japanese Defense, Out of the Closet," that the Japanese budget was creeping up and really was 1-1/2 percent of GNP because the Japanese did not count pensions as did Western nations[3] (as if there are no hidden costs in other national budgets). The implication of the title and article were that major defense moves were being made. But this small sample of critical journalism is not without its analytic counterpart.

In his popular work, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, Kahn linked economic and technological "power" to "other types of power" and saw the Japanese eventually striving to become a military superpower. Typically, Kahn stated his intention to open up the discussion rather than settle it. He continually admitted to overgeneralization, and he is so sympathetic to the Japanese that one wonders why he wrote such a critical book. Kahn's ambivalence caused him on one hand to tone down his predictions of military might and on the other to assert that "Japan's military weakness almost assuredly won't persist until the 1980's." He then conceded that self restraint in the military might be advantageous to economic growth and that Japan might make a virtue of military weakness. However, Kahn believed this is unlikely, partly because of underlying Japanese militaristic attitudes, which are considered to be of a prewar vintage. Essentially, Kahn hoped Japan would choose a low key military route, but predicted the opposite.[4]

In 1972, Brzezinski argued that even though the Japanese were spending less than one percent GNP on defense, the total increase in government financial programs was significant. A steady, measured, determined effort toward the emergence of a sizable military capability was seen. Brzezinski observed that with the large annual improvement in GNP, a constant percentage spent on defense was also an increase. He pointed out that some industry officials advocated a long distance strike capability to protect sea lanes and increased military expenditures to three percent of GNP. He believed that views of the elite to whom he had spoken represented advocacy and, thus, prediction of significant rearmament. At the same time, Brzezinski saw a dilemma in the opposition of the populace to rearmament. He decided, based on this evidence, an emerging arms industry, and what he considered to be a changing Japanese mood, that the most probable pattern would be a "deliberate and covert buildup" so that by 1975 Japan would not yet be a major power but could conduct quick, massive rearmament if required.[5]

Also in 1972, Axelbank said that there is a definite resurgence of military strength seen in an annual doubling of the defense budget "showing a tendency for boundless growth," a GSDF with "greater firepower than 1942 Imperial Army," Japan as the leading naval power in Asia excluding the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and "an intimate link" between arms manufactures and the military. Axelbank also saw the political leadership in the LDP, coupled with industrial interests, forming a link to continue pushing forward the "reverse course" on rearmament.[6]

In the mid-1970's, several other authors also focused on the theme of burgeoning Japanese military might. Among them, Halliday and McCormack argued that ties of the present SDF to the Imperial Army, a powerful military-industrial complex, major annual increases in defense expenditures, pressure from the U.S. and Japanese neo-imperialism in Southeast Asia combined to present the Japanese as an aggressive, expanding military power and a danger to peace.[7] In a 1975 work of similar construction, Sunoo charged that the Japanese military is the fifth largest in the world, presently dominates South Korea and Southeast Asia economically, has a major military-industrial complex, and harbors designs on Asia identical to the prewar period.[8]

Less biased analyses in the mid-1970s which focus on growing military include works by Forbis and Wu. Forbis concluded that Japan has the most skilled and modern military in the "Far East" with a budget of $3 billion per year ranking it sixth in the world. Forbis observed the SDF to be a highly lethal force, but considered it shakled by the one percent GNP ceiling, although he noted that this ceiling should be tempered by the reality of large GNP growth.[9] In 1975, Wu noted that Japan's 4th Five-Year Defense Plan (72-76) testified to Japan's willingness to do more for its own defense and led him to state that Japan's "growing military" could begin to take over security roles for the U.S. in East Asia. He thought that Japan would respond to threats to sea lanes by expanding her navy when challenged, and, in general, the U.S. could expect a growing security support role from the Japanese. This analysis indicated a growing Japanese conventional role as a prelude to nuclear rearmament.[10]

Recently, the Soviet Union has replaced the PRC as accuser of resurgent Japanese "militarization." Soviet annoyance with Japan coincides with the signing of the Japan-PRC Friendship Treaty which the U.S.S.R. said was "fraught with tremendous danger" and "in conflict with the interests of peace and detente."[11] The Soviets have long been concerned that Japan's technological and economic capabilities would lead to increased mobility and firepower on which they openly rated Japan highly in 1974.[12] In July 1979, TASS assailed increasing SDF strength noting it is greater than the Imperial Army and costing taxpayers a great deal. TASS called for the broad masses of Japanese to demand an end to the policy of "remilitarization" and the alliance with the U.S.[13]

Returning to an analytic counterpart, in 1978 Gordon saw the end of Japanese "low posture" on defense and reliance on the U.S. He noted that the 1977 "Defense White Paper" expressed doubts about the U.S.-Soviet balance with special concern for the growing Soviet threat in East Asia, and that PM Fukuda had added a "sphere of politics" to Japan's economic role, while endorsing $1 billion in support for ASEAN "regional projects." To Gordon, the broad meaning of this was that Japan is uneasy with her dependency status and wants to establish close relations with all Southeast Asian nations. This was believed to stem from uncertainty over the diminishing U.S. defense role in Asia. However, Gordon believed that the Japanese only desire an economic role and that the U.S. could halt the divisive trend by showing up its military position in Asia.[14] In the fall of 1979, Gordon seemed to believe the trend had worsened. He said there is a

tendency in Japan to read into every American action the bleakest interpretation for Japan's security and, consequently, Gordon was certain that Japan has began to move to a considerably stronger defense posture and would "increase significantly" her defense forces in the next three to five years. Gordon supported this argument in numerous ways, two of which will be mentioned. First, he relied heavily on personal contacts and interviews in Japan in 1978-79; however, no intereview data was provided. From these interviews he concluded that important "voices" had begun to advocate a push toward stronger defense forces. Second, he said there are numerous examples of Japanese who think the U.S. is (1) leaving Asia and (2) pressuring the Japanese to increase defense forces. While Gordon's article is interesting, one must suspect this kind of data, particularly when he misuses opinion polls, mixing those who support the present SDF with those who advocate strengthening it.[15] However, it is useful to consider his point of view anyway.

The preceding review of arguments advocating a resurging defense capability may be countered by numerous analysts who provide the opposite viewpoint such as M. Weinstein, Reischauer, F. Weinstein, Halperin, Clapp, Clough, Scalapino, Ike and others. Essentially, the opposite viewpoint is suggested in Chapters 3 and 5 where "realistic" defense is described and compared to the threat. It has already been ably demonstrated that Japan relies on the U.S. for the major defense burden. Essentially, there is a marked contrast between these two general points of view. One sees a trend toward burgeoning military might, and the other sees continued "low posture." Rather

than reviewing the various analyses which support the present "realistic" posture, it is best to analyze the basic proposition to see where policy is leading Japan and then interpret the results of this analysis.

What is the current defense buildup trend?

From a review of the "White Papers" on defense in the 1970's and analysis of defense policy and various policy statements, it may be concluded that the Japanese are gradually "building up" defensive capability. Table 6-1 shows this in terms of significant observable factors.

The "buildup" is a combined buildup and decline with an apparent net improvement considering technological advances, the creation of additional maneuver units and increased ship tonnage. However, these increases are offset by reductions in aircraft and GSDF personnel. Is this slight buildup trend leading to an "improved" defense posture?

In order to make a reasonable forecast, these additional factors need to be examined:

(1) What are policy goals?

(2) What is the record on goal accomplishment?

(3) What are spending policies, trends and forecasts?

(4) Is there evidence of any policy preconditions for "improved" defense?

Chapter 8 addresses defense spending as a function of economic growth so spending will be given only a cursory review here. From the analysis of the other factors, the likelihood of movement toward a higher posture will be determined.

TABLE 6-1: Defense Buildup Trend[16]

	FY 1960 (Final Year of 1st Plan)	FY 1966 (Final Year of 2nd Plan)	FY 1971 (Final Year of 3rd Plan)	FY 1976 (Final Year of 4th Plan)	FY 1979 (Annual Planning)
Ground	GSDF Personnel: 170,000	171,500	179,000	155,000	155,000
	Maneuver Units: 6 Inf. Div. 3 Comp. Bde. 1 Mech. Bde. 1 Tank Regt. 1 Abn. Bde.	12 Inf. Div. 1 Mech. Div. 1 Tank Regt. 1 Abn. Bde.	12 Inf. Div. 1 Mech. Div. 1 Tank Regt. 1 Abn. Bde.	12 Inf. Div. 1 Comp. Bde. 1 Mech. Div. 1 Tank Bde. 1 Abn. Bde.	12 Inf. Div. 1 Comp. Bde. 1 Mech. Div. 1 Tank Bde. 1 Abn. Bde.
	Air Defense: --	2 Hawk Units	4 Hawk Units	8 Hawk Units	8 Hawk Units
Maritime	Ships: Apx. 99,000 tons	Apx. 116,000 tons	Apx. 144,000 tons	Apx. 167,000 tons	Apx. 194,000 tons
	Aircraft: Apx. 220	Apx. 230	Apx. 240	Apx. 290	Apx. 200
Air	Aircraft: Apx. 1,130	Apx. 1,100	Apx. 940	Apx. 900	Apx. 440
	Air Units: 14 Radar Sites: 24 Nike Crps: 0	22 24 2	17 24 4	16 28 5	18 28 6
Total SDF Personnel Assigned (Authorized)	206,001 (230,935)	225,450 (296,094)	234,301 (260,688)	238,000 (266,000)	241,000 (268,000)
Total Reserve Personnel:	--	24,000	39,000	39,600	39,600

What improvements does defense policy call for?

The basic defense policy is described in Chapter 3-Military. Essentially, the SDF is designed to deter external aggression in tandem with the Japan-U.S. MST. After the fourth buildup plan, a "National Defense Program Outline" was developed in 1976 to clarify defense responsibilities and develop a more effective force. It remains in effect and is based on these assumptions.[17]

(1) The Japan-U.S. security system will be effectively maintained in the future.

(2) The United States and the Soviet Union will continue to avert nuclear warfare or large-scale conflict which could develop into nuclear warfare.

(3) Sino-Soviet confrontation will continue even if partial improvements in their relations are seen.

(4) The United States and China will move to adjust their relations in the future.

(5) The status quo will be maintained on the Korean Peninsula, and no large-scale armed conflict will break out.

There are three important components to the new policy. First, it continues to focus on "coping" with small scale aggression. Second, it aims at qualitative rather than quantitative improvements. In other words, Japan will retain essentially the same size force while changing its organization slightly and shifting emphasis to improving deficiencies with respect to the Soviet threat, as long as improvements are within constitutional constraints. As the JDA observes, "Defense capability...

can only function effectively when the quality...is maintained at parity with the potential scale of threat." Finally, the new policy recognizes that changes in international conditions, specifically abrogation of any of the five assumptions for the policy, may precipitate major improvements in the defense posture. The policy outline states that Japan's defense capability will be "standardized so that, when serious changes in situation demand, the defense structure can be smoothly adapted to meet such changes." The JDA observes that uncertainty in international politics cannot be ignored. Therefore, a collapse of the previously mentioned conditions could require "a strengthening and expansion of defense capability." The steps required to make such an expansion are included in the National Defense Program Outline.[18]

What is the record on goal accomplishment?

The short answer to this question is not good. Following a pattern set in the 1960's, the Japanese have consistently failed to meet procurement and authorized troop strength levels in the 1970's. Failure to meet planned equipment procurement goals has been the rule rather than the exception.[19] Examples are provided in Chapter 8 when procurement is examined. Furthermore, Table 6-1 shows consistent failure to meet authorized troop strength, and non-NCO GSDF troop strength has dropped to about 70 percent.[20]

The basic reasons for these shortfalls are restrained defense spending and, in the case of recruiting, low popularity of the SDF.[21] Despite a continual absolute increase in defense spending within the government budget, defense costs have decreased relative to other costs.

Within the defense budget, equipment costs have decreased relative to personnel costs.[22] In Chapter 8, defense spending is examined more closely.

Is there evidence of any policy preconditions for "improved" defense?

While spending is examined in Chapter 8, it is useful here to point out the continuing policy limit on defense spending of one percent of GNP. Because GNP growth has showed in the late 1970's and will remain gradual in the 1980's, this limit will serve as a greater restraint than it did ten years ago when annual GNP growth was almost twice as large as now. Furthermore, policy changes favoring social and environmental expenditures over growth are not likely to change in the present political climate. While there have been reports of analysts and others advocating removing the one percent limit, the existing policy has recently been reiterated, and the JDA has asked for a budget within policy limits for fiscal 1980.[23]

Policy derived from the Constitution will not change without revision, and, as discussed in Chapter 3, no such movement is under way or likely. Present policy does not allow "offensive" weapons. This precludes movement to an "independent" defense posture but possibly allows movement to an "improved" posture (see Table 4-2) with the consideration that this policy should allow Japan to defeat a major attack with minimal assistance. However, the ability to move even to an "improved" defense posture could be debated. On the one hand, it might be said that "offensive" weapons are necessary to defeat a major attack by counterattacking across the water toward enemy bases. Without

such weapons, Japan would wind up supporting the U.S. On the other hand, one might argue that the enemy may be defeated in the surrounding sea and in the landing area with "defensive" weapons. The U.S. could assist with long range bombers, troop deployment, and naval forces. Either point may be argued. It is best to concede that present constitutional policy may allow development of no higher than an "improved" defense posture, although there certainly would be debate on whether an "improved" level is allowable.

While the change in emphasis in the National Defense Program Outline from quantitative to qualitative indicated a leveling off of the buildup, one major policy change now indicates the potential to expand. That is the development of a mechanism for policy change to a higher defense posture. This is perhaps the most significant change in defense policy since 1952. The JDA states:[24]

> ...If there were major changes in the international geopolitical environment, and the previously mentioned assumptions (discussed in this chapter) collapsed, a strengthening and expansion of defense capability would be required (emphasis added). The National Defense Program Outlines provides for the various steps needed to smoothly implement such transition to a heightened defense posture.

From a policy viewpoint then, the potential for expansion is there in the form of the policy mechanism to allow expansion. However, one must recognize that some extant policy shortfalls or contradictions militate against expansion, such as the lack of a mobilization plan and legal problems as discussed in Chapter 3-Military. Generally, the net effect of this new policy change remains to be seen.

Conclusions (P1)

This chapter initially reviewed the major arguments advocating a trend towards at least an "improved" defense posture. Rather than addressing each argument, the course followed has been to examine a basic policy proposition. In doing this, consideration of two variables--national consensus and defense spending--has been deferred to Chapters 7 and 8, although a segment of the spending question has been discussed in this chapter. Recognizing this deferral, it is still possible to reach a conclusion.

The proposition, (P1), that the defense buildup program is leading Japan to an "improved" defense posture, is not supported by the analysis. Qualitative improvements are being made, but the buildup is reducing shortfalls in the "realistic" posture rather than approaching the "improved" posture. Some positive trends are seen in the force build-up such as improved technology in modern tanks, aircraft and ships; however, in many cases these trends are limited by slow procurement due to funding constraints and other problems. For example, the inability of the force to fill ground personnel will continue to limit its internal and external roles. General policy shortfalls or contradictions such as legal problems with the force and the lack of mobilization plans also retard SDF efficiency and deterrence value.

Under present policy conditions and considering that this analysis is limited in scope, it appears that the Japanese SDF will remain at the present "realistic" defense posture, directing efforts into improvement of present deficiencies. Yet, it has developed a plan for expanding its capabilities in the face of an increased threat, and this is a

significant change. The areas in which the analysis in this chapter is limited, national consensus and defense spending, are discussed in the following chapters.

CHAPTER SIX

ENDNOTES

[1] Kennedy, W.V. "The Defense of Japan," Special Report: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Penn, 1 Mar. 79, p. 1.

[2] Grazebrook, A.W. "Japanese Maintains Self Defense Force," Pacific Defense Reporter, Sept. 77, p. 51.

[3] Tokyo Correspondent "Japanese Defense, Out of the Closet," The Economist, 4 Mar. 78, p. 66.

[4] Kahn, Herman, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, 1970, pp. vii, 3, 9, 11, 22, 87, 93, 125, 151, 152, 157-164.

[5] Brzezinski, A. The Fragile Blossom, 1972, pp. 94-101.

[6] Axelbank, A., Black Star Over Japan..., 1972, pp. xi, 3, 5, 34-44, 55, 174.

[7] Halliday, J. and McCormack, G. Japanese Imperialism Today, 1973, pp. 80-83, 86, 89, 95, 104, 107-115.

[8] Sunoo, Harold H., Japanese Militarism Past and Present, 1975, p. 7, 100-105.

[9] Forbis, William H., Japan Today, 1975, pp. 421-423.

[10] Wu, Yan-Li, U.S. Policy and Strategic Interests in the Western Pacific, 1975, pp. 44-47, 51, 98, 111.

[11] Reported in the Kansas City Star (AP), 13 Aug., 1978.

[12] Kim, Young C. "Japanese-Soviet Relations" The Washington Papers, 1974, p. 3.

[13] TASS Broadcast, "TASS Exposes Japan's Arms Buildup," 6 Jul. 1979, JPRS doc. no. 73921, no. 33.

[14] Gordon, Bernard K. "Japan, The U.S. and Southeast Asia," Foreign Affairs, Apr. 1978, pp. 579-591.

[15] Gordon, Bernard K. "Loose Canon on a Rolling Deck: Japan's Changing Security Policies," Orbis, Winter, 1979, pp. 968-1003.

[16] A variety of sources are used to cross check figures: Because some do not agree, figures should be considered approximate. JDA, op. cit., 1978, pp. 66, 213; Buck, J.H. (ed) The Modern Japanese Military System, p. 242; ISS, The Military Balance (1976, 1977, 1978, 1979-80); JDA Defense of Japan 1976, p.91; Emmerson, op. cit., pp. 133-134, JDA Defense of Japan, 1977 (special pub.), p. 8; Oshima, R.J. "Japan's Postwar Rearmament: Progress and Problems" Tokyo 1971 (MA Thesis at Sophia Univ.), pp. 18, 30; Tomokisa, S. "Japan's Military Capabilities: Present and Future," Japan Quarterly, Oct.-Dec. 78, p. 414.

[17] JDA, op. cit., 1978, pp. 67, 69.

[18] JDA views and policy in previous two paragraphs from Ibid., pp. 70-77.

[19] A review of 1970 Defense White Papers shows this clearly, also Johnson and Yager, op. cit., p. 40 or Japan Economic Yearbook, Oriental Economist, 1979, pp. 77-78.

[20] Johnson and Yager, op. cit., p. 31.

[21] There is discussion over whether the problem in troop shortfall is one of recruiting difficulty or conscious restraint by the JDA to hold back spending. See Kennedy, W.V., op. cit., 1979, p. 10; Buck (ed) op. cit., pp. 67-98; 149-180. The author's opinion is that the problem probably lies in recruiting for less technical infantry type positions, similar to recruiting problems in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.

[22] JDA, op. cit., p. 208.

[23] JPRS, 74272 003, "JDA Submits FY80 Budget Request," Air Magazine, Apr. 79. (Japanese publication).

[24] JDA, op. cit., 1978, p. 70.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ATTITUDES AND DEFENSE POSTURE

This chapter will examine attitudes in order to determine their effect on the character and strength of defense posture. To direct the analysis, two propositions will be addressed.

(P2) Will rising nationalism lead to resurgent militarism causing increased aggressive military power?

(P3) Will a changing national consensus on defense policy cause an increased defense posture?

The first proposition focuses on the character of national attitudes and defense posture. It is linked directly to an increase in defense posture of an aggressive nature. The second focuses on changing attitudes about the existence and mission of the SDF.

(P2) Will rising nationalism lead to resurgent militarism causing increased aggressive military power?

The approach shall be first to examine the dependent variable, militarism, to see if there is evidence of a rise. Then, Japanese nationalism shall be examined. Based on what appears to be near consensus among analysts of all pursuasions and the discussion in Chapter 3, we may assume nationalism in the post-war era is on the rise. Therefore, the effort shall be to determine whether militarism is on the rise and if the two variables are connected. We shall first analyse four general categories of militarism.

In November 1979, reports appeared that Tojo and 1000 other "war criminals" had been enshrined adding to fears that "Japan was reviving militarism," and "the government was moving toward restoring state support for Shinto shrines."[1] This report is typical of some which appear periodically and attempt to link "war criminals" or wartime soliders to military and political leadership. It is part of a general category of militarism which is preoccupied with the idea of war criminals or rightists attempting to revive the prewar system. The Emperor Hirohito is said to be an untried war criminal, and his trip to Europe in 1971 is said to be an effort to revise the Constitution, a move sometimes construed as militaristic.[2] The presence of former Imperial soldiers in the military is emphasized. Halliday and McCormack note the SDF is headed by veterans of earlier wars of aggression, citing the Chief of Staff from 1959 to 1962 as a planner of Pearl Harbor.[3] In general, the idea of this brand of alleged militarism is that "war criminals" and former Imperial officers have influenced a new military in the mold of its prewar predecessor.

The second category of militarism involves extreme, ultra-nationalist acts which are linked to reviving militarism. Coups de'tat attempts and assassination in the early 1960's and the Mishima suicide of 1970 are the primary examples. A leading spokesman for ultranationalists was the popular novelist Mishima. On 25 November, 1970, after haranging elements of the SDF to rise to political action, he committed seppuku, an act which fascinated Japanese and caused much self-reflection. Outside commentators, especially Japanese neighbors, identified the act as a clear sign of resurgent militarism.[4] Mishima's act was said to reveal a deep vein of anti-modernism, and sympathy for

it was said to be shocking. Implied or stated is the idea that to be Japanese and to be nationalistic is to be militaristic; that the cult of Bushido lies just beneath the surface. Some analysts saw a link between Mishima's followers, the Shield Society, and the SDF, which is said to have tolerated and assisted the extremist group and to have been sympathetic to Mishima's extreme act.[5]

A third general category of militarism involves the alleged proliferation and influence of rightist groups on the LDP and society. Axelbank noted that by the first postwar election, 193 ultranationalist groups with militaristic goals were in action. He reported that in 1970 the national police listed 460 rightist groups with 140,000 members, and about 2.5 million sympathizers.[6] Thus, with this data, growth is suggested. Furthermore, rightist influence is inferred from the position on some issues of the LDP right wing. According to some authoritative sources, the right wing advocates amending the Constitution, substantial rearmament, anti-communism, restoring traditional values and using force to prevent a socialist or communist takeover in Japan (the internal security mission of the SDF). Rightists advocate these same views, but include more extreme causes such as Imperial restoration, placing the military under Emperor, radical anti-communism and assassination as a viable political tool (of course, rightist groups vary in intensity and ideology). Rightist influence is said to be shown in society by the revival of old warrior hero stories, posthumous decorations for Imperial soldiers, yearly wartime exhibits and a more sympathetic look at the past in textbooks.[7] In 1972, Brzezinski saw a symbolic change in the postwar pacifist mood by the excision of the peace dove from the uniform and the blossoming defense dialogue. He believed that

among pressures for rearmament were feelings of insecurity (among the elite) and rising nationalism.[8] In general, those who adhere to this category, see signs of militarism whenever signs of traditionalism or a political "reverse course" appear. They equate militarism with political conservatism or cultural traditionalism.

A final category of militarism is seen by some in Japan's so-called aggressive defense and foreign policy in the 1970's. Charges of "neocolonialism" have been made because of extensive Japanese investment and trade in South Korea and Southeast Asia.[9] In 1973, Japan's negative image in Southeast Asia caused Prime Minister Tanaka to be greeted by anti-Japanese demonstrations in almost every country he visited, including massive riots in Indonesia.[10] Militaristic tendencies were seen in Japanese claims to the Senkaku Islands and increased dialogue about defense policy, particularly the advocacy of nuclear arms by some members of the LDP right wing in response to China's nuclearization.[11] Some authors focus on large increases in military expenditures and the growth of an "influential military-industrial complex" as signs of rising military influence leading to militarism.[12] Halliday and McCormack emphasized the growth and importance of self-succiciency in arms, and they linked modern industry to the prewar zaibatsu. They also noted an "offensive" military orientation and a growing sphere of military influence shown in close ties between the Japanese and Korean military. This is also a frequent charge of the JSP. Halliday and McCormack also consider Japan to be clearly willing to move into a gap caused by the U.S. withdrawal. Evidence of aggressive tendencies is seen in the occasional Japanese

proposal of using troops in regional disaster assistance, which they considered to be a guise for infiltration.[13] Axelbank observed that Japanese ambitions for Taiwan and buzzing of Russian ships were signs of aggressive, militaristic behavior.[14] In general, advocates of this category emphasize military growth and activity, and Japanese overseas economic and political activity as signs of reviving militarism. Interestingly, the JSP concurs with most of these allegations.[15]

In the discussion thus far, four major categories of alleged militaristic behavior are identified. They closely correspond and in some cases are redundant with the charges of major rearmament made by some analysts and reviewed in Chapter 6. This is because the ideas of military strength and militarism are frequently used interchangeably. Ideally, by the definition of militarism developed in Chapter 2, this is incorrect; however, practically, it is difficult to seperate the two ideas, and they must unavoidably overlap somewhat. The four categories of militarism identified are:

(1) The influence of "war criminals" and Imperial soldiers on the postwar military.

(2) The "trend" of extreme acts of ultranationalism of a militaristic character and their influence on the military and society.

(3) The proliferation and growth of ultranationalist groups and their influence on LDP, military and society.

(4) Japan's new, aggressive foreign (economic) and military policy which evidences increasing militarism.

To analyze these four categories, we shall avoid focusing on the specific instances cited by advocates of reviving militarism, although

most of them are disputable. Instead of debating the specific evidence given, the focus shall be the idea embodied in each category to see whether it is a valid notion. The reason for this approach is that the evidence given was illustrative but incomplete, and the process of an exhaustive review and analysis of each item would be too lengthy an ordeal. It also seems more effective a technique to address the general idea rather than the specific case. The four categories of militarism will now be reviewed and put into perspective.

As for an Imperial military influence or the modern SDF, the latter bears little resemblance to the former, save some outward trappings such as the salute. Humphreys observes that, despite some enduring military themes in society such as in traditional theater and popularity of martial arts, the military institution does not foster a "traditional" military tradition. They have faced the problem of a lack of tradition by developing technical competence, professionalism, public acceptance and job satisfaction. All consequential ties with the Emperor, Shinto nationalism, and the tradition of the Imperial forces have been ended. Religious beliefs in the military, as in soceity, are secular. The general acceptance of the SDF, which will be shown later in this chapter, combined with a continuing revulsion for militarism, which may be found in almost any poll and the analyses of Buck, Reischauer, Ike and others, together discredit the notion that former Imperial officers and others have developed the SDF in the mold of prewar forces.[16]

The idea of a trend of extremist acts influencing the military and society is a gross exaggeration. There have only been a few, isolated

postwar acts of ultranationalist violence near the noteriety or scope of the Mishima suicide. The military and society have remained aloof, even repugnated by rightist antics. There was no support for the Mishima call to arms and no military action to restore the Imperial Way.[17] Reischauer observed the Japanese to have been "thrilled by Mishima's act, for they have always found suicide a fascinating subject, but they overwhelmingly repudiated his political motivations. There was indeed little possibility of reverting to the ethos of the past..."[18] Finally, as previously mentioned, public opinion surveys show little shift in underlying anti-militarism attitudes.[19]

There is no doubt that there are a lot of ultranationalist groups. However, neither their number nor size have changed very much since 1960. They are a small, uninfluential segment of society. In 1960, Morris observed them to be splintered by their lack of ideology and negative brand of motivation, with limited spheres of influence. In 1975, Dixon arrived at the same conclusion, although he noted their influence had waned since the 1960 Security Treaty crisis. They had changed to a non-violent approach but retained their assassination ethic.

Both Morris and Dixon agree it is more difficult to measure the size of the extreme right than the extreme left, for the latter is politically more organized with a more consistent Marxist ideology. Morris estimated that in 1955, two percent of the national vote went to rightist candidates and 2.3 percent in 1958. Dixon observed that votes received by Bin Akao, a perennial rightist candidate, are considered by some journalists to be a barometer of rightist influence.

In the 1960's Akao received about 120,000 votes in national elections and was never close to being elected. To see his relative strength, in the 1967 Tokyo gubernatorial election, he and another candidate received just under 27,000 votes, combined lowest in a field of eight candidates, while the two frontrunners received more than two million votes apiece. In December 1972 general elections, 13 rightist organization leaders were all defeated, each one usually receiving the fewest votes.

What about rightist influence on the right wing of the LDP? As Dixon points out, it is incorrect to link the two groups or to even think of rightists as a cohesive force. There is a large difference between rightist use of extremist violence and right wing willingness to compromise within a democratic political system. There is also a difference between advocating a return to militarism as opposed to advocating a civilian controlled but strengthened military. The two groups may share a few of the same goals, but they certainly do not advocate the same means. From the preceeding discussion, it is not surprising that Morris and Dixon conclude from their detailed analyses of the Japanese right, that rightist influence on the political system and on society is very low.[20]

The final category of militarism, concerning aggressive foreign and defense policies, was discounted in Chapters 3 and 6. Japan is hardly aggressive, having only risen from a "low posture" to a more outward directed approach in foreign policy in this decade. Japan's military threatens no one. Those who focus on these kinds of issues seem to be preoccupied with wartime ghosts, which have become more awesome in memory

than they were in reality. The revival of these ghosts, a quite different prospect than a few people worshipping their memory, is a very unlikely prospect.

In the mid 1970's many analysts have disputed the advocates of rising militarism. In 1973, Clough cited opinion polls to show general opposition to offensive capability,[21] and Lee observed in 1976 that opinion, even during heated Chinese charges of militarism in the early 1970's, did not support the idea of reviving militarism.[22] Indeed, Chinese charges were later shown to be purely rhetoric. Clough emphasized the role the press had assumed of attacking any signs of militarism,[23] and Ike observed that opposition parties would obstruct all militaristic tendencies. He emphasized deep-rooted Japanese pacifism reflected in continuing SDF recruiting difficulties.[24] Despite the presence of rightist groups, Emmerson and Humphreys concluded that the system of civilian control, opposition parties, public opinion and a free, pervasive press would retard militarism.[25] Because of bad memories with past experience, internal resistance, and regional uneasiness, Hinton concluded that the new nationalism was not militaristic.[26] Scalapino and others observed that too many things had changed for Japan to return to the era of the 1930's.[27] Indeed, the study of Japanese history in Chapter 1 makes this comment almost self-evident. Japan has achieved under peace, democracy and economic development, what she never even closely achieved under aggression and military dominance.

There are occasional incidents in the military in the 1970's which some construe to be signs of militarism.[28] One need only examine them closely to see they are related more to frustration by some officers

over their contradictory role. In July 1978, General Hiroomi Kurisu, Chairman of the Joint Staff Council said, "I have no choice but to train my men to engage in supralegal action if they are to repel a surpise attack effectively." His reason for making this public statement was that Japanese law prohibits members of the SDF from returning enemy fire until the Prime Minister gives the defense mobilization order. For his transgression, General Kurisu was dismissed. Fukuda's government did announce it would study this matter; however, one authoritative source guessed that would take several years.[29] One can only imagine the frustration of a military leader explaining to his soldiers that they must man their posts even though they cannot yet defend them.

In this and other similar examples of defense policy contradictions, Japan faces the danger that the military will be suppressed to the point of a major explosion of frustration, even though it is evident that militarism is not reviving. The military role, as discussed in Chapter 2, is to provide sound, even counsel in the shaping of security policy. In Japan, the military is so buried under civilian control that it appears to have no influence at all. A good thing--civilian control--has been carried too far owing to memories of wartime military dominance. Though unlikely, this could lead to an alliance of the military with the far right, because of the basic patriotic stance of rightists. While rightist organizations have failed to build a mass following, Dixon believes they stand a good chance of triumphing in a crisis precipitating a government breakdown.[30] It is possible to envision several scenarios in which economic and military threats prompt a move toward the right, perhaps a revival of militarism despite evidence to

the contrary. Were this to occur, one would hope it would be within the control of the existing political system.

Conclusion (P2)

Research does not support the proposition. None of the so-called categories of militarism are growing. In some cases they have no substance at all. Therefore, it may be said that postwar nationalism has grown without causing revived militarism. This supports the ideas developed in Chapter 3. Instead of being outwardly aggressive, modern Japanese nationalism is introspective and achievement oriented. Pride and a sense of uniqueness as Japanese also play a part. Surveys show interest in external aspects of defense and foreign policy to be lower than interest in domestic issues. The goals of "welfare nation" and "economic power" are consistently preferred by wide margins over "political..." or "military power," which receive little support.[31] Indeed, the corollary of the disproved proposition, that modern Japanese nationalism inhibits militarism, is pursuasive.

It must be emphasized that a narrow, precise definition of militarism has been used. In ideal circumstances of the Western democratic tradition, the military is professional, uncorruptable by politics, and militarism is not present. This does not prevent a country from developing a strong military force. The idea is that the military will remain responsive to civilian control, so long as it is professional, and proper institutional arrangements exist.

There is no reason to question the technical competence or professionalism of the Japanese military, although the lack of a long tradition is a difficulty which must be faced. Because the SDF has

developed without reversion to traditional methods, because there is no public support for militarism, and because of the democratic system, there is little reason to say that a further defense buildup would lead to a revival of militarism. This does not mean people will not charge "militarism" since the term is often used incorrectly as synomous with military strength. Nor does it mean that the military might not try to exert political hegemony in a crisis. Indeed, though it is unlikely, members of the military could conceivably do this under pressure. However, so long as the present system remains intact and, provided military influence is allowed when it is vitally needed, one should not expect a revival of militarism. That is, the present system has not allowed or precipitated militarism despite a defense buildup, and it does not appear to be at all likely in the future, whether the defense posture is strengthened or not.

(P3) Will a changing national consensus or defense policy cause an increased defense posture?

To address this proposition we shall focus on the domestic (public) component of national consensus. The best way to examine national attitudes on this issue is through the use of opinion surveys. Recognizing that there are some pitfalls with encapsulating domestic consensus, the approach shall be to make use of opinion polls in order to assess general attitudes. There are a wide range of related polls. For brevity, this paper will only focus on those which are most useful for evaluating the proposition.

It has been shown that consensus is an important traditional force in Japan; indeed, democratic ideas and a consensus culture seem symbiotic.

As a result of this and other social and cultural factors--notably cultural homogeneity and geographic isolation--consensus is particularly important in Japan. Normally, it preceeds policy, although in the initial postwar period there were exceptions in some of the occupation reforms and in the "reverse course," particularly the inception of the SDF. Those unusual circumstances aside, it is still possible, though unlikely, for the political leadership to attempt to initiate policy without consensus, as in the 1960 MST crisis. Under normal circumstances, however, one may expect consensus to preceed policy. While an emergency might cause an exception, a subsequent effort would be made to develop consensus.[32]

Because of the early difficult circumstances facing the SDF, mainly the lack of consensus on its inception, the Defense Agency paid special attention toward public relations. To address negative attitudes, policies focused on improving the SDF image and engendering public support, not dissimilar to the U.S. Military's volunteer effort in the 1970's. However, the Japanese went further than the Americans. While the U.S. forces focused on national defense, the Japanese focused on disaster relief--it became their most frequent mission. From 1951 to 1975, the SDF responded to 10,000 calls for relief assistance using about 3.5 million man days. Public engineering and welfare missions were also important, and a review of the 1978 Defense "White Paper" shows this to remain true today.[33]

Somewhat surprisingly, a majority of people have always recognized the primary purpose of establishing the SDF was for external and internal (public peace) security as shown in Table 7-1.[34] Also, this awareness is gradually rising.

TABLE 7-1: Public Opinion; Primary Purpose for Establishment of SDF[35]
(In Percent)

	1965	1969	1972	1975	1977
Disaster Relief	15	13	10	13	13
National Security (External)	40	50	56	57	60
Public Peace (Internal Security)	28	22	20	21	16
Community Activities	3	2	2	1	1
Don't Know	14	13	12	8	10

Yet, because of low perceptions of a threat (Chapter 5), public relations efforts, and major emphasis on disaster relief, the overwhelming majority considers the non-security mission of disaster relief to be the most useful as shown in Table 7-2.[36]

TABLE 7-2: Public Opinion; In What Way Has SDF Been Useful So Far?
(In Percent)

	1965	1969	1972	1975	1977
Disaster Relief	75	71	74	74	75
National Security	4	8	5	8	7
Public Peace	3	5	6	7	6
Community Activities	5	4	5	4	3
Don't Know/Others	8	12	10	7	9

Another reason for this seeming anomaly may be that the tangible benefits of disaster relief are more obvious than the intangible benefits of deterrence. In the face of a clear threat, one would expect the value of deterrence to be recognized. Thus, it is evident that either there has been no clear threat (to support the finding in Chapter 5) or the SDF has not contributed to deterrence of a threat in the public view.

Looking to the future, there is a growing awareness of the importance of the security mission for the SDF, although there is no consensus on it as yet. Table 7-3 shows that the combined internal (public peace) and external security mission have increased in importance relative to the non-security mission so that support is roughly equally divided between the two general concepts.[37]

TABLE 7-3: Public Opinions; How Should SDF Efforts be Concentrated? (In Percent)

	1965	1969	1972	1975	1977
a. Missions:					
Disaster Relief	40	24	38	34	38
National Security (External)	15	29	24	30	34
Public Peace (Internal)	16	19	16	19	11
Community Activities	11	5	7	5	4
Don't Know/Others	13	13	15	12	13
b. Combined by Type:					
Internal and External Security	31	48	40	49	45
Non-Security	51	29	46	39	42
Don't Know/Others	13	13	15	12	13

The JDA concludes from these studies that "national security is an issue with little apparent relation to people's livelihood in general" also noting that other polls consistently show more than half of the respondents to have little interest in defense issues.[38] Here, the additional conclusion is offered that, despite some general misgivings about international and regional tension, the Japanese do not sufficiently perceive a direct threat to Japan to ascribe national security as the major SDF function; however, there is a trend towards recognition of the

national security (internal and external) mission which has made it equally important with the non-security mission, despite evidence of a domestic consensus that the major benefit has come from disaster relief.

Closely related to the views of SDF missions, but independent of the particular mission supported, are views toward the existence of the SDF. In an example of how two independent views could be held, a person could oppose the security mission but support the SDF as a disaster-relief force. Despite opposition to SDF formation and post-war pacifism, since the mid-1950's most respondents have supported the existence of the SDF. Table 7-4 shows an increasing trend of support for the necessity of the SDF.[39]

TABLE 7-4: Public Opinion; Is SDF Necessary for Japan or Not? (In Percentages)

	1956	1959	1963	1967	1972	1975	1977
Better to Have	58	65	76	77	73	79	83
Don't Know	24	24	18	17	15	13	10
Better Not to Have	18	11	6	6	12	8	7

One may conclude from this that there is strong evidence of growing domestic consensus supporting the present "realistic" defense posture.

It is necessary to keep the ideas of maintaining the SDF and strengthening it separate. This is illustrated by examining opposition parties which now support the SDF but violently oppose expansion (and in some cases espouse reduction). Some analysts fail to recognize this. As mentioned in Chapter 6, Gordon recently used public opinion polls

to support his notion of a "changing consensus" toward a much stronger defense. At first glance, his data seems to support the idea; however, if one looks closely, it may be seen that Gordon combined the figures for "strengthen" with those for "keep it the same." He said that in 1978, Asahi showed 77 percent of its national sample believed "the SDF should be strengthened or the present situation should be maintained."[30] It is important not to make the same error as did Gordon. While a person may conceivably advocate both the present posture and an increased posture, there is a clear difference between supporting defense forces and advocating making them stronger.

For this reason, the survey analysis for strengthening the SDF is kept separate in this paper from that for maintaining or supporting its existence. We have already found domestic consensus in favor of maintaining the present force. Table 7-5 shows survey results from 1960 to 1977 concerning support for expanding or strengthening the SDF, which will be taken to mean increasing the defense posture, even though some, who would like to see the SDF strengthened, might not want to go as far as the "improved" defense posture.

TABLE 7-5: Support for Expansion of the Self-Defense Forces[41]
(In percentages)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1970	1972	1973	1974	1975	1977
Strengthen SDF	19	17	16	15	16	10	9	11	17	34
Keep it same	49	51	54	57	53	42	62	42	53	29
Weaken SDF	15	15	14	14	12	23	5	31	10	8
Others/Don't Know	17	17	16	14	19	25	24	6	20	29
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

While the majority does not support "strengthen," it is obvious that some of the people who support the existence of the SDF also want to strengthen it, and there is a small, increasing trend in that direction. Interestingly, in the 1977 poll, the largest group advocated "strengthen" for the first time. This indication of a possible trend needs to be watched closely.

Related to attitudes toward the SDF are attitudes towards more general security policy which will not be treated in depth here. It is useful to observe public perceptions of the present security relationship with the U.S. In the 1970's, in sharp contrast to the 1960 MST crisis, opinion has formed a consensus in support of the treaty arrangement with the U.S. as shown in the partial results of Table 7-6.[42]

TABLE 7-6: Public Opinion; Do You Support the U.S.-Japanese MST Arrangement? (In Percent)

	1970	1972	1975	1976	1978
Support the MST	44	41	71	63	70
...					

Most observers seem to agree on this increasing recognition of the usefulness of the MST; however, there is also growing concern over the declining power and will of the U.S. in East Asia. In a 1978 Asahi poll, 56 percent believed the U.S. would not defend Japan in a crisis.[43] Various analysts ascribe different interpretations to this, but most agree that the perceived decline of U.S. power and influence is of concern, despite continuing U.S. efforts to reassure the Japanese.

Conclusion (P3)

From the preceeding analysis, it may be concluded that the proposition, determine if a changing national consensus on defense policy is leading to an increased defense posture, is not supported. There is consensus on the present "realistic" defense posture and the security arrangement with the U.S. There is no consensus on national security as the main mission of the SDF or the need to move to a stronger defense posture. However, two minor trends show an increasing awareness of the importance of the national security mission of the SDF and increasing support for strengthening the SDF, although it must be emphasized that these trends both represent less than half of the respondents. Reflecting public opinion, consensus supporting the SDF but opposing its expansion (in most cases) is now present among opposition parties (Chapter 3), and many observers have commented on the increased candor in the press and from politicians on defense issues. In short, public attitudes show increasing awareness of defense issues but no consensus or major trend towards an "improved" defense posture. (The political aspect of national consensus is further examined in Chapter 9).

CHAPTER SEVEN

ENDNOTES

[1] Reported in the Kansas City Star (AP, 7 Nov. 79, p. 6.

[2] Halliday, J. and McCormack, G., Japanese Imperialism Today, 1973, pp. 90-92.

[3] Ibid., pp. 77-78.

[4] Reischauer, E.O., Japan, The Story of a Nation, 1974, p. 337.

[5] Halliday and McCormack, op. cit., 1973, pp. 91-92; Sunoo, H., Japanese Militarism, Past and Present, 1975, p. 4; Axelbank, A., Black Star Over Japan, 1972, pp. 69-82.

[6] Axelbank, op. cit., 1972, p. 89.

[7] Dixon, K.H., The Extreme Right Wing in Contemporary Japan, Ph.D. Thesis, FSU, 1975, p. 28.

[8] Brzezinski, Z., The Fragile Blossom, 1972, pp. 97-101.

[9] Scalapino, R., "U.S. Policy in Korea," speech, 2 Apr. 1977, pp. 8-10.

[10] Reischauer, E.O., op. cit., 1974, p. 344.

[11] Axelbank, op. cit., 1972, Chap. 9; also a basic theme of Kahn, Wu, Sunoo, Whiting, Halliday and McCormack, not to mention numerous journalists.

[12] Basically the same group at 11 above.

[13] Halliday and McCormack, op. cit., 1973, pp. 88-105; Japan Socialist Review, Jan. 1979, p. 19.

[14] Axelbank, op. cit., 1972, pp. 153-159.

[15] Japan Socialist Review, Jan. 1979, p. 19.

[16] For a further discussion and evidence of ideas in this paragraph, see Buck, James H. (ed) The Modern Japanese Military System, 1975, pp. 36-39.

[17] Dixon, op. cit., 1975, pp. 267-268.

[18] Reischauer, op. cit., 1974, p. 337.

[19] Buck (Mendel), op. cit., 1975, p. 156. For an example of antimilitarism opinion polls.

[20] Previous three paragraphs drawn from Dixon, op. cit., 1975, pp. 300-306; Morris, I., The Extreme Right Wing in Contemporary Japan, 1960.

[21] Clough, Ralph N., East Asia and U.S. Security, 1975, pp. 56-58.

[22] Lee, Chae-Jin, Japan Faces China, 1976, p. 92.

[23] Clough, op. cit., 1975, pp. 56-58.

[24] Ike, N., Japan, The New Superstate, 1973, p. 105.

[25] Emmerson and Humphreys, Will Japan Rearm?, 1973, pp. 8, 24, 66, 95-106.

[26] Hinton, H., Three and a Half Powers, 1975, p. 218.

[27] Scalapino, Robert, Asia and the Road Ahead, 1975, pp. 37, 41.

[28] See Bernard K. Gordon, "Loose Canon on a Rolling Deck...," Orbis, Winter, 79, pp. 97-975.

[29] Kennedy, W.V., "The Defense of Japan," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1 Mar. 79, p. 1.

[30] Dixon, op. cit., 1975, pp. 316-325.

[31] Buck, J. (ed), op. cit., 1975, pp. 157-159.

[32] Scalapino, Robert A. (ed), The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, 1977, pp. 105-107.

[33] JDA, The Defense of Japan, 1976, pp. 69-70; JDA, The Defense of Japan, 1978, pp. 110, 220-221.

[34] Ibid. JDA, 1976, p. 56. Polls are taken by the Cabinet Information Office.

[35] JDA, op. cit., 1978, p. 176. Survey results by Prime Minister's Office until 1977; In 1977 by independent contractor.

[36] Ibid., p. 176.

[37] Ibid., p. 177.

[38] Ibid., p. 178.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Gordon, op. cit., 1979, p. 972.

[41] Buck, James H. (ed) The Modern Japanese Military System, 1975, p. 166 (from PM Office, Kyodo and Mainichi); also JDA, op. cit., 1976, p. 55 and JDA, op. cit., 1978, p. 173.

[42] Ibid., 1978, p. 172; other figures quoted in the Kansas City Star, March 5, 1979 from polls, Japan Times, 29 Oct. 78 taken by Prime Minister's Office.

[43] Quoted in Kennedy, op. cit., 1979, p. 6.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEFENSE POSTURE

Based on definitions and analysis in preceeding chapters, notably Chapter 3-Economics, we are now able to investigate a proposition which considers the relationship between economic growth and defense posture. (P4) Will economic growth cause Japan to move to an "improved" defense posture in the 1980's?

The approach shall be to determine the relationship between economic growth and defense spending, compare defense spending to other nations, and forecast defense spending and defense posture for the 1980's.

Refining the proposition to three hypotheses, we have:

H_1: GNP growth causes growth of defense spending.

H_2: Government policy limits defense spending.

H_3: The present defense spending trend will cause Japan to move to an "improved" defense posture in the 1980's.

A discussion of defense spending, defense posture and GNP is in Chapter 2. Government policy decisions are implied or stated in all three hypotheses, and they include choices made in allocating funds by the administration and general spending policy on defense. A spending level commensurate with an "improved" defense posture will be a "major power level"[1] defined as the level among France, Britain and Germany--as discussed in Chapter 4 and further amplified in this chapter.

The first hypothesis, H_1, is investigated by comparing GNP growth and defense spending growth in the past ten years as shown in Table 8-1.[2]

TABLE 8-1: Economic Growth, Government and Defense Spending for Ten Years
(Figures in 1 billion yen)

ITEM / FY	NOMINAL GNP (A)	GROWTH FROM PREVIOUS YEAR	GENERAL ACCOUNT (B)	GROWTH FROM PREVIOUS YEAR	DEFENSE EXPENDITURE (C)	GROWTH FROM PREVIOUS YEAR	C/A (PCT)	C/B (PCT)	B/A (PCT)
1968	53288.2	17.6	5818.5	17.5	422.1		.79	7.3	10.9
1969	62259.9	16.8	6739.5	15.8	483.8	14.6	.78	7.2	10.8
1970	73049.5	17.3	7949.7	18.0	569.5	17.7	.78	7.2	10.9
1971	81577.0	11.7	9314.3	17.2	670.9	17.8	.82	7.2	11.4
1972	94729.4	16.1	11467.6	23.1	800.2	19.2	.84	7.0	12.1
1973	115675.2	22.1	14284.0	24.6	935.5	16.9	.81	6.5	12.3
1974	136422.4	17.9	17099.4	19.7	1093.0	16.8	.80	6.4	12.5
1975	149631.6	9.7	21288.8	24.5	1327.3	21.4	.89	6.2	14.2
1976	169208.6	13.1	24296.0	14.1	1512.4	13.9	.89	6.2	14.4
1977	192850.0	14.0	28514.3	17.4	1690.6	11.8	.88	5.9	14.8
1978	210600.0	9.2	34295.0	20.3	1901.0	12.4	.90	5.4	16.3
MEAN:		14.8		19.5		16.3	.84	6.6	12.8

The mean or average annual growth in defense spending is 16.3 percent, a little higher than the average annual growth in (nominal) GNP of 14.8 percent. The relationship between these two variables is shown in figure 8-1.

FIGURE 8-1: GNP Growth Compared to Defense Expenditure Growth



Considering that these figures are percentages, it appears that there is a close correlation, particularly if defense growth is offset two years to compensate for planning decisions. Another way of viewing the correlation of these variables is the relatively steady ratio between defense spending and GNP during the past ten years shown in figure 8-2. A level line would show a perfect correlation.

FIGURE 8-2: Ratio of Defense Spending to GNP[3]
(In Percent)



However, it should be noted this consistency did not exist in the preceeding fifteen year period. Then, defense spending as a percentage of GNP declined steadily, showing that GNP growth neither accompanied nor caused asimilar growth in defense spending then. In figure 8-2, the slight increase in relative defense spending from FY 70 to FY 78 reflects the variation in figure 8-1. As a tentative conclusion for H_1, there appears to be a close relationship between GNP growth and defense spending growth in the past ten years.

An analysis of inflation during this period helps confirm this tenta-

tive finding. To a large degree, the increase in defense spending relative to GNP from 1975 to 1978, shown in a rise of about .1 percent of GNP annually in table 8-1, is explaned by severe inflation which plagued Japan from 1973 to 1975. Normal creeping inflation, which had been six to ten percent annually, suddenly became cost-push inflation and jumped to almost 25 percent in 1974, the worst in the industrialized world.[4] The spiraling effect of a 24.9 percent increase in consumer prices was a decline of .5 percent in real economic growth in 1974 and only a small increase of about two percent in real growth in 1975.[5] In 1974 and 1975, the real defense budget also remained stagnant, showing no compensation for inflation. Indeed, table 8-1 shows there was probably a net loss. From 1975 to 1978, a .1 percent of GNP increase was made in the defense budget, possibly an effort to recoup some of the loss; however, the spending increase was small compared to the inflationary loss. This may be better understood by reviewing the adverse impact of the tight money policy on defense procurement.

Reduced buying power contributed to numerous shortfalls in the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan as discussed in Chapter 6. Procurement shortfalls adversely impacted an industry causing the Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations) Defense Production Committee to favor removing the arbitrary one percent of GNP ceiling on defense expenditures, not to move to an "improved" defense posture but instead to meet procurement goals of the present "realistic" defense posture. Procurement shortfalls have been mostly with Japanese industry instead of U.S. industry, Japan's largest arms supplier (Japan is the largest

U.S. customer). According to the Oriental Economist, this has meant an erosion of the fledgling Japanese research and development effort begun in 1970, because of increased reliance on the U.S.[5] Essentially, this has served to retard qualitative improvement by slowing Japanese technological advances. In 1976, the JDA observed, "due to spiraling prices and government policy of curbing gross demand (limiting spending to retard inflation), a considerable portion of the major equipment additions...will not be implemented [and]... will be shelved entirely ..." Examples included 17 of 54 ships, 42 or 211 aircraft, and 31 of 280 tanks unfulfilled and lost as of December 30, 1975. A comparison of 1976 planned strength and 1978 actual strength in major items of equipment shows these two figures to be fairly close indicating 1976 goals were finally reached in 1978.[6]

Again, this does not mean that increased spending of .1 percent of GNP allowed Japan to redress losses. Procurement is still delayed. The F15, an aircraft the Japanese need now to "cope with" the Soviet air threat, originally scheduled for deployment beginning in FY 1977, has been delayed twice, ostensibly for non-budgetary reasons. Deployment of the first squadron will not take place until October 1982. As a result of this kind of problem, one analysis noted Japan's tight money policy denies growth from previous years.[7] Perhaps it is more accurate to say that real growth in defense spending is limited, and procurement goals are often not met.

This analysis supports the assertion that defense spending is not responsive to inflation. Instead, it is more accurate to say that nominal GNP growth is closely correlated to nominal defense spending.

Of course, if inflation remains low and controlled, then the impact on defense spending will not be as great.

The rationale for the causal direction of the relationship is simple. Defense spending is too small to have a major impact on the economy. Since the Korean war, the defense sector has declined in importance both numerically and relative to other economic sectors. Today the weapons industry is less than one percent of Japanese industry,[8] and defense spending does not grow unless GNP grows. Therefore, causation must be from GNP growth toward defense spending growth. We shall see that the relationship explained partially by inflationary compensation is also explained by "restrained" policy.

While the absolute amount of defense spending increased, as shown in Table 8-1, government policy limited defense spending to one percent of GNP, and other policy decisions further limited defense spending to .9 percent of GNP and below. Defense expenditures also declined relative to general accounts, as shown in figure 8-3.[9]

FIGURE 8-3: Defense Expenditures



Figure 8-4 vividly shows that defense expenditures have also declined relative to social costs.

FIGURE 8-4: Defense Spending and Social Costs[10]



As Japan has shifted emphasis from growth to social conditions, emphasis on defense has stayed about the same, while emphasis on social programs has increased. One way defense expenditures have risen slightly relative to GNP in the past four years is that government spending has risen considerably relative to GNP as shown in Table 8-1 and Figure 8-3.

In regard to H_2, it may be said that government policy decisions favoring social costs and limiting defense spending have provided what we may tentatively call a "restraint" on defense spending. The rejoinder to this characterization is how could defense spending be "restrained" when real defense spending growth is three to five percent a year?

For one thing, the procurement issue already showed the effect of the "restraint" on procurement. Another way of seeing whether defense spending is really "restrained" is by cross-national comparison. Table 8-2 compares defense spending from 1975 to 1979 for the top twenty defense spenders, recognizing problems in comparison such as variation in size of defense sector and exchange rates. There are also more fundamental problems in the basic consideration of what relative costs really are considering vast differences in personnel costs and foreign aid. Despite these problems, Table 8-2 provides at least a general, if imprecise, comparison.

Various analysts rank Japan from sixth to seventh in armed forces in the world. Perhaps they do not count Saudi Arabia and Iran. Table 8-2 shows Japan to have moved from tenth to ninth place in 1975 in spending and to be entrenched in eighth or ninth place today, consider-

TABLE 8-2: Comparison of Defense Expenditures, Top 20 Spenders[11]

Country	$ Billion-Total					PCT of Government Spending					PCT of GNP				
	75	76	77	78	79	75	76	77	78	79	75	76	77	78	79
1. Soviet Union	124.0	127.0	133.0	148.0	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	12.0	12.0	12.5	12.5	
2. United States	88.9	91.0	100.9	105.1	114.5	23.0	23.8	22.7	23.0	21.5	5.9	5.4	5.2	5.0	
3. China	25.0	32.4	37.0	40.0	46.0	n/a	35.0	40.0	42.0	46.0	n/a	10.0	10.0	10.0	
4. West Germany	16.1	15.2	16.8	21.4	24.4	24.4	23.5	23.5	22.9	22.3	3.6	3.7	3.5	3.4	
5. France	14.0	12.9	11.9	15.2	18.8	20.2	20.6	16.3	17.0	17.5	3.9	3.7	3.2	3.3	
6. Britain	11.1	10.7	11.7	14.1	17.6	11.6	11.0	12.7	10.5	11.5	4.9	5.2	5.0	5.7	
7. Saudi Arabia	6.7	9.0	7.5	13.1	14.2	20.0	29.0	24.0	35.1	29.9	18.0	17.7	13.5	15.0	
8. Iran	8.8	9.5	7.9	9.9	n/a	24.9	28.9	23.5	23.8	n/a	17.4	12.0	10.9	n/a	
9. JAPAN	4.6	5.1	6.1	8.6	10.1	6.6	6.2	5.9	5.5	5.4	.9	.9	.9	.9	
10. Italy	4.7	3.8	5.1	6.2	7.1	9.7	8.6	9.6	8.8	8.2.	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.4	
11. Netherlands	3.0	2.8	3.7	4.3	4.8	11.0	9.8	11.0	9.6	9.1	3.6	3.3	3.6	3.8	
12. East Germany	2.6	2.7	4.0	4.2	4.5	7.9	7.8	8.9	8.9	8.8	5.5	5.7	5.8	5.8	
13. Canada	3.0	3.2	3.6	3.7	3.8	11.9	10.0	8.8	8.8	8.6	2.2	1.8	1.8	1.8	
14. India	2.7	2.8	3.2	3.5	3.7	21.1	19.6	24.8	25.5	26.9	3.0	3.1	3.4	3.3	
15. Belgium	2.0	2.0	2.4	3.1	3.6	11.6	10.2	9.3	9.2	9.2	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.5	
16. Poland	1.8	2.3	3.1	3.3	3.5	7.0	7.4	6.5	7.1	6.1	3.1	3.0	2.8	3.0	
17. Spain	1.4	1.0	2.2	2.4	3.4	14.5	14.9	15.3	13.2	n/a	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.8	
18. Sweden	2.5	2.4	2.8	2.9	3.3	10.5	12.5	8.7	8.5	8.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	
19. South Korea	.9	1.5	2.0	2.6	3.2	29.2	34.6	34.3	36.0	34.4	5.1	6.2	6.5	5.6	
20. Australia	2.5	2.8	2.7	3.0	3.0	8.6	9.4	8.2	8.2	n/a	3.2	3.0	2.9	2.7	

ing the outcome of the Iranian revolution. As mentioned previously, Morley calls this a middle power level, below the major powers--France, West Germany, and Britain--and considerably below the super powers--the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. (with China somewhere in-between). In terms of defense expenditures as a percentage of government spending and as a percentage of GNP, Japan ranks the lowest by far of the top twenty defense spenders. Japan also ranks low in defense spending per capita. While Japan's absolute defense expenditures are "respectable," it is clear that the opportunity cost of defense in Japan is relatively very low, presenting a major economic and social advantage over other nations.

Does this mean Japan's defense spending is "restrained?" Yes, compared to other nations it is in terms of Japan's relative capacity shown by low opportunity cost and relative to the spending of Japan's major threat--the U.S.S.R. Therefore, both the first and second hypotheses are well supported. Considering H_1 and H_2 together, it may reasonably be said the GNP growth and government policy limits cause restrained growth of defense spending which may be undermined by inflation, especially when it is out of control as in 1973-75.

To examine H_3, defense spending for the major powers and Japan is projected into the 1980's based on average growth over the past five years. While this is a rough forecast and does not consider possible economic fluctuations, there is no reason to expect these growth rates to change markedly, barring a major international crisis or an economic recession in one of the countries. Figure 8-5 shows the forecasted trends.

FIGURE 8-5: Defense Spending Forecasted for the 1980's for Selected Nations[12]



Based on the past five years defense growth then, trends for the major powers and the middle power, Japan will be similar, although according to this chart Japan may lose a little ground. Considering that Japan's real GNP growth is expected to be about 5-1/2 to seven percent in the 1980's and the world average about 5-1/2 percent,[13] perhaps no ground will be lost. Therefore, under present policy restraints, there is no reason to expect economic growth to move Japan to an increased defense posture, and H_3 is not supported.

When one considers the level of spending required to enable Japan to move to an increased defense posture, the level varies from two to three percent of GNP depending on which analyst is speaking. Using a forecast similar to figure 8-4, under present real GNP growth trends in Japan and barring a change in trends for the major powers, at two percent of GNP Japan can move up to the level of France and Britain by about 1987, although West Germany would not be reached until around the end of the century, if then. Assuming steady GNP growth, at three percent of GNP, Japan can catch France and Britain by 1984 and Germany by just after the end of the decade. Thus, two to three percent of GNP at present growth rates is not a bad estimate for moving to an "improved" posture, although to assure "major power" status or an "improved" defense posture during the decade, three percent of GNP is probably more accurate.

While a detailed analysis of spending power at this level will not be done, it does appear that Japan would move to an "improved" defense posture with this kind of spending effort. Since France, Britain and West Germany all spend between three and 5.7 percent of GNP on defense

annually, it is evident that Japan could do this, albeit the opportunity cost of an increase would be at the expense of social programs and to a lesser degree, economic growth, not to mention other internal and external factors. Such a policy change might also increase inflation as a result of increased government spending. Certainly, a sudden shift would be inflationary, and this would further slow any decision to move to increased spending.

Conclusion

Returning to the proposition, it may be said that economic growth is unlikely to lead Japan to an "improved" defense posture in the 1980's, because of restraints on spending and the potential for periodic inflationary loss. If restraints were to be lifted, economic growth and an increase of defense spending to about three percent of GNP annually would probably lead Japan to an "improved" defense posture in the mid-to-late 1980's. Recognizing that under present policy trends, this is very unlikely, Chapter 9 will examine some issues concerning the likelihood of policy changes.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ENDNOTES

[1] Morley, J.W., Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970's, 1972, pp. 9-15. Morley defines major powers as the PRC, France, West Germany and Britain which spent $5-7 billion each on defense in the late 1960's. Based on that figure, Japan could have spent two percent of GNP to reach them in the 1970's.

[2] Several sources are used to verify dates. Variations in GNP figures do exist; however, they are not significant. Sources: Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1978; JDA, Defense of Japan, 1978; JDA, Defense of Japan, 1977; ISS, The Military Balance: 1977-78, 1978-79, 1979-80; Oriental Economist: Japan Economic Yearbook, 1978-79.

[3] JDA, Defense of Japan, 1978, p. 210.

[4] Inflation figures confirmed by International Financial Statistics, IMF, Oct. 1979 and Jan-Mar 75.

[5] Oriental Economist, Japan Economic Yearbook, 1978-79, pp. 77-79.

[6] JDA, Defense of Japan, 1976 and 1978.

[7] JDA, op. cit., 1978; JPRS 73849, 19 Jul, 79 KYOOD, June 28 Tokyo; JPE Avn Report Weekly, 3 Jun. 79, p. 4.

[8] Buck, J.H. (ed). The Modern Japanese Military System, 1975, pp. 129, 145 (note 41).

[9] Table 8-1 and JDA, Defense of Japan, 1977 (Special pamphlet).

[10] JDA, op. cit., 1978, p. 208.

[11] ISS, The Military Balance, 1977-78, 1979-80 (comparative tables).

[12] Ibid.

[13] Forecast from White Papers of Japan 1974-75, p. 176. an EPA estimate. Other sources confirm this; e.g., Banks, A.S. (ed). Political Handbook of the World, 1979, p. 247.

CHAPTER NINE

PROSPECTS FOR POLICY CHANGES

It has been established that under present policy Japan will most likely continue at a "realistic" defense posture, making gradual qualitative improvements. What are the prospects for a policy change? Chapter 10 examines the nuclear side of this question, while this chapter continues to focus on the conventional posture. There are numerous factors which might contribute to a policy change in a climate of economic growth and social adjustment. After all, no one denies that economic growth has given Japan the potential to move to an increased posture, as was shown in Chapter 8. It is quite possible to consider a whole host of variables. Instead, we shall focus on the general issues which research indicates to be the most viable.

The impact of the threat, national attitudes, defense policy, and economic growth have already been assessed. The results of these analyses as well as the historical survey and consideration of elements of national security are prerequisites for studying these issues, and frequent reference to previous chapters is made. Recognizing this, three issues are selected.

(1) What will be the impact of economic vulnerability and uncertainty about regional and world stability, considering strained relations with the U.S.S.R.?

(2) How will Japanese policy be influenced by bilateral problems with the U.S.?

(3) How will internal political changes influence policy?

Economic Vulnerability, International Instability, and Strained Relations with the U.S.S.R.

Beginning with the first issue, this is in a sense the root of the Japanese problem: deciding how to deal with the perculiar combination of economic strength and economic vulnerability. The lesson of history is that nations will use their economic strength to develop a military means of protecting it. Yet Japan's unique history casts considerable doubt on the application of historical generalizations, and in the modern age, a nation is by no means limited to adopting historical patterns.

In Chapter 3, it was shown that Japan is a vulnerable economic giant. While the thesis of emerging political activity was also developed, Japan's international voice is limited, particularly in a crisis, by her inability to use force to back up foreign policy or protect her interests. This becomes of concern when the growing Soviet threat, discussed in Chapter 5, is considered. The Japanese have attempted to deal with resource vulnerability by reducing dependence on the Middle East, stockpiling fuel and diversification, with limited improvement. Yet the problem of the potential Soviet threat to sea lanes remains. It is a problem which has caused some industry leaders and many analysts such as Brzezinski, Wu and Brown to envision Japan developing a major naval force.[1]

The Japanese have the shipbuilding capability to build a "blue water" navy. In fact, the Japanese shipbuilding industry is the largest in the world.[2] From one military viewpoint, however, they are unlikely

to use it to build large naval force. An interview with the U.S. Navy and the Japanese SDF liaison officers to the Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, indicates three reasons for this. First, building a carrier force would take a long time--seven years to produce the first carrier. Second, carriers consume considerable fuel--about 12,000 gallons a day--precisely the shortage they would attempt to redress. Finally, it would be very difficult to protect shipping worldwide, and the costs would be enormous.[3]

External political conditions also serve to retard military growth. While the Chinese have recognized and encouraged Japanese self-defense strength, not one of Japan's neighbors appears to favor Japanese offensive strength. Chapter 3 showed the favorable trend in mood among Southeast Asian nations toward the Japanese between the 1973 and the 1977 Japanese Prime Minister tours of ASEAN. While a more receptive mood exists now, no one doubts that underlying fears of Japan also exist, a historical legacy of Japanese imperialism leading to the Pacific War. The development of a major naval force could easily undermine regional stability by leading to an arms race. This would probably cause a deterioration of relations which have aided economic growth. Thus, Japan could destroy a cornerstone of the economic element of national security by focusing on the military element. Considering these points, it is unlikely that Japan would change to a policy favoring an "independent" naval defense posture. Yet, Japan could conceivably move to an "improved" defense posture without creating regional problems.

But there are other reasons which preclude a policy change, even

to an "improved" posture. As shown in Chapters 3, 5, and 6 there is no consensus for strengthening the defense posture. The press and opposition parties would fight it violently, and the weakened LDP would be unlikely to risk a radical move which might unify the opposition. Furthermore, decision making practices and the amae political culture are more likely to cause slow, gradual changes, and major changes would be needed to move to the "improved" posture.

Conditions of economic vulnerability, economic growth and a Soviet threat have existed throughout the 1970's, as has the drawdown of U.S. forces. Although they may have contributed to a consensus on the adequacy of the present defense posture, they have not yet caused a changing consensus for strengthening the defense posture. It remains to be seen what the reaction will be to Soviet intransigence on bilateral issues. Yet many of these issues are really a continuation of actions which have taken place throughout the 1970's, and some date to the early postwar period. No doubt many Japanese will be frustrated, but they will most likely continue to try to make diplomacy work anyway.

As the discussion has shown, it is very unlikely for Japan to respond to economic vulnerability and uncertainty about world and regional stability with a policy change toward an "improved" defense posture. In the case of a direct threat to vital Japanese interests, consensus could change. While this is a highly speculative circumstance, it is evident that Japan, under a major crisis, may be expected to act in her own self interest. Yet even then, Japan may try to compromise and negotiate rather than move to an increased defense posture. However, should the threat persist, the new defense policy

discussed in Chapter 6 provides the mechanism for strengthening defenses, and this is an indication of Japanese determination to do whatever is necessary to assure her survival.

Bilateral Problems with the U.S.

As this paper has noted, there have been problems with the treaty in the past. Many authors recognized the impact of the Nixon shocks in the early 1970's on the Japanese. While he and Kissinger paid rhetorical homage to the alliance, they both made personal and private statements which raised doubts about their attitude towards the Japanese, causing anti-Americanism to swell.[4] Muraoka described the initial result of the U.S.-China initiative when he said that Japan felt undermined and deflated by the U.S. failure to consult them. Their security precepts and national pride had been severely shaken at a time of rising national consciousness.[5]

As introduced in Chapter 1, to complicate the problem, the Americans, since Dulles, have pushed the Japanese to share a larger part of the defense burden. This was a main point of the Nixon Doctrine. However, because of the relatively low defense expenditures by the Japanese, there were charges by the U.S. of a Japanese "free ride." As a partial result of the Nixon Doctrine and pushing from Laird, the Japanese responded with the Fourth Five-Year Defense Plan, designed to cause Japan to do more for her own self defense. As has been shown, the SDF improved but still remained at the same basic defense posture.[6] The Japanese leadership must have felt a great conflict between internal and external pressures on rearmament.

As mentioned in Chapters 3 and 6, the Japanese were extremely alarmed over the U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea and other matters which indicated a low priority by the U.S. for East Asia.[7] The 1½ wars policy has been cited by JDA analysts as indicative of this low regard.[8] Furthermore, a comparison of U.S. Navy commitments clearly shows higher priority to the Atlantic.[9] The present increased pre-positioning of U.S. tanks in Europe and the European theme in many U.S. Army field manuals emphasize this Europe-first posture.

The major treaty problems may be summed up as follows:

(1) The Japanese have been treated as an unequal partner in the past.

(2) The U.S. has pushed the Japanese to share more security responsibilities, and this has conflicted with internal pressures.

(3) Potential threats have been identified by Japanese analysts who are concerned over the U.S. ability or will to respond to the relatively lower priority theater.

Despite these problems and other lesser ones, it is evident that both countries are becoming more sensitive to the other's interests, and sound diplomacy is shoring up treaty problems. While the Nixon shocks may be blamed for creating tension, the PRC-U.S. reapproachment, reassurance to the Japanese during the Ford administration and the Carter recognition of PRC have done much to contribute to regional stability. The U.S. has made it plain that peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue is imperative, and both sides are looking at issues much more calmly than in the early part of this decade.

U.S. policy in Korea has also shown increasing sensitivity to the Japanese, who emphasize the importance of Korea to their national

security. Stability in Korea is one of the five assumptions for the present Japanese defense plan, discussed in Chapter 6. The Carter administration has recognized Japanese concern over Korea and has made numerous reassuring moves. In a joint communique issued on 28 March 1977, Carter and Fukuda "...noted the continued importance of peace and stability of Japan and East Asia...;" and, "in connection with the intended withdrawal of the United States ground forces in the Republic of Korea, the President stated that the United States remains committed to the defense of the Republic of Korea." More recently, the withdrawal has been delayed, and U.S. units are being strengthened in light of an intelligence upgrading of North Korean forces. Vance and Brzezinski have also both noted the goal of stability in East Asia and the importance of a strong U.S. presence, while Brown has reassured Japan that the U.S. will help protect the flow of oil from the Middle East and will insure Korean security.[10]

In the past few years, the U.S. has quit pushing the Japanese to rearm quickly and now seems content with steady, gradual Japanese defense development. In June 1978, Brzezinski said, "for the U.S., alliance with a Japan steadily improving its defense capabilities provides the anchor for our position in East Asia..."[11] This is typical of numerous other statements by various officials. "Pushing" has changed to "polite encouragement," which is infinitely more palatable for Japanese politicians.

A few examples of other efforts made to resolve bilateral issues are provided. The two countries are working together to solve economic problems, notably the U.S. trade deficit with Japan. The Japanese are

contributing to costs of U.S. personnel and bases, and size of U.S. forces in Japan has decreased to a more tolerable number.[12] Continued improvement of relations with the PRC, an initiative of both countries, is a steadying force for U.S.-Japan relations by virture of preempting some Japanese opposition from the left to the U.S. In an example of several bilateral and multilateral actions, the U.S., Japan and 97 other nations have recently worked together in Geneva to resolve world trade issues.[13]

Generally, despite some real and potential problems, the alliance is on fair footing now as reflected in public opinion and softening of political opposition. There are no indications of a possible Japanese "shock." Japan remains concerned about the Soviets and frustrated by Soviet intransigence but still attempts diplomatic solutions. Indeed, as shown in Chapter 5, there is a lack of consensus on a Soviet threat. While U.S. reassurance on Korea helps, the Japanese remain alert to the possibility of conflict there, linking it to Japanese security. Thus, there is concern over several bilateral issues, but as long as U.S. credibility remains, Japan is unlikely to change present defense policy trends.

However, if the conditions for the present defense policy are undermined, and a consensus for a change emerges, then Japan may move to a higher posture. Even then, however, opposition views and decision making procedures are bound to make policy changes gradual, except under the most dire circumstances. The danger for the U.S. is that a changing consensus on defense policy could also accompany a changing consensus on alignment, particularly in regard to potential U.S. policy changes.

Internal Political Changes

First, it is useful to review possible internal political changes. In recent national elections for the House of Representatives called for by PM Ohira, the LDP gained votes but lost its majority because of poor organization and inept choice of issues. In the new lower house, the LDP now has 248 of 511 seats, eight short of majority. However, the LDP claimed 10 of 19 independents, but this still gave Ohira far less than the "stable majority" he desired.[14] Meanwhile the JCP, with a lower total vote than last election, gained 39 seats through sound election strategy.[15] Ohira's faulty strategy angered some LDP factions, particularly since the Ohira faction increased its seats, and this dispute threatened to split the party.[16] While Ohira and the LDP appear to have survived this situation, the slim majority held by the LDP (and its allied independents) and LDP internal strife underscore the continuing weakening trend for the LDP in the 1970's. But, as Scalapino points out, a left government is not in the offing. The left is severely fragmented. A coalition government combining the LDP with centrist parties is the most likely alternative to LDP rule.[17]

Is it possible for a workable coalition government to form? In 1977, the potential for consensus on international issues among several parties was seen in the lack of attacks on LDP foreign policy during the House of Councillors election. Blaker explained what he called an "emerging consensus" of views among several parties by the erosion of LDP power which had caused the ruling party to shun bold decisions, the decline of JSP as the major opposition party, and the increasing fragmentation of politics.[18] In Chapter 3, it was also noted that the Japanese rapprochement with China has a settling effect on regional and

internal politics, despite Soviet antagonism. The Japanese opposition was thrown off balance by the new "alliance."[19] By 1979, even the JSP considered that Ohira's policy would be flexible and endorsed his slogan of "confidence and consensus."[20]

On the proposal of a coalition in the 1980's, the Komeito (CGP) Party now accepts the SDF and desires it to be "equipped with the capability for maintaining minimum territorial integrity." As discussed in Chapter 3, the DSP also accepts the SDF and both parties are more favorably disposed towards the MST than in the past. Perhaps the New Liberal Club is the most likely coalition party, since it advocates preservation of the MST and the existing SDF posture.[21]

What kind of effect would a coalition government have on defense policy? First, in regard to the MST, the likeliest members of a coalition with the LDP accept the MST, although some advocate its gradual abolition. With modern national consensus favoring the MST as discussed in Chapter 7, treaty abolition would be unlikely; that is, even in a coalition government, those advocating gradual abolition would probably be in the minority. Second, in regard to the defense posture, a coalition government representing more "progressive" views would be less likely than the LDP to increase the defense posture. Some might think the coalition would opt for a reduced defense posture toward "unarmed neutrality," but this is also unlikely. There is no consensus in Japan for such a move. Even if there were to be a JSP coalition (an unlikely prospect), the JSP has split on this issue, the JCP opposes it, and a consensus for a move towards "unarmed neutrality" would be very unlikely. However, compared to a growing threat, a static

policy with no improvements would mean a relative reduction.

What about a move toward the right? Generally, the trend of declining influence in the LDP underscores the unlikelihood of this prospect. The inability of LDP right wing candidates to gain votes on a "strengthen defense" platform illustrates slim prospects for political moves in this direction.[22] The weakened position of the LDP will also preempt any drastic policy changes.

Therefore, it may be said that foreseeable political changes are unlikely to cause an "improved" defense posture. The distinct possibility of the loss of power of the LDP could lead to a coalition government of the LDP and one or more centrist or "progressive" parties. While such a government is unlikely to make a marked move towards "unarmed neutrality," the prospects for further restricting defense improvements are increased, and a static policy could erode improvements leading to an overall reduction in relative capability. However, even in a coalition government, changes will probably be slow and deliberate, for "tyranny of the majority" is just as much, if not more, of an anathema for the opposition.

Conclusion

In general then, it may be said there are few prospects for a change in defense policy. This chapter has reviewed three major issues which could influence defense posture, and none of them have demonstrated the likelihood of a change. But the cumulative effect of various factors should also be considered. One unlikely, extreme, but possible scenario involving these issues could be a Soviet threat to sea lanes, regional instability, U.S. inability to address the threat adequately,

deteriorating U.S.-Japanese economic relations and the rise of a coalition government in Japan. In this kind of scenario, one may first expect the Japanese to negotiate, then endure and finally protect, increasing defenses as required.[23] While a coalition of the left might "endure" longer, even that kind of government would eventually protect the nation. However, the danger for the U.S. is that any Japanese government, most particularly a coalition government, may choose to seek a new security arrangement rather than increase defenses.

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

CHAPTER NINE

ENDNOTES

[1] See Brzezinski, Z. The Fragile Blossom, 1971, p. 97; Wu, Y., U.S. Policy and Strategic Interests in the Western Pacific, 1975, p. 51; Brown, L. "American Security Policy in Asia," 1977, pp. 27, 28.

[2] Harris, W. and Levey, J. (ed) The New Columbia Encyclopedia, 1975, p. 1398.

[3] Interviews were conducted with Col. Toshio Tada, GSDF, and Commander Edward Kellogg, USN, in May, 1979 at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

[4] Scalapino, R. Asia and the Road Ahead, 1975, p. 403.

[5] Muraoka, K. Japanese Security and the United States, 1973, pp. 1-4.

[6] Wu, Y., op. cit., 1975, pp. 44-47; Weinstein, F.B. (ed) U.S.-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia, 1978, pp. 74, 75.

[7] Ibid. (Weinstein)

[8] Kennedy, W.V., "The Defense of Japan" SSI, 1979, p. 1; One might also get this impression from reading between the lines in the 1978 Defense of Japan, pp. 16, 17.

[9] For example, according to U.S. Navy documents provided by the U.S. Navy liaison officer at CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, the Atlantic fleet, including the Mediterranean, in May 1979 has seven carriers, two of which were nuclear, with an average commission date of 1965. The Pacific Fleet, with responsibility for the Indian Ocean as well had six carriers, one of which was nuclear, with an average commission date of 1956.

[10] Carter-Fukada Joint Communique, Sept. 1977; Cooley, J. "U.S.: We'll Help Protect Oil Flow to the Far East," Christian Science Monitor, 25 Oct 79, p. 7; Brzezinski "U.S. Role in East Asia," Dept. of State Bulletin, Feb. 79, p. 2.

[11] Brzezinski, "The U.S. and Japan," Dept. of State Bulletin, June 75, p. 2.

[12] JDA Defense of Japan 1978, pp. 144-167.

[13] U.S. News and World Report, 23 Apr 79, p. 43.

[14] Associated Press "japanese Elections a Blow to Ohira" Lawrence Journal World, Oct. 8, 1979, p. 8.

[15] Oka, T. "How Ohira Won Votes But Lost Poll" Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 10, 1979.

[16] Oka, T. "Japan's Creaky Ruling Party Faces Critical Decisions," Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 16, 1979, p. 4.

[17] Scalapino, R., op. cit., 1975, pp. 28, 29.

[18] Blaker, M. "Japan in 1977: An Emerging Consensus," Asian Survey, Jan. 78, pp. 91-95.

[19] Dahlby, T. Far Eastern Economic Review, Nov. 3, 1978, p. 10.

[20] Japan Socialist Review, Jan. 79, p. 3.

[21] JDA, op. cit., 1978, pp. 180-181; Banks, A.S., Political Handbook of the World, 1979, p. 247. Buck, J. (ed), The Modern Japanese Military System, 1975, p. 222.

[22] Martin, B.K., "Japan is Growing More Aware of Weakness," The Sun, 4 Mar 79.

[23] See Scalapino, op. cit., 1975, p. 51; Komni, K. "The Future of Japan in Terms of National Security" Asian Survey, pp. 370-371.

CHAPTER TEN

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The nuclear question for Japan is interrelated to issues concerning conventional defense development and overall U.S. Pacific strategy, which is to maintain a deterrence system including a mixture of conventional and nuclear capability. As we saw in Chapter 5, the situation in the western Pacific for the U.S. and Japan is different from that in Europe, where armies are deployed on the ground along a contiguous land mass.[1] However, the Nixon doctrine expects allies to share an increasing burden and responsibility for the common defense, with the U.S. supplying the nuclear shield and the nation threatened supplying the primary responsibility for manpower (which the Japanese have not done).[2] In 1971, Nixon made occasional mention of a future pentagonal world power arrangement, noting that in five to ten years five great powers--the U.S., Western Europe, U.S.S.R., PRC and Japan--would control the world, and, if they could maintain a multipolar balance, it would be a better world. George Ball observed this to be a complete renunciation of central U.S. strategy since WWII. But Nixon's view of a multipolar world did not develop. The world is increasingly economically multipolar and interdependent. Yet, in terms of strategic nuclear weapons, the world remains bipolar with neither side holding a marked advantage.[3] As the SALT negotiations show, the few other nations having nuclear weapons, including China in the Pacific,

are only of peripheral concern unless the issue is proliferation.

With this overview of the strategic picture in the Pacific in mind, we shall review the nuclear option for Japan. The original proposition considered is to determine whether increased conventional rearmament will cause Japan to adopt a nuclear weapons defense posture. However, the analysis of prospects for conventional rearmament shows an "improved" defense posture to be unlikely, thus undermining the proposition. Even so, there are several variables which might cause acceptance of a nuclear option. First, they will be investigated, and then the general thesis that Japan will not adopt a nuclear weapons course in the 1980's will be developed.

The Argument for a Nuclear Weapons Option

Several analysts have observed what they consider to be an erosion of the "nuclear allergy." It includes a willingness in the late 1960's to discuss nuclear issues, even among political figures.[4] During this period, informal polls of Japanese graduate students by Kahn showed the overwhelming majority felt Japan would acquire nuclear weapons. Kahn believed this did not indicate a firm antinuclear commitment by the majority of the population.[5] In 1975, Wu believed the "nuclear allergy" had to be considered, although he saw a change in attitude typified by the 1970 White Paper identifying "defensive" nuclear weapons as possibly permissible, for which there was no violent protest. Wu also cited opinion polls which showed a sizeable number of people (about one-third) who thought Japan would eventually go nuclear, even though most opposed nuclear weapons. Additionally, a large delay in ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) suggested the growing possi-

bility of a nuclear option.[6]

The nuclear threat differs from the conventional threat in its size, potential and employability. Perceptions of a U.S.S.R. strategic edge over the U.S. exist; however, in this case the Defense Agency (JDA) does not seem to see as great a threat. Instead, they observe the strategic balance to be effective, although the JDA does recognize "the perception that the Soviet Union appears to be in an advantageous position..."[7] In the case of the nuclear threat, perhaps the society at large is a little more uneasy than the JDA, the opposite relationship than they have concerning the conventional threat. Article 9, the three non-nuclear principles, and continuing opposition to the MST reflect both the rejection of a nuclear weapons policy and a fear of being drawn into a nuclear war. The latter fear of being involved in a nuclear exchange is the idea behind "unarmed neutrality," the JSP platform which has ebbed in favor, perhaps due to its impracticality.

As mentioned in previous chapters, in case of a direct, clear threat to vital interests, the Japanese are likely to act ultimately to protect those interests. If the threat were nuclear, the Japanese would have to either rely on the U.S. or negotiate. Some think even a small nuclear capability would assist that negotiating position or, for that matter, any negotiating position.[8] Once the threat presented itself, it would be too late to develop the capability. Therefore, some argue for a small nuclear capability to enhance negotiating ability.

Some analysts say that U.S. credibility is low, noting the gradual decline in U.S. ability and will to respond. Low U.S. credibility increases Japanese feelings of isolation and vulnerability, particularly

when there is regional tension or conflict among democratic trading partners.[9] Japan could go nuclear to compensate, to gain prestige commensurate with economic stature.[10] Indeed, consciousness of hierarchial status is very marked in Japan, and she could desire to become among the top nations internationally. A strong undercurrent of resistence to formally committing Japan to a second class status in the NPT debate was noted by Clough, an analyst otherwise disposed to argue that Japan would not go nuclear.[11]

A final argument reviewed here is that, dispite some shortfalls, the Japanese have the technology and economic capability to go nuclear. This argument is stressed by the proponents of militarism and a growing military-industrial complex discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 3 indicates that Japan has the industrial base and technology. Even many analysts who argue against the nuclear option such as Clough, Emmerson and Humphreys, Clapp, Endicott, Bullard, Muraoka and Halperin, concede nuclear potential. While there are some technological shortfalls, Franklin Weinstein observes Japanese nuclear potential is a force to be carefully considered.[12]

To sum up the arguments for Japan going nuclear, they are based on the observation of a changing consensus toward favoring nuclear weapons, perceptions of a threat in regard to Japanese vulnerability, the decline of U.S. power and credibility, possibilities for international tension (and conflict among democratic nations), and Japanese potential to go nuclear. Considering these arguments, the stronger rationale for why Japan will <u>not</u> go nuclear shall now be discussed.

The Argument Against Nuclear Weapons

There is no consensus in favor of nuclear weapons. Inhibitions for exploring this issue have broken down, and there is a certain fatalistic attitude among some Japanese about nuclear inevitability, but there is still majority opposition to acquiring even "defensive" nuclear weapons, and a strong consensus opposes policy changes which would lead to nuclear capability on the order of China or Britain; however, as Endicott observes, there are some leaders who are "reluctant to close the door completely to Japan's nuclear option." In the early 1970's, public and political opinion remained opposed to a nuclear weapons program, as shown in Tables 10-1 and 10-2.[13]

Table 10-1: Public Reaction to Nuclear Armament
Question: "Do You Desire Nuclear Arms?"

Response	Percent
Highly desirable	2.5
Rather desirable	5.2
Either way	12.1
Rather undesirable	22.3
Extremely undesirable	45.3
Do not know	12.6

Table 10-2: Reaction to Nuclear Armament by Political Parties
Question: "Should Japan Have Nuclear Arms?"
(percent)

Reaction	Total	LDP	JSP	Komeito	DSP	JCP	None
Should arm itself with nuclear armament immediately	2	3	2	4	4	1	1
Should arm itself with nuclear armament in the near future	11	16	10	11	6	3	8
Should do so sometime or other	22	31	19	13	28	12	17
Should absolutely not arm itself with nuclear weapons	58	45	65	68	61	80	67
Do not know	7	5	4	4	1	4	7

A review of other opinion polls by numerous analysts in the mid to late 1970's shows continuing opposition similar to these figures to nuclear weapons and no emerging consensus; however, a mild erosion of the "nuclear allergy" is noted.[14]

In 1975, Mendel observed that the left had been focusing on the "fear of remilitarization" for years, and for this reason many adherents reflect future worry about the inevitablity of nuclear weapons. Generally, surveys show that some Japanese who oppose nuclear weapons join the few who advocate them to create a group which predicts them.[15] There is a distinct difference between a fatalistic prediction and an "emerging consensus."

Opposition is particularly strong against revision of Article 9 of the Constitution, the antiwar clause.[16] This reflects opposition against offensive capability which most nuclear weapons would have, the

definition of a defensive nuclear weapon being elusive in all cases beyond a fixed charge. By interpretation, "small, defensive" nuclear weapons would be constitutionally permissible; however, they too would go against formal, written non-nuclear policy. Most nuclear weapons used "defensively" on or nearby Japan would present major problems for the Japanese anyway, because of population density and weapons effects.[17]

Reflecting public opinion, opposition parties, the press and some other interest groups would fight any movement toward a nuclear policy vigorously. A constitutional amendment to allow offensive weapons would face a two-thirds Diet vote. Even in the improbability that the LDP had that kind of majority and reached party consensus on the change, they would still be unlikely to exercise "tryanny of the majority" (Chapter 3) unless there was a fundamental threat or change in the Asian security environment.

Citing the delay in NPT ratification as an indication of emerging nuclear consensus is an incorrect analysis. Granted, part of the delay was caused by the desire to carefully and independently arrive at a policy. Yet another part of the delay was caused by opposition to the LDP linking ratification to strengthening the MST arrangement with the U.S. In 1976, all parties except the Communists voted to ratify the treaty. Thus, Japanese delay over ratification did not indicate a changing political consensus to go nuclear. Instead, in line with Japan's emerging political role discussed in Chapter 3, the Japanese delay on ratification indicated emerging independence and delays for reasons related to the antinuclear consensus as well.[18]

While inhibitions are breaking down, only a substantial decline in confidence in the U.S. or a major realignment of ties coupled with a direct threat to vital interests, could forge a consensus on nuclear weapons. Some of the opposition parties are in a particular quandry. If the MST is dissolved as some still advocate, they must face an increased possibility of nuclear weapons, and the two issues are largely contradictory. Essentially, there is consensus on present nuclear bipolarity shown in support for the MST.

There are numerous other reasons why Japan will not go nuclear, a few of which will be discussed. Any dent in U.S. credibility from the Vietnam demise and the Korean withdrawal has been at least addressed politically, and, despite Soviet growth, U.S. forces remain supreme in the Pacific as discussed in previous chapters. The SALT II debate indicates a "rough equivalence" in strategic weapons between the superpowers. The likelihood of a U.S. response may be lower than it was two decades ago, but credibility remains because of the idea of "uncertainty." The Soviets are "uncertain" whether the U.S. would respond at least with a limited attack, which would attempt to avoid retaliation. Furthermore, the U.S. nuclear umbrella is worldwide.[19] A failure in Japan would undermine U.S. credibility elsewhere. Ultimately, this would have to compromise vital interests of the U.S. Finally, despite its shortfalls, the U.S. umbrella is more credible than a Japanese umbrella could be for many years.[20]

Development of a nuclear capability would work against the economic and foreign policy interests of Japan. A massive, expensive effort over at least ten years, a lengthy period of vulnerability, would be

required.[21] Cost estimates range from $6.6 billion (1972 prices) for a modest SLBM force[22] to $11.1 billion (1971 prices) for a force such as the French have.[23] In 1982 prices, those costs would roughly double based on a 70 percent increase in consumer prices from 1972 to 1979.[24] In the 1980's, the cost would range between $13 billion and 22 billion, as much as double the present budget, considering projected growth. While this could potentially be absorbed, .. would be at the opportunity cost of economic and social programs.

Similar to the argument against an independent defense posture in Chapter 9, relations with trading partners would be strained by adoption of a nuclear posture. Most would oppose a Japanese nuclear capability.[25] Charges of militarism, which abated in the 1970's, would again abound. NPT efforts worldwide and in East Asia would be undermined. Ultimately, the course designed to protect Japanese interests would threaten them. Among other reasons, because of the unsettling effect, enormous Japanese potential, and memories of WWII, none of the superpowers would favor such a move.[26] In an increasingly interdependent world in which the Japanese are very tuned-in to foreign opinion, a major policy decision such as this would necessarily consider foreign relations. It is unlikely Japan would ignore the outside world.[27]

Japan faces demographic and geographic disadvantages which make the adoption of nuclear weapons unlikely. The lack of land mass, crowded population centers and a concentration of industiral targets leave Japan with the difficult task of securing a second strike capability. A submarine launched system could give Japan a limited

second strike capability;[28] however, clearly there would be logistical and various other problems with deploying submarines in the Arctic and Indian Oceans. If Japan were to go to a Trident type long range system, costs would be even greater than previous estimates--perhaps several times as large. Generally, when compared to the Soviet Union or the PRC, Japan is at a tremendous disadvantage in terms of her small land mass and concentrated population.[29] The costs for overcoming this disadvantage would be great and might not even lead to an improved position.

Finally, Japan is unlikely to move to a nuclear posture without first moving to at least an "improved" and probably and "independent" conventional defense posture. If these efforts were undertaken simultaneously, the economic and social costs would be staggering. Opposition would be intense, particularly considering present emphasis on social goals in the 1980's, political factors and activity of the press. Only a clear threat to vi·al Japanese interests could overcome such obstacles. Even then, Japan might choose to negotiate rather than to risk postwar accomplishments. The finding of previous chapters that Japan will probably not move to an "improved" conventional posture in the 1980's makes a nuclear course even more remote.

Conclusion

The advantages of prestige, self reliance, self protection and the Japanese potential for going nuclear are greatly outweighed by the disadvantages of such a course. Public and political opposition would be intense. Indeed, this could be an issue to unite opposition parties. The amae political culture would have to be ignored. Japan would risk

postwar gains while undermining social and economic development at home and abroad. It would be difficult to develop a worthwhile capability. Internationally, Japan would stand to lose the gains of postwar diplomacy. It would be illogical to go nuclear without further building up conventional capability, and neither prospect is likely. Even when faced with a direct threat to vital interests, Japan has other courses to follow, although chances of going nuclear would increase under such circumstances. Considering the current strategic balance and the spirit of detente, there is clearly little chance that Japan will adopt a nuclear weapons posture in the 1980's.

CHAPTER TEN

ENDNOTES

[1] Weinstein, F.B. U.S.-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia, 1978, p. 119.

[2] Wu, Yuan-Li. U.S. Policy and Strategic Interests in the Western Pacific, 1975, pp. 7, 8.

[3] Clapp and Halperin, U.S.-Japanese Relations in the 1970's, 1974, pp. 183-188.

[4] Former PM Kishi, for example: Clough, R. East Asia and U.S. Security, 1975, p. 5. Kishi is an exception. He is very conservative on defense.

[5] Kahn, H. The Emerging Japanese Superstate, 1970, pp. 12, 13, 165.

[6] Wu, op. cit., 1975, pp. 107-110; Clough, op. cit., 1975, p. 59.

[7] JDA, Defense of Japan 1978, pp. 19, 20.

[8] Wu, op. cit., 1975, p. 108.

[9] Ibid; Emmerson and Humphries, Will Japan Rearm, 1973, pp. 86-88; Austin, L. Japan, The Paradox of Progress, 1976, pp. 113-115; Gordon, B.K. "Loose Canon on a Rolling Deck..." Orbis; Winter 1979, pp. 965-995.

[10] Emmerson and Humphries, op. cit., 1973, pp. 86-88.

[11] Clough, R., op. cit., 1978, p. 57.

[12] Weinstein, F.B., op. cit., 1978, p. 27.

[13] Endicott, J.E., Japan's Nuclear Option..., 1975, pp. 97, 99, 101.

[14] For examplese, see Emmerson and Humphries, op. cit., 1973, p. 157; Buck, J. (ed) The Modern Japanese Military System, 1975, p. 167; Scalapino, R. Asia and the Road Ahead, 1975, pp. 39-40; Weinstein, F. op. cit., 1978, pp. 111-112.

[15] Buck, J., op. cit., 1975, p. 167.

[16] Curran, J.S. "The U.S. and Japan: Asian Roles..." SSI, 1978, p. 11.

[17] Muraoka, K. Japanese Security and the U.S., 1973, pp. 26-27.

[18] Weinstein, F.B. (ed) op. cit., 1978, pp. 109-112.

[19] Ibid., pp. 96-105.

[20] Tsutomu, K. The Silent Power, 1976 (trans.) p. 206.

[21] Weinstein, F.B. (ed), op. cit., 1978, pp. 96-105.

[22] Emmerson and Humphries, op. cit., 1973.

[23] Endicott, op. cit., 1975, p. 231; Maraoka, op. cit., 1973, p. 26.

[24] International Monetary Fund Statistics, 1979.

[25] Emmerson and Humphries, op. cit., 1973, pp. 88-92.

[26] Dougherty, J.E., Orbis Fall 75, p. 947.

[27] Emmerson, J.K., Arms Yen and Power, 1971, p. 360.

[28] Scalapino, R., op. cit., 1975, pp. 39, 40.

[29] Muraoka, op. cit., 1973, p. 24.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The Martin Weinstein Proposition

In 1971, Martin Weinstein advanced an interesting proposition. He argued that, while the Japanese had built up a stronger defense force than had existed in 1954, the basic role of the SDF was the same in 1968 as it had been in 1954; that it continued to reflect the government's same estimate of internal and external security threats. In 1966, the National Defense Council identified three threats to Japan: Soviet nuclear (and Chinese nuclear potential), Soviet conventional and internal revolution (a likely product of war in Korea). For the nuclear threat, Japan would rely on the U.S. deterrent. For the internal threat, Japan would rely on the police and the GSDF. For the conventional threat, Japanese forces would prevent infiltration and stop a small "probing" attack; the ASDF would play a major role in air defense (providing fuel and ammunition supply is available); and the MSDF would protect Japanese shipping in territorial and coastal waters, and to a limited extent in peripheral seas. In the event of a large scale attack, Japan would rely on the U.S. security guarantee or guerrilla war. In summary, Japanese planners considered the SDF capable of internal security, preventing infiltration, repelling probes, playing an important role in air defense and a minor role in protecting shipping. But primary defense responsibility for a major attack would rest on U.S. shoulders. In 1975, Martin Weinstein again

advanced the argument that basic policy had not changed noting that Japan still did not have primary responsibility for defense; however, the SDF did perform the useful function of raising the threshold of attack by making it more costly for the attacker and, thereby, helping to assure a U.S. response. In other words, in his view capability increased, but the basic defense posture remained unchanged.[1]

Conclusions

Considering arguments like Weinstein's and opposing arguments, threats to Japan are analyzed in Chapter 5. In terms of an economic threat, there does not appear to be much a military solution could do, except guard the sea lanes. Indeed, increasing defenses may undermine favorable economic conditions. The Soviet Union poses the primary external threat to which military force may be addressed, and the Korea situation offers an indirect external threat as well. While the Soviets have the power to overwhelm Japan, they also face major obstacles with mounting an invasion, the buildup for which would probably be detected. Their ground forces are not deployed in such a way as to threaten Japan. Instead they are directed inward on the continent towards the Chinese. Furthermore, the total security of the Soviet Union would be severely weakened by committing resources and military strength to such an act. But Japanese perceptions of this portential threat should not be discounted.

Korean instability is the most likely source of unrest in the region, and this, along with the Soviet naval buildup and the possibility (though slim) of a Peking-Moscow rapprochement, causes some Japanese defense analysts to perceive a threat in the weakening of

U.S. regional and worldwide strength. The external threat is the same as that noted by M. Weinstein in 1966, although it differs in intensity because of the shifting U.S.-Soviet balance. It is linked to the same internal threat, primarily from the left; however, the left is now politically co-opted and, therefore, more likely to stay within the system, particularly considering Japanese nationalism and basic historical animosity towards the U.S.S.R.

While there are several threats to Japan, it is not surprising that there is a lack of consensus on a specific threat. There are possibilities but no probability. However, even though Japanese diplomats are trying to achieve productive relations with the Soviets, basic Soviet intransigence over bilateral issues and Japanese nationalism could combine to produce consensus on a threat. Presently, it is unclear whether this will happen.

Considering the discussion of the threat, the analysis in Chapter 6 does not support the proposition that the defense buildup program is leading Japan to an "improved" defense posture. Instead a modest increase in capability is reducing shortfalls at the "realistic" defense level, and deficiencies still exist. Under present policy Japan will most likely remain at this "realistic" level in the 1980's. However, the National Defense Plan Outline contains a provision for expanding capabilities when threatened, and this shows determination to strengthen defenses, if there is a clear threat which cannot be countered diplomatically.

Related to observable defense development are less tangible attitudes and beliefs. Chapter 3-Social-Psychological describes the general

character of modern Japanese, and Chapter 7 establishes that growing nationism is not causing militarism to revive. Instead, the corollary, that the nature of modern Japanese nationalism inhibits militarism, is quite likely. Since the inception of the SDF, defense capabilities have gradually risen while there has been no resurgence of militarism. Therefore, future defense improvements are unlikely to kindle or to be accompanied by a growth of militaristic tendencies. The Japanese SDF, which bears little relation to the old Imperial forces, is most likely to retain the same professional character it has now, in the 1980's.

There is a problem, however, concerning the inability of the military to exert influence, a result of excessive measures taken to prevent militarism. This could cause a frustrated reaction by military leaders, if they are unable to prevent threats to vital Japanese interests by virtue of their low influence and status. In a less extreme example, resentment could develop within the military over the years. Or, the steadying impact of military influence in some situations could be lost. Clearly, the Japanese political leadership needs to determine how to allow the proper level of military influence, while retaining civilian control.

Turning to the relationship between economic growth and defense spending, Chapter 8 shows that GNP growth and policy limits cause restrained growth of defense spending, sometimes called the government's tight money policy. It would be useful, but beyond the scope of this paper, to further investigate this proposition to analyze the precise defense buying power of spending increases. Instead, a less precise but more succint comparison is made among countries and by examining

procurement shortfalls to show that Japan is unlikely to move to an "improved" defense posture in the 1980's without a major policy change. Indeed, spending restraints inhibit improvements at the "realistic" level. Particularly important is the impact of inflation which has served to undermine research and development, and procurement. The potential for inflation, which could result from sudden or large increases in government spending, will also limit future policy changes. Finally, shifting national priorities from economic growth to social development will cause more gradual economic growth in the 1980's, and this will tend to keep future defense spending increases modest.

In Chapter 9, three major issues which might lead to a policy change on defense are examined. They involve important questions for the Japanese including economic vulnerability, uncertainty about regional and world stability, bilateral problems with the U.S., and plausible internal political changes. The analysis shows that none point to a likely policy shift in the 1980's. One consistent theme of these issues and of previous chapters is how would Japan respond to a direct threat? In the earlier postwar period, and on into the 1960's some analysts cited opinion polls to show the Japanese might not defend the nation. Conscious of this, the JDA still feels the need to place a poll in the Defense of Japan 1978 showing 86 percent of respondants "strongly or averagely willing to defend the nation. Only six percent claimed to feel weak will."[2] While there are some questions with how people would resist an attack, the national will is there. The historical analysis in Chapter 1 reinforces this. When faced with a direct threat to vital interests, the Japanese may be expected to pull together as they

have for a millenium. The new policy option for increasing defenses is indicative of this kind of underlying determination. In short, a threat which cannot be countered diplomatically, will almost assuredly cause an increase in defense posture. Yet, considering that such a threat is improbable, the Japanese are unlikely to move to an "improved" defense posture in the 1980's The analysis of the three issues in Chapter 9 reinforces this conclusion.

In Chapter 10, the nuclear weapons option is examined. Since an "improved" conventional defense posture is unlikely, the general issue is examined instead of the proposition. Indeed, the unlikelihood of improving the conventional posture makes a nuclear option even less plausible. An implicit assumption of the analysis is that the "rough equivalence" between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. will continue. There are some advantages to going nuclear, and Japan does have the potential; however, the major disadvantages overwhelm the few advantages showing the slim chance of adopting nuclear weapons. Even if Japan does choose to move to an "improved" or "independent" defense posture, the cost, strategic problems, public reaction, geographical disadvantages and probable international backlash strongly discourage the nuclear weapons option.

The forecast for Japan for the 1980's is a continued gradual improvement of defense capability within the same "realistic" defense posture described by Martin Weinstein in the 1960's, but with a greater deterrent value. Japan is unlikely to move to an "improved" defense posture and, therefore, even more unlikely to move to an "independent" posture or accept a regional security role. A direct threat to vital

interests could change this; however, such a threat is unlikely and, if presented, may be solvable diplomatically. As for a nuclear weapons option, the Japanese will almost assuredly not risk such a course.

What are the key implications for U.S. policy?

It is essential to recognize that Japan's defense buildup is similar to the Japanese custom of tatemae and honne: saying one thing and meaning another.[3] On one hand, Japan may correctly announce that it is building up its defense capability to those who desire such an effort, the U.S. government for one. On the other hand, Japan may also correctly announce that defense policy is restrained, when that pronouncement is beneficial, say to the opposition or in an international forum. Perhaps, in this case, it is more correct to call this saying two things which mean the same thing. The reality is that Japan is unlikely to move to an "improved" defense posture or assist U.S. regional defense capability in the next decade, and the U.S. should not plan on any such effort. Instead the U.S. should work on improving the security relationships while trying to find a way for Japan to increase its contribution.

Japanese perceptions are crucial to the improvement of the mutual security relationship. The U.S. must strive to show an even greater awareness of Japanese sensitivity to a perceived low priority for Asia vis-a-vis Europe. It should not be difficult to demonstrate increased interest in many ways, but as long as the '1-1/2 wars' policy remains in effect the obvious bias will be there, and Asia will be perceived to have low priority. Therefore, it is time to seriously question the efficacy of this policy, particularly its impact on Japanese perceptions.

Connected to this is the growing Soviet threat and the potential shift in the naval balance. In regard to this threat, Japanese political activity and national attitudes should be watched for a "changing consensus." However, even if a domestic consensus develops, a minority in the amae political culture could hamper a major policy shift. The danger for the U.S. is that the consensus may change in the direction of changing alignment, if the Japanese perceive a low U.S. regard for Japan, low U.S. power, or the need to reach an accommodation with the U.S.S.R. Almost as dangerous would be a shift towards a politically isolated Japan. As shown in Chapter 1, there is certainly ample historical precedence for the swing of the pendulum away from friendly relations with the U.S. Considering the potential threat and concern over American reliability, U.S. policy must continue the recent trend of solidifying and improving relations with Japan.

The continued "low profile" for Japan's defense forces needs to be fully appreciated by U.S. policy makers. Contemplating again the "1-1/2 wars" policy, it reflects not only U.S. reliance on the Chinese to offset the Soviet Union but U.S. reliance on the Japanese to pick up an increased defense role as well. Yet reality is different. Based on this chapter's forecast for Japan's defense policy, the U.S. will continue to shoulder the major defense burden for Japan, the region and Japanese sea lanes world wide. Japan will continue to make a low, "respectable," but imbalanced contribution while practicing tatemae and honne. In the long run, the impact on the U.S. economic element of security cannot be beneficial, while Japan will continue to reap the economic and social opportunity costs. Furthermore, the

balance in the Pacific could shift in Soviet favor while U.S. analysts are deceiving themselves about Japanese defense improvements.

Just as there are few signs the U.S. government is aware of this reality, there are also few signs the Japanese are purposely pursuing a strategy to "use" the U.S. Instead, their policy is a product of many forces, as has been clearly shown in preceeding chapters. Therefore, it is just as clear that any U.S. security or economic "shock" to cause the Japanese to play a larger defense role could have very serious consequences for bilateral relations. Does this mean the U.S. must continue to assume a disproportionate share of the defense burden?

What needs to be decided soon is whether the continued imbalance of defense efforts is acceptable. If it is, then Japan should be encouraged to continue with the present policy. If it is not, there seem to be five options. First, the U.S. could gradually continue the Asian withdrawal, "pushing" the Japanese to accept an increased role. Second, the U.S. could simply demand Japanese compliance and try to use economic leverage to get it. Third, the U.S. could suddenly pull out, announcing it would reinforce but not keep troops in the area. Fourth, the U.S. could sponsor an Asian regional security organization similar to NATO which includes the Chinese. Finally, the U.S. could continue with the status quo, encouraging Japan to play a greater role.

The first option presents a return to "pushing" Japanese leaders similar to U.S. policy in the 1950's and 1960's. Japanese leadership would be placed in a different position which could easily lead to the decrease of the LDP, a riskly course for U.S. policy and one which might produce alienation rather than improved defenses. A generalization

about the second, third and fourth options is that none of them are good. The second and third options risk in varying degrees a collapse of U.S.-Japanese relations which might eventually produce the desired military result, but at a high political and economic cost. The fourth option of regional security is one considered by some western analysts but totally rejected by most regional nations and the Japanese to whom regional security is anathema.[4] Furthermore, close security ties with the Chinese could be dangerous for both the U.S. and Japan, considering the increased possibility of being drawn into a conflict with the U.S.S.R. The fifth option, maintain the status quo and encourage Japan to play a greater role, is the only sound option of this group because productive bilateral relations are maintained. Yet it fails to address the imbalance of defense efforts, since "polite encouragement" is only producing improvements within the "realistic" defense posture. In general, the options which might produce an increased Japanese defense posture present a whole host of nearly inponderable and often dangerous outcomes for U.S. and Japanese security.

But there is one more different kind of option. The U.S. could take a more holistic view of security and encourage Japan to make up a proportionate share of defense costs by contributing in other areas. The precedence for this is already established in the program of sharing defense installation costs, and several analysts have suggested such a course.[5] Why not expand this into other areas such as special economic benefits for the U.S. and real Japanese financial leadership in solving regional and world, economic and social problems? Is this option far fetched? Well, perhaps it is. Japan does face internal

social problems which might suffer a little, and no country has ever attempted such a program. Yet Japan is in a unique position, and there is no pattern or example to follow. The Japanese are presently trying to decide what role to play in a future world order, and they have indicated often the desire to become a new type of nation which does not rely on military strength, a view reinforced by their Constitution and foreign policy. Indeed, the Japanese take a view of security which considers all of the elements discussed in Chapter 3. While Japan continues to stay at the "realistic" defense level, the savings on defense could be invested in other international areas, which in the long run would contribute to the security of both nations. Thus, it would be in the U.S. interest to at least explore and perhaps encourage this kind of symbiosis. Otherwise, the likely prospects for the continuance of the present imbalance and Japan's "realistic" defense posture should be recognized.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

ENDNOTES

[1] Weinstein, M., Japanese Defense Policy, 1947-1968, 1970, pp. 41, 42. Buck (ed) (Weinstein) The Modern Japanese Military System, 1975, pp. 45-48.

[2] JDA, Defense of Japan, 1978, pp. 174-175.

[3] Weinstein, F. (ed), U.S.-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia, 1978, p. 29.

[4] Ike, N. Japan, the New Superstate, 1973, p. 102.

[5] For example, Clough, R., East Asia and U.S. Security, 1975, pp. 115-116.

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